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Abstract
A contingent capital bond (CCB) is a subordinated security that converts to common shares
when a predetermined trigger is breached. The 2008 financial crisis and the Basel III motivate
the issuance of CCBs, aiming to mitigate the too-big-to-fail problem in financial distress and
to resolve financial institutions by bailing in with the firm’s own capital rather than a bailing
out using the taxpayers’ money.
Within the structural modelling framework, we consider the pricing of CCBs with an affine
geometric Brownian motion by assuming that coupon payments have impact on the asset value
dynamics. We extend the capital structure into four tranches including deposits, equity, and
senior and subordinated bonds, and calibrate the model to Canadian banking data. Under
infinite maturity, we derive a closed-form formula to price CCBs. Regulatory suggestions can
be made based on our model in the design of conversion terms in recognition to the creditor-
claim seniority and to ensure that equity investors are not rewarded for poor performance.
Under the finite-maturity case, the term structures of CCBs are investigated by applying Monte
Carlo simulation.
When the conversion price is based on the contemporary market stock price (as it tends
to be in practice), CCB investors may have incentives to short the firm’s stock to depress the
market stock price and earn favourable returns from possible future conversion. Continuing
with the structural model, we allow for a deviation between the stock’s fundamental value and
market value and use it to analyze the CCB investors’ incentives to short. We discuss three
kinds of market-based conversion prices and find that directly using the contemporary market
stock price could tempt manipulations. However, adding a floor to the contemporary market
stock price or using the trailing average instead would curb the manipulation incentives.
Among the issuances of CCBs, one noticeable characteristic is that regulators retain the
right to force the conversion in view of the issuing firm’s solvency prospects and the economic
stability. In an intensity-model based approach, we incorporate regulatory discretion into the
pricing model and therefore manage to quantify the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the cost
of CCBs. Reasonable intervals for conversion terms are also detected under the regulatory trig-
ger. Two categories of intensity functions are considered to distinguish regulators’ behaviours
towards non-systemically important and too-big-to-fail financial institutions. In general, the
CCBs issued by too-big-to-fail financial institutions are more expensive than those issued by
non-systemically important financial institutions due to the feature that conversion is sure to
happen before liquidation.
Keywords: Contingent capital bond, structural model, manipulation incentives, intensity
model, regulatory discretion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The recent financial crisis brings up an important question – what should policymakers do
when faced with the potential failure of a large bank? In 2008 officials had to choose between
taxpayer bail-outs or systemic financial collapse (Calello and Ervin [2]).
There were a number of taxpayer bail-outs in the 2008 financial crisis. Examples include
the Federal Reserve seizing control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by pledging a 200 billion
dollars cash injection; the government bailed out American International Group Inc. (AIG)
with 85 billion dollars and provided financial institutions with various forms of financing
through programs such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Although governments
claim that bailouts are essential to provide economic stability and to prevent disruption to the
financial system, it has been argued that these bail-out resolutions make taxpayers “foot the
bill” and give banks incentives to take undue risks (Dickson [4]). This is especially true for
systemically important banks, because of their “too big to fail” status. The implied taxpayer
funded protection allows systemically important financial institutions to take on additional risk
without having to fully pay for the losses, essentially avoiding market discipline.
The alternative choice, systemic financial collapse, would probably be worse. One typical
example is the sudden failure of Lehman Brothers’ Holdings, Inc. which is widely viewed as a
watershed moment in the 2008 financial crisis. Its insolvency resulted in more than 75 separate
and distinct bankruptcy proceedings all over the world (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP [7]). The
aftershocks were swift and far-reaching – the stock market plunged, credit stopped flowing and
unemployment surged. One month after its crash, the International Monetary Fund warned that
“The world economy is entering a major downturn in the face of the most dangerous financial
shock in mature financial markets since the 1930s.”
The disadvantages of the two potential results stimulate the initiative of a bail-in financial
resolution which can curb the excessive risk-taking activities of too-big-to-fail financial insti-
tutions and help reduce the probability of a systemic financial collapse. In addition, a bail-in
financial resolution does not make taxpayers in the first place to foot the bill for big financial
institutions. One widely discussed security is called contingent capital bond (CCB)1. A con-
tingent capital bond is a subordinated security, such as subordinated debt or preferred shares,
1CCBs are often referred to as CoCos, where CoCo stands for contingent convertible.
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that converts to common shares when a certain predetermined trigger is breached (D’Souza
and Gravelle [5]). If the trigger is not breached, the CCB still performs as a traditional bond.
This hybrid characteristic enables CCBs to provide an instant capital infusion by converting
debt liability into common shares under financial distress, and to shield investors from tax
charges under normal financial circumstances. With contingent capital, the resolution for dis-
tressed financial institutions starts from within using private capital, not public money (Calello
and Ervin [2]). As a result many authors, such as Flannery [6], believe that CCB can help
eliminate managers’ excessive risk-taking activities (moral hazard) by the potential dilution
effect after conversion. In addition, according to Dickson [4], a key aspect of the proposal of
contingent capital is that governments would not guarantee any bank or provide emergency
capital unless conversion of contingent capital had taken place so that penalties would be car-
ried out appropriately. In other words, the issuance of CCB would have the potential to address
market discipline. Contingent capital has been considered as a promising regulatory tool and
required in regulations. For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011)2
requires that the terms and conditions of all non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments issued
by an internationally active bank must have a provision that requires such instruments to ei-
ther be written off or converted into common equity upon the occurrence of the trigger event.
Figure 1.1 presents the revolution of financial resolution after the financial crisis and relevant
problems and benefits. In Figure 1.2 we show the working mechanism of contingent capital.
Bail-Out
Implied government rescue
Taxpayers
Bail-In
Address market discipline
Reduce moral hazard
Meet regulatory requirements
Figure 1.1: Financial resolution: From Bail-out to bail-in.
1.2 Features of Contingent Capital
According to Figure 1.2, there are two main design features of contingent capital bond – the
conversion trigger (when to convert) and conversion terms (how to convert). In Figure 1.3,
Avdjiev, Kartasheva and Bogdanova [1] categorize the features of contingent capital and our
following discussion will be based on the graph.
A wide variety of conversion triggers have been suggested in the literature, and most can
be classified as either market-based or accounting-based. One natural choice for the book-
value conversion trigger is a capital-ratio trigger because it gives regulators and investors a
2http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.htm
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Figure 1.2: Working mechanism of contingent capital.
direct sense of the bank’s leverage, profitability, liquidity and solvency and is open to the
public in financial statements. Capital ratio triggers are studied and used in the quantitative re-
search of contingent capital, such as Glasserman and Nouri [8], Pennacchi [13] and Metzler and
Reesor [12], etc. Book values are only updated periodically and this can lead to a lag between
financial statements and a firm’s true financial health. To alleviate this issue, as well as poten-
tial incentives for managers to manipulate financial statements, several authors have suggested
conversion triggers based on market variables. For example, Flannery [6] and Sundaresan and
Wang [15] claim that the trigger should be related to the contemporaneous market stock price
because triggers based on market values are forward-looking and quickly reflect changes in a
firm’s condition. In addition to using a single trigger, dual trigger is also discussed, such as in
Pennacchi [13], Squam Lake[14] and McDonald [11]. With a dual trigger, conversion occurs
when two conditions are met – one based on individual firm and the other based on industry as
a whole. The idea behind the dual trigger is to clear deadwood if the industry is not in trouble.
In practice, banks appear to prefer conversion triggers based on book value considering po-
tential manipulation from equity market (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [9]). The
book-value based conversion triggers include Tier I capital ratio, common equity Tier I capital
ratio (CET 1), etc. Another trigger suggested in practice is the discretionary trigger, which
incorporates the authority’s supervision and judgement in the conversion decision in order to
mitigate the possible lag-behind of a book-value trigger or avoid an unnecessary conversion un-
der a market-value trigger. Although a discretionary trigger is increasingly used in contingent
capital issuances over the past couple of years, such as in Credit Suisse (2011 and 2012), UBS
(2012), Royal Bank of Canada (2014), Bank of Montreal (2014) and Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce (2014), etc., to the best of our knowledge, there has been no rigorous attempt to
model discretionary trigger.
Conversion terms (also known as loss absorption mechanisms) determine the value in-
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vestors receive from conversion. In our thesis, we only discuss the case of conversion to equity.
An important variable is the stipulated conversion price (also known as conversion rate) since
it determines the number of shares that investors receive for a corresponding notional amount
of bonds following conversion (Zahres [16]). One choice is a fixed conversion price. If the
conversion price is fixed then CCB investors know exactly the number of shares they will re-
ceive at conversion, and equity investors know exactly the dilution effect to their claim. The
fixed conversion price is used in typical issuance of contingent capital bonds such as by Lloyds
Banking Group in 2009. The other choice is a market-based conversion price. A market-based
conversion price relates the number of shares received at conversion to the contemporary or
the recent preceding market stock price. For example, in 2011, Credit Suisse Group issued
2 billion dollars of contingent capital bonds, setting conversion price as the volume weighted
average stock price for a preceding time period with a floor price. Intuitively, the lower the
market-based conversion price, the more shares investors will receive at conversion and the
more dilution to original shares. Therefore, the market-based conversion price motivates issu-
ing banks to avoid conversion by taking timely corrective actions, since the potential dilution
after conversion cuts the ownership for current equity investors. At the present time most of the
academic studies in the pricing of contingent capital take the contemporary market stock price
as the conversion price by default, examples include Glasserman and Nouri [8], Pennacchi [13]
and Chen et al. [3], etc.
Figure 1.3: Main features of contingent capital. From Avdjiev, Kartasheva and Bogdanova [1].
According to an OSFI advisory [10], there is an explicit principle for the design of contin-
gent capital:
Principle No.5
The conversion method should take into account the hierarchy of claims in liqui-
dation and result in the significant dilution of pre-existing common shareholders.
From the perspective of regulators, the design of conversion term matters because a conver-
sion potentially benefiting contingent capital investors or existing shareholders might violate
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seniority or tempt manipulations. Taking the fixed conversion price for instance, if the conver-
sion price is too low then the contingent capital investors might take less losses than the senior
bondholders at conversion which disobeys the hierarchy of claims in liquidation. However,
if the conversion price is too high then equity investors can be effectively rewarded for poor
performance, in the sense that they are better off in the presence of contingent capital than its
absence. Therefore, there exists a regulatory interval for conversion price within which the
principle in OSFI advisory can be followed. Figure 1.4 describes the reasonable interval for
conversion price. One of our main contributions in the thesis is the model and estimation of
the reasonable regulatory interval for conversion terms.
Disobey
Liability Seniority
Reward 
Existing Shareholders
Reasonable 
Interval 
Conversion Price
Figure 1.4: Reasonable region for conversion terms.
It is worth noting that our thesis addresses questions that would be of interest to regulators
and issuers of contingent capital, as opposed to traders and/or investors. Most of the discussions
are focused on the concerns of regulators and issuers, giving insights in proper and reasonable
designs of contingent capital and investigating its fair price and factors influencing its price.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized in an integrated article format. We study and discuss three different
problems related to contingent capital bonds. In Chapter 2, we focus on the pricing of contin-
gent capital under a structural model extended based on Metzler and Reesor [12] and calibrate
the model to Canadian banking data. We investigate the short-selling incentives from investors
when the conversion is likely to occur with a market-based conversion price in Chapter 3. A
regulatory discretionary trigger is incorporated into the pricing of contingent capital in Chapter
4 using an intensity-model based approach. We summarize the thesis in the last chapter.
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Chapter 2
Pricing of Contingent Capital Bonds
under a Structural Model
2.1 Introduction
The pricing of contingent capital bonds (CCB) is widely studied in terms of structural models.
Employing structural models to price CCBs can successfully capture the change of the firm’s
capital structure after the conversion of contingent capital and the conversion trigger can be
modelled based on some firm value related capital ratio. All relevant quantities (equity value,
bond value and conversion trigger, etc.) are functions of a single state variable – the value of
the firm’s assets in the structural model1.
Various structural models have been used for pricing CCBs. Albul, Jaffee, and Tchitsyi [1]
provide a model based on Leland [16] and develop a closed-form solution for the value of
CCBs with market-based conversion triggers and fixed imposed losses2 at conversion. They
show that CCBs can reduce the chance of costly bankruptcy or bailout and increase the value
of the issuing firm if properly implemented. Pennacchi [25] incorporates possible sudden and
discrete asset value declines during financial crises into a structural model by considering an
individual bank whose asset value follows a jump-diffusion process. With a practical capital
structure composed of short-term deposits, long-term bonds and equity, the author studies the
pricing of fixed-coupon contingent capital under various contractual terms (e.g., conversion
terms, conversion trigger and maturity) and bank-related risks (e.g. asset jump risks and ex-
cessive risk-taking incentives). The featured conclusions include the asset jump risk would
obviously increase the credit spreads for contingent capital, a relatively high level of equity
value based conversion trigger would protect contingent capital investors from losses of a sud-
den asset value drop and the issuance of contingent capital is likely to mitigate the moral
hazard. Glasserman and Nouri [11] establish a structural model on a broader basis including
Merton [20], Black and Cox [6] and Leland [16], and derive an explicit expression for the val-
uation of CCB. Their research is distinguished by using the capital ratio as conversion trigger
and the consideration of gradual and on-going conversion scheme. Chen et al. [7] consider a
1From this point of view, using a structural model to price contingent capital bond is a natural choice and
would be a good start point for potential further investigations of the pricing problem using other models.
2The conversion term of fixed imposed loss will be discussed later.
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jump-diffusion model with firm-specific and market-specific jumps of the firm’s asset value.
They derive closed-form expressions to value the firm and its liabilities with the incorporation
of debt rollover and endogenous default. Moreover, they present detailed discussions of poten-
tial issues such as debt overhang, the increment of the firm’s loss absorbency and the effects of
reducing the bankruptcy costs with the issuance of CCBs.
However, because of model and parameter assumptions, not many structural models could
work when we incorporate fixed coupon payments, the regulatory requirements in Basel III
and real capital structures of financial institutions into calibration at the same time. For exam-
ple, Metzler and Reesor [21], Madan and Schoutens [18] and Raviv and Hilscher [12] price
CCBs as zero-coupon bonds and therefore cannot deal with the coupon issue. For the studies
considering CCBs with coupon payments, almost all of them implicitly assume the coupon
payments are proportional to the firm’s asset value and therefore ignore the impact of debt ser-
vice on the asset value dynamics. For instance, Glasserman and Nour i[11] and Albul, Jaffee
and Tchitsyi [1] assume the firm’s value follows the geometric Brownian motion and incor-
porate the fixed coupon payments into the drift term as a payout ratio proportional to the firm
value. This implicitly assumes the issuance of new equity to pay for the coupons when the firm
is in financial distress and ignores the fact that it is difficult for a weakened firm to issue new
equity3. Despite its impressive level of details, the model developed by Pennacchi [25] seems
a bit too unwieldy and contains several parameters that appear difficult to calibrate. Most of
the other models deal with endogenously determined default, which is not ideal when the goal
is pragmatic calibration.
Metzler and Reesor [21] present a novel approach to the valuation of zero-coupon CCBs in
the structural framework. They studied the loss absorbency mechanism of contingent capital
at conversion and find that conversion terms (specific rules governing the exchange of debt
for equity upon conversion) can fundamentally alter the nature of the CCB. Their analysis is
mainly from the regulators’ perspective and therefore provides preliminary guidance for the
design of conversion terms. For example, they find that under the fixed conversion price, there
exists a narrow “regulatory interval ” within which the fixed conversion price should be located
in order to respect the seniority between the senior bond and the CCB in the capital structure,
as well as guarantee the existing shareholders are not rewarded at conversion.
In this chapter, we extend the model proposed by Metzler and Reesor [21] to price con-
tingent capital with fixed coupon payments. Once conversion occurs, there will be no coupon
payments to investors so the CCB with coupon payments cannot be replicated with a portfolio
of zero-coupon CCBs – it means that the zero-coupon CCB model put forward by Metzler
and Reesor [21] cannot be directly applied to price the CCB with coupon payments. In the
chapter, we use the general asset value dynamics put forward by Merton [20], considering both
dividend and coupon payments, with the dividend payments proportional to the asset value but
the coupon payments proportional to the notional value of the firm’s liabilities. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the pricing of CCB using this affine geometric
Brownian motion by assuming that the coupon payments would have impact on the behaviour
of the firm’s asset value. We use the model-implied par yields to measure the costs of CCBs
and the other liabilities in the firm’s capital structure. Additionally, the change of the CCB
3The difficulty lies in two incentives against the recapitalization of a distressed firm – debt overhang and
adverse selection (Duffie [9])
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value is investigated with respect to the change of different firm-specific parameters. Follow-
ing the suggestions of Financial Stability Board and European Commission [24], we extend our
model by allowing part of the senior bond to be converted as well in a trigger event to realize
a burden-sharing resolution regime. We manage to calibrate the model using capital structures
of representative Canadian financial institutions and the Basel III capital ratio requirements.
This calibration is a critical first step in determining realistic estimates of the costs of a partic-
ular Canadian institution to issue contingent capital as well as preliminary guidance on setting
important design features such as conversion prices and triggers.
For the reader’s convenience, we list some of our main findings and conclusions here.
• CCB could either cost more or less than otherwise identical (i.e. non-convertible) junior
bond depending on the conversion term and trigger of CCB. Under our calibration, re-
placing the traditional junior bond with the CCB in the capital structure, the spread of
the contingent capital would be greater than that of the otherwise identical junior bond it
would replace, whereas the spread on senior bond would be slightly reduced.
• Under fixed conversion price, the costs of contingent capital are sensitive to the trigger
location since the equity value received by CCB investors is positively related with the
trigger location. However, under fixed imposed loss, the costs of contingent capital are
not as sensitive as under fixed conversion price to the trigger location. This is because
the redemption to CCB investors upon conversion is fixed as the difference between the
notional value and the write-down value upon conversion.
• Under fixed conversion price (fixed imposed loss), the credit spread of contingent capital
is positively related to the conversion price (the fixed write-down at conversion). The
firm’s asset volatility influences the spread significantly. It would be costly for a firm
with volatile asset value to issue contingent capital due to the possible early conversion.
• There exist reasonable intervals for conversion terms within which the claim seniority
is respected and the existing shareholders will not be rewarded for the firm’s poor per-
formance at conversion. The size of the interval or region is remarkably narrow and
becomes even smaller as the conversion trigger moves upwards. Therefore, the issu-
ing firm must be careful if it uses a going-concern (relatively high) conversion trigger
since there would be a relatively small room from which the firm can choose a proper
conversion term.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 and 2.3 give a brief review and our extension
of the structural model put forward by Metzler and Reesor [21]. In Section 2.4, we show the
details of our calibration. Section 2.5 demonstrates our numerical results, and the term structure
under the finite time horizon. Finally, we summarize and discuss our future work in Section
2.6.
2.2 Non-Contingent Debt Model
Assuming a probability space (Ω,F ,Q), where Q is a risk-neutral pricing measure and let
E denote the expectation with respect to Q. Interest rates are taken to be deterministic and
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independent of both time and tenor, so that the risk-free interest rate term structure is flat at the
constant level r > 0. We assume that the firm’s liabilities have a common maturity of T > 0
years.
Metzler and Reesor [21] begin with a firm having a traditional capital structure consisting
of a senior bond with notional value LS , a junior bond with notional value LJ and common
equity. In order to more accurately reflect the balance sheets of Canadian banks, one must also
include deposits, modelled here as a “super-senior” bond with notional value LD (interpreted
as the total amount on deposit) having a recovery rate of 100% (this reflect the fact that the
majority of deposits in Canada are federally insured). We call the capital structure including
deposits, the senior bond, the junior bond and common equity as traditional capital structure.
We assume that bond i pays a continuous coupon at a constant rate ctradi per dollar notional
value so that the dollar payout rate is ctradi Li for i = D, S , J. We assume that equity receives
dividends continuously at a constant rate q > 0 proportional to the firm value Vt so that the
dollar payout rate is qVt at time t. Similar to Merton [20], under the risk-neutral measure, we
assume the firm value evolves as affine geometric Brownian motion4,
dV tradt =
[
(r − q)V tradt − (ctradD LD + ctradS LS + ctradJ LJ)
]
dt + σV tradt dWt, (2.1)
where σ is the volatility of the firm value. Both r and σ are assumed positive constant. It
is worth noticing that the coupon payments are not proportional to the asset value in (2.1),
implying that the firm cannot necessarily reduce its debt costs as losses mount. In addition
we preclude negative dividends, which means that the firm cannot issue new equity to service
its debt when it is in distress. Mathematically, the main difference between using a constant
coupon payments in the drift term as (2.1) and a proportional coupon payments with respect to
the asset value such as in Glasserman and Nouri [11] is the attainability of the origin. When the
drift is (r−q)V tradt as in Glasserman and Nouri [11], the origin is never attainable in finite time,
whereas in our case the origin is attainable in finite time for any initial asset value. Moreover,
we prove that if r < q + σ2/2 then all trajectories are eventually absorbed at the origin in finite
time, and if r ≥ q + σ2/2 then the eventual absorption at the origin occurs with a positive
probability. See Theorem B.1.4 in Appendix B for details. Similar firm value dynamics is
mentioned in Merton [20] and Leland and Toft [17], etc.
Define the total liability L = LD + LS + LJ. It is convenient to rewrite the dynamics in a
non-dimensional form,
dV tradt
L
=
[
(r − q)v¯tradt − (ctradD `D + ctradS `S + ctradJ `J)
]
dt + σv¯tradt dWt, (2.2)
where v¯tradt = V
trad
t /L is the firm’s asset-liability ratio at time t and `i = Li/L for i = D, S , J is
the proportion of each bond in the total liability. It is possible to allow the firm to issue new
debt as asset value grows but it would be difficult to model and calibrate such a policy.
As in Glasserman and Nouri [11], we assume that the firm is seized by regulators and there-
fore ceases operation if the asset-liability ratio falls below the level d∗, where d∗ is a predefined
level at which regulators deem the bank non-viable. Here we assume the ratio is specified in
4We only consider one single state variable driving the evolution of the firm’s asset value in the thesis. In
practice, the firm’s asset value could be influenced by other variables such as the market condition and the change
of the firm’s liability structure, etc.
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regulations such as in Basel III and therefore is known to all investors. Liquidation/seizure
therefore occurs at the hitting time,
τtradd = inf{t ∈ [0,T ] : v¯tradt ≤ d∗}. (2.3)
Observe that τtradd = ∞ if asset value never goes below the liquidation threshold. In contrast
to Metzler and Reesor [21], we allow for non-zero bankruptcy costs and therefore the vio-
lation of strict priority upon seizure. In practice, absolute priority violations do take place
(Lando [15]) and there are cases where debt payments are reduced but equity is still “alive”
after restructuring and has a positive value (the model of Anderson and Sundaresan [2] cap-
tures this phenomenon). Denote constant RD, RS and RJ as the recovery rate for deposits,
the senior, and junior bond respectively. Total bankruptcy cost at liquidation is given by
BCtrad
τtradd
= L − (RDLD + RS LS + RJLJ). We will calibrate recovery rates in order to match
empirically-observed spreads collected in Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5] for Canadian
banks5. The `i’s are obtained from balance sheets. The point of liquidation will be chosen
according to the acceptable capital level in Basel III and bankruptcy costs will therefore be
implied.
Valuations under Traditional Capital Structure
Bond holders earn their coupons until the random time
τtradd = min{τtradd ,T }, (2.4)
at which point they receive either their face value Li in the event that the firm is not liquidated
or RiLi in the event that the firm is liquidated prior to T . Assuming the level of asset value
at which the firm is seized by regulators locates above the total notional value of the firm’s
liability, we can write the principal repayment Li = Li[1{τtradd >T } + Ri1{τtradd ≤T }] for i = D, S , J.
For simplicity, let E[e−r(τ
trad
d −t)|V tradt = vtrad] = Et,vtrad [e−r(τtradd −t)] under the risk-neutral mea-
sure. The value of bond i is the expectation of the discounted cash flows to the bond holder
itradt = Et,vtrad [
∫ τtradd
t
ctradi Lie
−r(s−t)ds + Lie−r(τ
trad
d −t)],
=
ctradi Li
r
(
1 −Et,vtrad [e−r(τtradd −t)]
)
+ LiEt,vtrad [e−r(T−t)1{τtradd >T }] + RiLiEt,vtrad [e−r(τ
trad
d −t)1{τtradd ≤T }],
(2.5)
for i = D, S , J, where Dtradt , S
trad
t and J
trad
t are the value of deposits, the senior bond and junior
bond in the traditional capital structure at time t respectively. Given the firm has yet to be
liquidated at time t, it follows that the equity value is
Etradt = Et,vtrad [
∫ τtradd
t
qV trads e
−r(s−t)ds + L max{v¯trad
τtrad
− `D − `S − `J, 0}e−r(τtradd −t)]. (2.6)
5There is no historical data to use since no large Canadian bank has ever defaulted. However, since the recovery
rates used in the model is exogenously given and fixed, it is possible to use recovery rates from other countries,
such as the United States.
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Since e−rtV tradt +
∫ t
0
e−rs(qV trads +c
trad
D LD+c
trad
S LS +c
trad
J LJ)ds is a martingale (see Appendix B.1.2
for details), the equity value follows that
Etradt = V
trad
t − Dtradt − S tradt − Jtradt − BCtradt , t ≤ τ¯tradd , (2.7)
where BCtradt = Et,vtrad [BC
trad
τtradd
e−r(τ
trad
d −t)1{τtradd ≤T }] is the expected total bankruptcy cost at time t
for the firm.
Par Yields of Traditional Bonds
Par yields are those coupon rates that simultaneously solve the following equations for i =
D, S , J,
ctradi Li
r
(
1 −E0,vtrad [e−rτtradd ]
)
+ LiE0,vtrad [e−rT1{τtradd >T }] + RiLiE0,vtrad [e−rτ
trad
d 1{τtradd ≤T }] = Li, (2.8)
or equivalently, after normalization, simultaneously solve the following equations,
ctradi
r
(
1 −E0,vtrad [e−rτtradd ]
)
+E0,vtrad [e−rT1{τtradd >T }] + RiE0,vtrad [e−rτ
trad
d 1{τtradd ≤T }] = 1, i = D, S , J.
(2.9)
The expectations on the left-hand side depend on the dynamics of asset value, and therefore
depend on coupon rates of bonds in the capital structure, in general the equation system implicit
in (2.8) or (2.9) must be solved numerically. Particularly, in the perpetual case (i.e. T = ∞) we
have τtradd = τ
trad
d , and the par yield of the bond i is solved from
ctradi
r
(
1 −E0,vtrad [e−rτtradd ]
)
+ RiE0,vtrad [e−rτtradd ] = 1, i = D, S , J. (2.10)
By Proposition 2.2.1, the expectations in (2.10) can be calculated with an explicit formula.
As a result, we can solve for the par yield and therefore the credit spread of each bond in the
capital structure under the perpetual case.
Proposition 2.2.1 Let ctrad = `DctradD +`S c
trad
S +`Jc
trad
J be the non-dimensional coupon payment.
In the perpetual case, for v¯tradt ≥ d∗ and t < τtradd ,
Et,vtrad [e−r(τ
trad
d −t)] = u(v¯tradt , d
∗, r − q, ctrad, σ), (2.11)
where for positive numbers r, q and ctrad, the function u is defined as
u(v¯tradt , d
∗, r − q, ctrad, σ) =
(
d∗
v¯tradt
)λ+ M (λ+, 2(λ+ + 1) − 2(r − q)/σ2,−2ctrad/σ2v¯tradt )
M
(
λ+, 2(λ+ + 1) − 2(r − q)/σ2,−2ctrad/σ2d∗) , (2.12)
where λ+ is the unique positive solution to λ2 +
(
1 − 2(r − q)/σ2
)
λ−2r/σ2 = 0 and the function
M is the confluent hypergeometric function.
Proof According to Theorem B.1.6 in Appendix B, this proposition can be proved by taking
x = v¯tradt , y = d
∗, α = r and µ = r − q.
In the case with finite maturity, there is no closed form formula for the expectation of
discount factors. However, we can solve for the par yields using Monte Carlo simulation.
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2.3 Incorporating Contingent Capital
Now we consider a firm which replaces the junior bond with a CCB in the capital structure.
The CCB investor initially possesses a subordinated bond paying a coupon rate cCCB on the
notional value LJ. If conversion never occurs, the CCB pays its coupon until maturity and the
investor receives the principal payment at maturity. If conversion does occur, the CCB investor
will return the bond to the firm (who retires it) in exchange for newly issued common shares.
To be consistent with the recent issuance of CCBs, we only consider a full conversion of CCB.
That is, post conversion the CCB investor only holds common shares (i.e. the bond is fully
written off).
In order to incorporate bail-in debt (BID), which is also considered as contingent capital but
has a higher seniority than CCB (subordinated debt), we allow for a fraction of the senior bond
to be retired in exchange for common equity via conversion. Suppose that the notional of the
senior bond is reduced to (1− fS )LS post conversion, where fS ∈ [0, 1] is called the conversion
proportion, and the coupon rate cS is applied to the reduced principal. In exchange for the
reduction in principal, the senior bond investor receives a fraction of the firm’s common equity,
so post conversion the senior bond investor will effectively hold two securities - a fraction of
common equity and the senior bond with a reduced notional value (1 − fS )LS . We assume that
once the conversion is triggered, CCB and 100 fS % of the senior bond convert at the same time.
In keeping with Metzler and Reesor [21], whose development we follow closely, let N
denote the number of common shares in existence today and N∗CCB (N
∗
S ) the number of shares
issued from the conversion of CCB (partial senior bond). Therefore, the CCB (senior bond)
investor owns 100ωCCB% (100ωS %) of the firm upon conversion, where ωCCB = N∗CCB/(N +
N∗CCB + N
∗
S ) (ωS = N
∗
S /(N + N
∗
CCB + N
∗
S )). We call ωCCB (ωS ) the ownership stake distributed
to CCB (senior bond) investors and it can be understood as a dilution factor to the existing
shareholders.
We use Vt as the firm’s asset value at time t with the incorporation of contingent capital and
continue using the asset-liability ratio v¯t = Vt/L. We assume that conversion occurs when the
firm’s asset-liability ratio falls below the predefined critical level b∗ for the first time,
τc = inf{t > 0 : v¯t ≤ b∗}. (2.13)
The choice of the conversion barrier (trigger) will be discussed later. The liquidation occurs
when
τd = inf{t > 0 : v¯t ≤ d∗}. (2.14)
Assuming the critical level b∗ > d∗, we have conversion always happens before liquidation.
With the incorporation of contingent capital into the capital structure, prior to conversion,
the asset value dynamics are
dVt =
[
(r − q)Vt − (cDLD + cS LS + cCCBLJ)] dt + σVtdWt, 0 ≤ t < τc, (2.15)
while post conversion, both CCB and 100 fS % of senior bond convert to common shares, so the
asset value dynamics become
dVt =
[
(r − q)Vt − (cDLD + cS (1 − fS )LS )] dt + σVtdWt, t ≥ τc. (2.16)
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We continue to use the simplified assumption, necessary for tractability, that all liabilities have
the same maturity T (with T = ∞ for the perpetual case). In other words, the firm will cease
operation at T if no liquidation happens; however, if the asset value falls below the pre-defined
liquidation level prior to maturity, the firm ceases to operate at τd. This assumption conflicts
with the real world because a firm’s bonds usually have different maturities. However, since we
are more concerned about the difference contingent capital would make under financial distress
(i.e., large default/liquidation risk), identical maturity assumption facilitates us to investigate
this, ignoring risk exposure brought by different maturities. Also, we can think of the same ma-
turity realized by the debt rollover before the firm is liquidated. Additionally, the involvement
of different maturities would increase the complexity of our model. For example, the capital
structure becomes non-stationary and the default level changes as the debt in the bank’s capital
structure expires.
Valuation of Bonds After Incorporating Contingent Capital
Since we only consider the conversion of CCB and partial senior bond, the valuation of deposits
remains the same with that under the traditional capital structure. For the senior bond, its value
is the summation of two parts – the part remaining as liability and the part converted to common
shares. Prior to conversion and maturity, the present value of the first part is∫ τd
t
cS (1 − fS )LS e−r(s−t)ds + (1 − fS )LS e−r(T−t)1{τd>T } + RS (1 − fS )LS e−r(τd−t)1{τd≤T }, (2.17)
and the present value of the second part is∫ τc
t
cS fS LS e−r(s−t)ds + ωS Eτce
−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T } + fS LS e
−r(T−t)1{τc>T }, (2.18)
where τc = min{τc,T } and Eτc is the equity value of the firm right after conversion. Discounting
the cash flows to CCB investors gives the present value of CCB at time t < τc,∫ τc
t
cCCBLJe−r(s−t)ds + ωCCBEτce
−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T } + LJe
−r(T−t)1{τc>T }. (2.19)
Taking expectation on (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19), we obtain the value of two parts of the senior
bond – the part remaining as straight bond (S Bt ) and the part converted to common shares (S
C
t ),
and the value of CCB at t < τc,
S Bt =
cS (1 − fS )LS
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τd−t)]
)
+ (1 − fS )LSEt,v[e−r(T−t)1{τd>T }],
+ RS (1 − fS )LSEt,v[e−r(τd−t)1{τd≤T }], (2.20)
S Ct =
cS fS LS
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T }]
)
+Et,v[ωS Eτce
−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T }]
+
cS fS LS
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(T−t)1{τc>T }]
)
+ fS LSEt,v[e−r(T−t)1{τc>T }], (2.21)
CCBt =
cCCBLJ
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T }]
)
+Et,v[ωCCBEτce
−r(τc−t)1{τc≤T }]
+
cCCBLJ
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(T−t)1{τc>T }]
)
+ LJEt,v[e−r(T−t)1{τc>T }]. (2.22)
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The value of the senior bond is therefore given by
S t = S Bt + S
C
t , t < τc. (2.23)
In the finite-maturity case with T < ∞, we must use the Monte Carlo simulation to estimate
the expectations of discount factors in the formulas. Unfortunately, Monte Carlo method has
relatively high computational costs. In the perpetual case with T = ∞, by Proposition 2.2.1, it
is clear that
Et,v[e−r(τc−t)] = u(v¯t, b∗, r − q, c, σ), (2.24)
where c = cD`D + cS `S + cCCB`J. If τc = ∞ then conversion does not occur and contingent
capital investors receive their coupon streams in perpetuity, never becoming part owners of the
firm. Being consistent with the discussion under the traditional capital structure, we continue
to assume that the firm is liquidated once its asset-liability ratio falls below the threshold d∗.
However, it is noteworthy that post conversion, the firm’s liabilities become LD + (1 − fS )LS .
Correspondingly, the bankruptcy cost becomes BCτd = LD +(1− fS )LS −(RDLD +RS (1− fS )LS ).
Thus, following the same logic of (2.7), the equity value right after conversion is Eτc = b
∗L −
Dτc − S Bτc − BCτc , where BCτc = Eτc,b∗L[BCτd e−r(τd−τc)1{τd≤T }].
Since we assume b∗ > d∗, by the strong Markov property we know that the times τd − τc
and τc are independent on the event {τc < ∞}. Therefore,
Eτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)] = u(b∗, d∗, r − q, c′, σ), (2.25)
where c′ = cD`D + cS (1 − fS )`S is the non-dimensional coupon payment after conversion. We
define τd − τc = 0 on the event τc = ∞.
Proposition 2.3.1 In the perpetual case, for v¯t ∈ [b∗,+∞) and b∗ > d∗, we have
Et,v[e−r(τd−t)] = Et,v[e−r(τc−t)]Eτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)], (2.26)
where Et,v[e−r(τc−t)] and Eτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)] are given by (2.24) and (2.25) respectively.
Proof According to Lemma B.1.7 in Appendix B, the proposition is proved.
Since conversion always happens prior to liquidation, if τc < ∞, then τc < τd; if τc = ∞,
then τd = ∞. In the perpetual case and v¯t ≥ b∗ > d∗, the valuation of deposits, the senior bond
and the CCB in the capital structure become
Dt =
cDLD
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τd−t)]
)
+ RDLDEt,v[e−r(τd−t)], (2.27)
S t =
cS (1 − fS )LS
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τd−t)]
)
+ RS (1 − fS )LSEt,v[e−r(τd−t)]
+
cS fS LS
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τc−t)]
)
+Et,v[ωS Eτce
−r(τc−t)], (2.28)
CCBt =
cCCBLJ
r
(
1 −Et,v[e−r(τc−t)]
)
+Et,v[ωCCBEτce
−r(τc−t)], (2.29)
for t < τc, respectively.
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Par Yields of Bonds After Incorporating Contingent Capital
In the perpetual case, we can solve for par yields by equating the closed-form expressions
(2.27), (2.28) and (2.29) with the corresponding notional values. However, in the case of finite
maturity (T < ∞), there are no closed-form expressions for the expectations of discount factors.
One feasible approach to estimate the par yields would be using Monte Carlo simulation.
2.3.1 Conversion Terms
We focus on two kinds of conversion terms in this section – (1) a fixed conversion price and
(2) a fixed imposed loss on contingent capital bond at conversion. The former specifies a fixed
conversion price and therefore the number of shares received by contingent capital investors.
The latter specifies a fixed loss (also known as write-down) to the notional value at conversion
while allows the conversion price depending on the stock price.
Before we we detail our discussions on the two conversion terms, we define the effective
loss at conversion. In the case that only CCB converts, the value of shares received at con-
version is ωCCBEτc , and the face value of bond given up is LJ. Therefore, the effective loss
imposed to CCB investors at conversion is
βCCB = 1 − ωCCBEτcLJ . (2.30)
Under fixed conversion price, the value of shares received depends on the conversion price and
the effective loss is implied by the difference between the fixed conversion price and the stock
price at conversion (Metzler and Reesor [21]). In contrast, fixed imposed loss determines the
effective loss (left hand side of (2.30)) directly and therefore the value of shares received by
CCB investors. The number of shares generated from conversion is determined by conversion
price which might depend on the market stock price. Similarly, we define βCS as the effective
loss imposed to the converted part of the senior bond,
βCS = 1 −
ωS Eτc
fS LS
, fS > 0. (2.31)
For the special case only considering the conversion of CCBs, we directly assign βCS = 0.
Fixed Conversion Price
As noted by Metzler and Reesor [21], in the mathematical modelling of contingent capital it
is most natural to work with ownership stakes (dilution factors) ωCCB and ωS , whereas the
contract usually specifies a rule for determining the conversion price. Define a positive non-
dimensional parameter pCCB = PCCB/P0, where PCCB is the fixed conversion price of CCB
specified in the contract and P0 is the market stock price at the issuance assuming all bonds
are priced at par. For example, if pCCB = 0.5 then the conversion price stated explicitly in
the CCB contract is 50% of the firm’s market stock price at the issuance of CCB. Similarly,
we define a positive non-dimensional parameter pS as the ratio of the fixed conversion price
applied to the (converted part of) senior bond (PS ) over P0. We suppose that if conversion is
triggered, the CCB and 100 fS % of the senior bond convert to common shares. Using the facts
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that N∗CCB = LJ/PCCB and N
∗
S = fS LS /PS , it is straightforward to see that the implied ownership
stake afforded to the CCB and senior bond investors at conversion is
ωCCB =
`J
pCCB(v¯0 − 1 − BC0/L) + `J + fS `S 1p¯
, (2.32)
and
ωS =
fS `S
pS (v¯0 − 1 − BC0/L) + `J p¯ + fS `S =
fS `S
`J
1
p¯
ωCCB. (2.33)
respectively, where p¯ = pS /pCCB is the ratio of the two conversion prices. If p¯ = 1 then
ωS / fS `S = ωCCB/`J meaning that the CCB investor and senior bondholder afford the same
conversion price and they will receive the same number of shares in the exchange of each unit
dollar of notional value upon conversion. However, issuers and regulators might want to im-
pose a higher conversion price to CCB (p¯ < 1) in order to respect the seniority. Under this cir-
cumstance, we have ωS / fS `S > ωCCB/`J, implying that in the exchange of the same amount of
notional value, the senior bondholder will receive more shares than the CCB investor. Further-
more, as pCCB → 0+ (pS → 0+), the CCB (senior) investor becomes 100% owners of the firm
since ωCCB → 1 (ωS → 1); while as pCCB → ∞ (pS → ∞), the CCB investor (the converted
portion of the senior bond for the senior bondholder) is completely wiped out at conversion in
the sense that ωCCB → 0 (ωS → 0) and the bond is worthless at that time. Particularly, if we
only consider the conversion of CCB, we assign fS = 0 which leads to ωS = 0.
Fixed Imposed Loss
Under fixed imposed loss, if the issuer assigns the fixed loss at conversion as 100βCCB%, the
value of common shares received by the CCB investor is 100(1 − βCCB)%LJ. The number of
shares the investor will receive is equal to the value divided by the prevailing market stock
price. Similarly, a fixed loss of 100βCS % to the converted fraction of the senior bond at the
event of conversion would redeem the investor with common shares valuing 100(1 − βCS )% of
the converted notional value fS LS . If we consider the case that both CCB and (partial) senior
bond convert to common shares, it is natural to require βCCB > βCS in order to respect seniority
of the converted part of the senior bond.
As noted by Metzler and Reesor [21], the fixed-loss mechanism is tantamount to a conver-
sion price that is proportional to the firm’s stock price at conversion. For example, for a CCB
with $100 notional value, a 20% write-down to the notional value is equivalent to using the
conversion price as 1.25 times the stock price at conversion and zero imposed loss on CCB.
As it is reasonable to assume that the firm’s stock price decreases as conversion nears and the
trailing average stock price will be highly correlated with the stock price at conversion, the 1.25
times the stock price at conversion can be taken as a proxy for a trailing average conversion
price. Hence, we can see that if the conversion price is proportional to the stock price, the loss
imposed at conversion is non-random. For this reason, we call it the fixed-imposed loss.
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The Relation Between Fixed Conversion Price and Fixed Imposed Loss
Although fixed conversion price and fixed imposed loss are defined differently, in the perpetual
case, they are connected via the dilution factors. To be more specific,
(pCCB, pS )
one−to−one←−−−−−−−→
(2.32),(2.33)
(ωCCB, ωS )
one−to−one←−−−−−−−→
(2.30),(2.31)
(βCCB, βCS ). (2.34)
Equation (2.34) asserts the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between two conversion
terms. For example, given (βCS , βCCB), we can “project” the imposed loss to a fixed conversion
price by choosing (pCCB, pS ) which gives the same ownership stakes (ωCCB, ωS ), and vice versa.
Additionally, from (2.32), (2.33), (2.30) and (2.31), we find that as long as p¯ = 1 the effective
losses imposed to the converted part of the senior bond and the CCB are the same. However, if
p¯ < 1 ( p¯ > 1), for the converted part, the CCB investor would bear a larger (smaller) effective
loss than the senior bondholder upon conversion.
2.3.2 Reasonable Terms of Conversion
Following the advisory from OSFI [19], issuers and regulators would like to guarantee that (1)
debt seniority is respected upon conversion and (2) equity investors are not rewarded for poor
performance at the occurrence of conversion. In order to respect seniority it suffices to ensure
that
βS < βCCB, (2.35)
where βS is the total effective loss imposed on the senior bond at conversion,
βS = 1 −
S Bτc + ωS Eτc
LS
. (2.36)
If only CCB converts to common shares in a trigger event, we assign ωS = 0 in (2.36) and
βS measures the loss of a straight senior bond. The following proposition states an equivalent
condition to (2.35) in the terms of par yields.
Proposition 2.3.2 The condition βS < βCCB is satisfied if and only if cS < cCCB, where cS and
cCCB are the par yields of the senior bond and CCB, respectively.
Proof See Appendix B.1.3.
We say that equity investors are rewarded for poor performance if (1 − ωS − ωCCB)Eτc >
Etrad
τtradc
and punished for poor performance otherwise6. The term Etrad
τtradc
is the equity value to
existing shareholders in an otherwise identical traditional capital structure7 at τtradc , which is
the first-passage time of the conversion barrier (the asset-liability ratio b∗) under a traditional
capital structure. In other words, Etrad
τtradc
is the value of the otherwise identical firm’s equity
after an equivalent fall in asset value. The satisfaction of the condition means that the existing
shareholders are better off in the presence of contingent capital than they are in its absence. In
6See Metzler and Reesor [21] for a more detailed discussion in the case if zero-coupon CCBs.
7The capital structure with contingent capital replaced by traditional bond with the same seniority.
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non-dimensional terms, it is straightforward to see that equity investors are punished for poor
performance if and only if
b∗−(1−βD)`D−(1−βS )`S −(1−βCCB)`J− BCτcL < b
∗−(1−ρD)`D−(1−ρS )`S −(1−ρJ)`J−
BCtrad
τtradc
L
,
(2.37)
where ρi for i = D, S , J represents the loss imposed on the corresponding straight bond under
the traditional capital structure at τtradc . After simplification, we have
βCCB <
ρD`D + ρS `S + ρJ`J − βD`D − βS `S
`J
+
BCtrad
τtradc
− BCτc
L`J
, (2.38)
which provides an upper bound on the imposed loss.
To summarize, given the conversion proportion of the senior bond, the reasonable conver-
sion terms are those that ensure
βCCB ∈ (βS , (ρD − βD)`D
`J
+ (ρS − βS )`S
`J
+ ρJ +
BCtrad
τtradc
− BCτc
L`J
) and p¯ < 1. (2.39)
Here we require p¯ < 1 so that the seniority between the converted part of the senior bond
and CCB is guaranteed. As long as the loss imposed to CCB at conversion implied by the
conversion term is located within the range given by (2.39), it ensures liability seniority and
the existing shareholders are not rewarded at conversion and therefore the contingent capital is
properly designed.
We note that conversion prices (in the case of a fixed-price contract) or losses imposed at
conversion (in the case of a fixed-loss contract) that ensure (2.39) must in general be deter-
mined numerically. Metzler and Reesor [21] prove the existence of the region for reasonable
conversion terms under some conditions in the case of zero-coupon contingent capital and only
with the conversion of a junior bond. However, in the case of contingent capital with coupon
payments, it is more practical to provide numerical proofs rather than rigorous analytical proofs
because different conversion terms would influence the coupon rates of contingent capital and
therefore the asset value process. In addition, we will see later that the reasonable interval for
conversion term might not exist in the case of contingent capital with coupon payments. It is
not a contradiction to the discussions made in Metzler and Reesor [21] as in [21] the liability
seniority might be violated in order to ensure that the existing shareholders do not benefit from
conversion8.
Similar to Metzler and Reesor [21], under fixed conversion price, we define
fˆ ( fS , pS , pCCB) = βCCB − βS , (2.40)
and
gˆ( fS , pS , pCCB) = Etradτtradc − (1 − ωS − ωCCB)Eτc . (2.41)
8In Metzler and Reesor [21], they provide constraints to ensure the liability seniority and the existing share-
holders are not rewarded for poor performance at conversion. When the constraints are breached, the liability
seniority has to be violated so that the existing shareholders will not benefit from conversion.
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Under fixed imposed loss, function fˆ and gˆ depend on the effective loss βCCB and βS instead of
the conversion price ratio pCCB and pS . In the case of fS = 0 (i.e. only with the conversion of
CCB),
fˆ (pCCB) = βCCB − βS , (2.42)
and
gˆ(pCCB) = Etradτtradc − (1 − ωCCB)Eτc , (2.43)
By Proposition 2.3.2, (2.40) and (2.42) can be replaced by the difference between the par yield
of the CCB and the senior bond. Based on our previous discussions, a reasonable conversion
term would make (2.40) and (2.41) (or (2.42) and (2.43)) nonnegative. Rather than giving the
proofs of the monotonic features of the functions like in Metzler and Reesor [21], we will
directly provide numerical results on the existence of the reasonable intervals in Section 2.5.
2.4 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate our model using data from Canadian banking sector, establishing
a base for our investigation of the expenses for Canadian banks if they issue contingent capital
bond. We use our calibrated model to generate insights into issues that would be of interest to
regulators and issuers of contingent capital, such as the determination of appropriate terms of
conversion, the potential cost of contingent capital and the impact its presence would have on
other debt costs, etc.
2.4.1 Capital Structure
We assume an endogenous capital structure and calibrate our model to the capital structures
of the big-6 Canadian banks according to their shareholders’ reports on the second quarter of
2012. Using the approach put forward by Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5], we assign each
bank’s liabilities to four general buckets based on their seniority9:
• deposits, and
• senior debt (including senior secured debt and senior unsecured debt), and
• junior debt (including subordinated debt, preferred shares and non-controlling inter-
ests)10, and
9Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5] put the issues of banks into four general buckets: secured, senior unse-
cured, subordinated and junior subordinated. In our calibration, we include both the secured and senior unsecured
within our senior tranche, subordinated and junior subordinated within our junior tranche. The amounts of de-
posits are specified in the quarterly reports.
10Generally, preferred shares cannot be treated as a liability in capital structures. However, D’Souza and
Gravelle [8] point out that preferred shares are also a candidate to be classified as contingent capital, so we
include preferred shares in our junior tranche. In fact, the preferred shares occupy only a small fraction in the
capital structure, for example, 0.6% in RBC’s and 0.5% in CIBC’s capital structure respectively, and the final
results are not influenced significantly based on this classification.
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• common equities Tier 1 capital (including common shares, retained earnings and other
components of equity)11.
It is worth mentioning that in the thesis we “standardize” the dollar values of liabilities and
equity into proportions of a unit. The standardization facilitates the par yields searching (root-
searching) procedure in our numerical experiments. In Table B.1 of Appendix B.2.1 we present
the dollar value of each layer in the capital structure of the big-6 Canadian banks, followed by
Table B.2 where we present the proportions of layers in the capital structures. Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.1: Capital structure of the big-6 Canadian banks on the second quarter of 2012.
illustrates similar capital structures of the big-6 Canadian banks, with deposits, senior debts,
junior debts and common shares weighting 61.50%, 32.10%, 1.98% and 4.41% on average (or
61.37%, 31.74%, 1.92% and 4.60% as median) respectively.
Without changing the capital structure of each bank, we replace all of its junior debt with
CCB. For the part of the senior bond which can be converted at a trigger event, the unsecured
senior debt in the senior tranche is used as a proxy. This arrangement is consistent with the
regulatory suggestions put forward by Arjani and D’Souza[3], and similar to the way proposed
by Flannery[10]12.
The introduction of contingent capital rises the bank’s loss-absorbing capacity. The loss-
absorbing capacity refers to the equity value in the bank’s capital structure which absorbs the
loss in the very first place without affecting the debt repayment ability of the bank. Convert-
ing contingent capital to common shares, the bank’s equity value increases and the liability
value decreases. Dividing the contingent capital value with the exiting equity value in the
11This approximation is based on the Basel III rules and details can be found in the second quarter shareholders’
report of RBC in 2013 (page 37), http://www.rbc.com/investorrelations/pdf/q213report.pdf .
12Flannery[10] assumes that companies can most readily issue contingent capital by replacing their unsecured
long-term debt, including the traditional subordinated debt in Tier 1 and Tier 2. In our calibration, we distinguish
the unsecured senior debt and subordinated debt, including them in the senior and junior tranche respectively.
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capital structure, we get the improvement of the loss-absorbing capacity of the bank by replac-
ing the junior bond (and part of the senior bond) with contingent capital. Perceived from the
approximated capital structure (see Table B.4 in Appendix B), for the big-6 Canadian banks,
replacing the junior bonds with CCBs, the loss absorption capacity is improved by an average
(median) 45.99% (41.31%). Furthermore, including the conversion of partial senior bonds, the
loss absorption capacity is raised further by an average (median) 104.62% (102.21%). There-
fore, contingent capital would strengthen the firm’s stability by boosting up the firm’s capital
immediately upon conversion.
Considering the similarity among the big-6 Canadian banks in their capital structures, with-
out loss of generality, we show and analyze the results under the capital structure of a repre-
sentative bank instead of listing all results for the six Canadian banks.
2.4.2 Conversion Trigger
With Basel III coming into effect, one popular choice of conversion trigger is a capital ratio
trigger and/or authorities discretion. For example, Lloyds Banking Group used the 5.0% con-
solidated core Tier 1 ratio, Credit Suisse Group used common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio and
the authority’s supervision, and Royal Bank of Canada directly makes the conversion decided
by the authority’s judgement of non-viability, etc. In this chapter, we only consider the capital
ratio trigger. The regulatory discretionary trigger will be discussed in Chapter 4.
The recent issuances of contingent capital illustrate CET1 ratio as a natural choice13 for
conversion trigger. According to the different locations of the CET1 ratio, we classify it into
two types, the going-concern trigger and the gone-concern trigger. A going-concern trigger,
or a “high” trigger, corresponds to an early conversion when the capital of the bank is only
modestly eroded. However, a gone-concern trigger, or a “low” trigger, is close to the point
of non-viability. In addition, since the CET1 ratio is defined as common equity Tier 1 capital
divided by the risk-weighted asset (RWA)14 and the asset-liability ratio used in our model is
defined using the total asset, we must identity an empirical relation between the bank’s RWAs
and total assets. For the representative bank, we plot the ratio of the risk-weighted assets
divided by the total assets in Figure 2.2. It illustrates that the ratio is relatively stable over time,
so setting it as a constant is reasonable. To this end, we set the ratio as 0.387, which is the
mean of the time series15. In Table 2.1, we list some correspondence between the CET1 ratio
and the asset-liability ratio. We assume the bank will be liquidated when the CET1 ratio falls
below 4.0%, or when the asset-liability ratio falls below 1.0157.
As shown in Table B.1, we incorporate CET1 ratio into our model by approximating CET1
capital with the common equity. To be compliant with Basel III criteria and conservative in the
choice of conversion triggers, we can consider the 4.5% CET1 ratio, the mandatory requirement
in Basel III, as a gone-concern trigger and higher CET1 ratios (for example, 6.0%) as going-
concern triggers.
13See Appendix A for more details.
14Risk-weighted asset is a bank’s asset weighted according to the risk.
15Based on the discussion, assuming the asset-liability ratio at time t is v¯t, then the CET1 ratio at the moment
is (1 − 1/v¯t)/0.387.
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Figure 2.2: The ratio of RWA over the total asset of the representative Canadian bank: the
time series has mean 38.71% and standard deviation 3.39%.
Table 2.1: Correspondence Between CET1 Ratios And Asset-Liability Ratios
CET 1 Ratio 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0%
Asset-Liability Ratio v¯t 1.0157 1.0197 1.0238 1.0320 1.0403 1.0487 1.0573
2.4.3 Other Parameters
Recovery rates. Since there is no large Canadian bank has ever defaulted, the recovery rates
used in this paper apparently should be higher than those of the United States16. We assume
that, upon liquidation, the recovery rate for deposits is 100%, i.e., deposits are guaranteed to
be fully repaid. The recovery rate for the senior bond is 98.88%, and for the junior bond is
97.87%. These recovery rates are estimated using our model to match the empirical credit
spreads (the median credit spread for senior unsecured debts is 0.21% and for subordinated
debts it is 0.40%) reported in Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5] for Canadian banks.
Risk-free interest rates. Following the method suggested in Hull [13], the risk-free interest
rate is approximated by the yield of treasury bonds. We approximate the risk-free interest rate
using the yield of Canadian government one-year treasury bills from July 31, 2011 to July 31,
2012. The yield of one-year treasury bills during this period is relatively stable, allowing us to
choose the risk-free interest rate as the average 1.00%17.
Asset volatilities. Moody’s reports estimate asset volatilities from the Merton model. Being
16According to Moody’s report (2010) [22] which considers comprehensive scenarios (default and no default)
in the banking field of United States, the value-weighted recovery rate is 54.7% for senior unsecured debt and
63.8% for senior secured debt. For the senior subordinated debt and subordinated bond, the empirical recovery
rate is 39.4% and 32.2%, respectively.
17Kim et al. [14] study the Merton model with CIR dynamics for the short rate and find that the stochastic
interest rates play a relatively insignificant role in the computed credit spreads. Similar discussions can be found
in Lando [15]. Therefore, for simplification, we take the risk-free interest rate as a constant rather than following
a diffusion process.
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conservative, we assume the asset volatility to be 5.0%, which is the largest reported asset
volatility for the big-6 Canadian banks according to Moody’s for the period from 2007 to
2012. The largest value 5.0% showed up in the late 2008, during the financial crisis.
Dividend payout ratios. The dividend payout ratio is approximated by the average of the
last ten year’s dividend payout ratios of common shares (dividends paid to common shares
divided by total asset values). As shown in Appendix B.2.2, given the relatively low standard
deviation, it appears reasonable to directly use the average dividend payout ratio for each bank.
Conversion fraction of the senior bond. In the event that the senior bond is partially con-
vertible, we assume that only the unsecured portion converts. This assumption follows the
suggestion put forward by Arjani and D’Souza[3] and Flannery[10]. For example, according
to Table B.3 in Appendix B, the conversion fraction of the senior bond for RBC is 19.47%.
Table 2.2 lists all the calibrated parameters in our base case. The parameters are set to the
value shown in the base case by default unless specified otherwise.
Table 2.2: Calibrated Parameters in Base Case
Parameter Value
Recovery rate for deposits RD 100%
Recovery rate for senior bond RS 98.88%
Recovery rate for junior bond RJ 97.87%
Default level 4.0% CET1 ratio
Conversion level 5.0% CET1 ratio
Conversion proportion for CCB fCCB 100%
Conversion proportion of senior bond fS 19.47%
Asset volatility σ 5.0%
Risk-free interest rate r 1.00%
Dividend payout ratio q for RBC 0.3718%
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section we implement our model using the calibrated parameters. In each part, results
are shown under fixed conversion price and fixed imposed loss respectively. Moreover, Monte
Carlo simulation is employed to study the term structure of CCB yields.
2.5.1 Base Case
Using the calibrated parameters in Table 2.2, the estimated credit spreads under the traditional
capital structure are shown in Case 1 of Table 2.3. The spreads are the same with the median
of empirical credit spreads summarized in Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5], where they
find that from 1990 to 2010, for the big-6 Canadian banks, the median credit spread for senior
unsecured debts is 0.21% and for subordinated debts it is 0.40%. Since we assume a full
recovery of deposits, the credit spread for deposits is always zero and not included in the table.
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Only Conversion of CCB Under fixed conversion price, we set pCCB = 0.5, meaning the
conversion price for CCB is 50% of the market stock price at the issuance of the contingent
capital18. Under fixed imposed loss, we assume the loss imposed to CCB upon conversion
is 5.33% of the notional value. By the arrangement, we match the risk premiums under two
conversion terms (Case 2 and Case 4).
Replacing the non-contingent junior bond in the capital structure with CCB, Case 2 and
Case 4 in Table 2.3 illustrate a cost increase in the junior tranche but a decline in the senior
bond. Therefore, the terms of conversion are sufficiently punitive to CCB investors (i.e. the
conversion price is sufficiently high) for the CCB to be more expensive than otherwise identical
junior debt19. However, the conversion of contingent capital provides a capital cushion and
reduces the risk of liquidation, which benefits the senior bondholder leading to a fall in credit
spread.
According to the last column of Case 2 and Case 4 in Table 2.3, the issuance of contingent
capital would reduce the weighted total costs for the firm. This mainly results from the fall in
the cost of the senior bond, which accounts for a much greater proportion of total liabilities than
does junior debt, for Canadian banks. Thus, even though it is more expensive than otherwise
identical junior debt, issuing contingent capital here would reduce the firm’s total cost of debt.
From this perspective, issuing contingent capital might benefit the bank regardless of regulatory
requirement.
Table 2.3: Credit Spreads in the Base Case
Case Conversion Part(s) Senior CCB(or Junior) Weighted Totalb
Traditional 1c None 21bp 40bp 22bp
Fixed Price
2 CCB 13bp 113bp 18.28bp
3 CCB & Partial Senior 7bp 152bp 14.65bp
Fixed Loss
4 CCB 13bp 113bp 18.28bp
5 CCB & Partial Senior 7bp 111bp 12.49bp
a Credit spreads here are defined as the difference between the par yields and the risk-free interest rate.
b The weighted total cost is calculated with the corresponding notional value as the weight.
c The credit spreads from Case I are from Beyhaghi, D’Souza and Roberts [5].
Conversion of CCB and Partial Senior Bond When a fraction ( fS = 19.47%) of the senior
bond participating in the conversion, we keep the conversion arrangements for the CCB un-
changed. To respect seniority, the fixed conversion price ratio is assumed to be p¯ = 0.95 < 1
meaning the conversion price for the senior bond is 95% of that for CCB; under fixed imposed
loss, we assume the write-down to the converted part of the senior bond is 45.54% of the write-
down to CCB at conversion. This arrangement gives the same credit spread for the senior bond
(7 basis points) in Case 3 and Case 5.
For these parameters at least, a partially convertible senior bond is less expensive than a
traditional senior bond. The possible reasons resulting in the decline of credit spread includes
(1) the larger safety cushion reduces the possibility of liquidation and (2) the potential upside
18We will see later that this conversion price is located within the reasonable interval for conversion price.
19We will soon see this need not always be the case.
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from the received equity stake in a reinvigorated firm. In contrast, the risk premium of CCB
moves in opposite directions under the two conversion terms. There are two effects for the CCB
investor brought by the conversion of senior bond – the ownership stake received at conversion
is reduced and the dividend stream after conversion is prolonged. These two effects compete
with each other. In our bases case, under fixed conversion price, the first effect dominates
leading to a rise in the spread while under fixed imposed loss, the second effect dominates
resulting in a slight spread drop20.
As is shown in Table 2.3, the issuance of contingent capital would reduce the weighted total
liability cost for the firm. This mainly results from the fall in the costs of the senior tranche.
Comparing Case 2 with Case 3 and Case 4 with Case 5, the larger the fraction of the senior
bond converts to common shares in a trigger event, the more borrowing costs will be reduced
for the firm.
In the following sections we expand on our base case analysis by considering the impact of
the terms of conversion on the firm’s debt costs. We start from the conversion term of the fixed
conversion price and then turn to the fixed imposed loss.
2.5.2 Fixed Conversion Price
We focus on the fixed conversion price in this section and investigate the credit spread of con-
tingent capital under different conversion prices and its sensitivity to the firm’s asset volatility.
In addition, the reasonable interval for conversion price is estimated and presented. For each
problem, we start from the case fS = 0 (i.e. senior bond is non-convertible) and then the case
fS > 0 (i.e. senior bond is partially convertible).
Conversion Prices
Only Conversion of CCB Figure 2.3 plots the change of credit spreads with respect to the
change of conversion price. As the conversion price increases, the credit spread of the CCB
and senior bond raises. Intuitively, a higher conversion price implies a lower ownership stake
to the CCB investor at conversion so the investor would require a higher risk premium as a
compensation. For the senior bond, a relatively high conversion price means more expensive
contingent debt, which pushes the firm towards liquidation faster and causes the climb of the
spread.
Additionally, Figure 2.3 indicates a positive relation between the firm value volatility and
the credit spreads. The more volatile the firm value, the higher the conversion probability and
the earlier the conversion could be. Therefore, fixing a conversion price, for the firm with a
higher volatility, the CCB investor would require a higher (lower) risk premium to compensate
for the conversion risk provided that the fixed conversion price implies a positive (negative)
20In the case that only CCB converts, matching the credit spreads for CCB under two conversion terms implies
1 − βCCB = Pτc/PCCB, where Pτc is the contemporary market stock price at conversion. Adding part of the senior
bond into conversion, we turn to match the credit spreads for the senior bond by assigning 1 − βS = Pτc/PS ,
or equivalently, 1 − xβCCB = Pτc/(yPCCB), where in our base case βCCB = 0.0533, x = 0.4554 and y = 0.95.
We can verify that 1 − βCCB > y(1 − xβCCB), so with the conversion of the partial senior bond, the effective
conversion price for CCB increases, leading to a rise in the credit spread for CCB in Case 3. In addition, we have
1 − 1/x + Pτc/(xyPCCB) > Pτc/PCCB, so the effective redemption to CCB increases, leading to a drop in the credit
spread in Case 5.
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effective write-down at conversion. The intersection point in the right panel of Figure 2.3
represents the point at which the CCB is redeemed at par, in which case the fixed conversion
price is the same as the contemporary stock price at conversion. In the base case the bond is
redeemed at par provided the conversion price is approximately 46% of the firm’s initial stock
price. The value appears to be independent of asset volatility as in our model once we fix the
CET1 ratio which triggers the conversion, the equity value (share price) at conversion is given.
Therefore, under fixed conversion price, the contemporary stock price at conversion implied
by the conversion trigger is a constant and not influenced by different asset volatilities. In the
left panel, the credit spreads of the senior bond are not as sensitive as the spreads of the CCB
to the firm’s asset volatility because conversion only influences the length of coupon payment
stream to the senior bond without impacting its recovery rate at liquidation.
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Figure 2.3: Credit spreads as a function of conversion price or the firm’s asset volatility. We
only consider the conversion of CCB. The x-axis is the conversion price for CCB divided by
the market stock price at the issuance of CCB.
Conversion of CCB and Partial Senior Bond It is perceived in Figure 2.4 that the positive
relation between the conversion price and the credit spread of CCB and senior bond continues
to hold when the senior bond is partially convertible. The credit spread of the senior bond
becomes sensitive to the change of conversion price because fixing the conversion price ratio
p¯, the conversion price for the senior bond increases with the growth of the conversion price
for the CCB. For both panels in Figure 2.4, to the left of the intersection point the contingent
capital is redeemed above par, in which case early redemption is better than late redemption. To
the right of the intersection point, the opposite occurs. The possible early conversion implied
by a relatively high asset volatility would increase (decrease) the risk premium for contingent
capital provided that at conversion, the effective redemption value implied by the conversion
price is below (above) the corresponding notional value. In addition, given an asset volatility,
the credit spread of CCB becomes less sensitive to the change of the conversion price than
the case with only conversion of CCB (right panel in Figure 2.3). This is because partial
conversion of the senior bond provides extra capital infusion to the firm, further delaying the
possible liquidation and prolonging the dividend stream for the CCB investor after conversion.
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Figure 2.4: Credit spreads as a function of conversion price or firm’s asset volatility. We
consider the full conversion of CCB and 19.47% of the senior bond. The conversion price ratio
is fixed at p¯ = 0.95. The x-axis is the conversion price for CCB divided by the market stock
price at the issuance of CCB.
In Figure 2.5 we vary the conversion price ratio p¯ while keeping the conversion price for
CCB unchanged. A sufficiently low conversion price ensures that the convertible portion of the
senior bond is redeemed above par at conversion, resulting in negative credit spreads in the left
panel. In the right panel, as the conversion price ratio declines, the ownership stake distributed
to CCB investors declines. As a result, CCB investors bear more losses and the credit spread
for the CCB rises dramatically. Hence, when the senior bond is involved in conversion, the
issuing firm has to be careful in setting the conversion price ratio in order to ensure that both
tranches contribute to the loss absorbency through conversion.
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Figure 2.5: Credit spreads as a function of conversion price ratio or firm’s asset volatility. We
consider the full conversion of CCB and 100 fS % of the senior bond. The conversion price for
CCB is fixed at pCCB = 0.5. The x-axis is the conversion price ratio p¯.
So far we analyzed the costs of contingent capital under different conversion prices and
asset volatilities. Obviously, for a firm with relatively high risk (volatile asset value), it is ex-
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pensive to issue contingent capital provided that the contingent capital is going to absorb losses
(be redeemed under par) upon conversion. Besides, the conversion price cannot be too low and
the combination of the conversion price and conversion price ratio cannot be arbitrarily chosen.
An extremely low conversion price or unreasonable combination of conversion price and price
ratio might benefit investors through conversion and effectively creates a class of investors that
benefit from the onset of financial distress. It would make the contingent capital fail to work
as a regulatory tool which is supposed to make contributions to loss absorbency through con-
version and boost the firm’s capital rather than profit from the deteriorating situation of the
existing shareholders.
Conversion Fraction of Senior Bond
Figure 2.6 illustrates the impact of fS on the firm’s debt costs. It shows that the spread for the
senior bond decreases first and then increases while the cost for the CCB moves in opposite
direction by climbing first and then falling. The change of spread for the senior bond can be
interpreted by two opposite impacts. On the one hand, the converted part suffers a positive
write-down and loses the corresponding coupon payments. On the other hand, the conversion
of the senior bond further prolongs the life of the firm and therefore the coupon stream of
the unconverted part and the dividend stream for the converted part. When the conversion
proportion is relatively low, the second impact dominates, leading to a fall in the credit spread
of the senior bond as the conversion proportion increases. However, when the conversion
proportion is relatively high and keeps growing, the first impact dominates, leading to a rise
in the credit spread of the senior bond. Although the conversion of the senior bond can delay
the possible liquidation and extend the dividend stream after conversion, it causes dilution to
the ownership stake distributed to the CCB investor upon conversion and the dilution is more
severe as a larger fraction of the senior bond converts in a trigger event. The two influences
compete with each other resulting in a humped-shaped credit spread of CCB in Figure 2.6.
As the senior bond takes a heavy weight in our calibrated capital structure, it appears that
the weighted total spread has a similar shape with the spread of the senior bond. The non-
monotonic shape indicates that there might exist a conversion fraction for the senior bond with
which the weighted total spread is minimized. For example, in Figure 2.6, when the conversion
fraction is around 30%, the weighted total spread realizes a minimum value of about 15 basis
points.
Reasonable Intervals for Conversion Prices
In this section, we implement our model to investigate the reasonable interval for fixed con-
version price. Recall that reasonable terms of conversion imply that seniority is respected at
conversion and that equity investors are not rewarded for poor performance. Following the
definition of (2.42) and (2.43), we know that the function fˆ (pCCB) measures the difference be-
tween losses imposed at conversion to contingent capital investor and senior bond investor. A
positive (negative) value of the function fˆ (pCCB) means the loss imposed on CCB investors is
more (less) than mark-to-market loss sustained by senior investors. In addition, the function
gˆ(pCCB) measures the difference in the equity value at conversion between the case in the ab-
sence of contingent capital and the case with contingent capital. A negative (positive) value
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Figure 2.6: Credit spreads as a function of conversion proportion of the senior bond. The
conversion price for CCB is pCCB = 0.5 and the conversion price ratio p¯ = 0.95. The weighted
total credit spread is estimated with the corresponding notional value as the weight.
of the function gˆ(pCCB) means the original shareholders are rewarded (not rewarded) for the
firm’s poor performance.
Only Conversion of CCB Figure 2.7 plots the reasonable interval for the conversion price
implied by the function (2.42) and (2.43). The monotonic feature of the function fˆ (pCCB) and
gˆ(pCCB) is well captured in the graph. The value of the function fˆ (pCCB) (the green solid line) is
positive when the conversion price is located above 45.83% of the stock price at the issuance of
CCB. Beyond this point, the CCB investor always bears more losses than the senior bondholder
at conversion, guaranteeing the seniority between liabilities. However, the conversion price
cannot go beyond 53.32% of the stock price at the issuance of CCB since otherwise it makes
the value of gˆ(pCCB) (the black dot line) go negative rewarding the existing shareholders for the
firm’s poor performance. Consequently, a reasonable interval for the fixed conversion price is
[45.83%, 53.32%] of the stock price at the issuance of CCB which is indicated as the red line
in the figure.
In Table 2.4, we list reasonable intervals for the fixed conversion price under different trig-
ger locations. A high trigger implies a relatively high market stock price upon conversion, and
in order to respect seniority, the conversion price needs to move upwards. Thus, the location
of the interval moves towards right. As the trigger location moves upwards, the size of the rea-
sonable interval shrinks and the issuing firm has to be more prudent in choosing the conversion
price.
Conversion of CCB and Partial Senior Bond With the senior bond participating in conver-
sion, the functions (2.40) and (2.41) depend on three variables – the conversion proportion ( fS ),
the conversion price for the senior bond (pS ) and for the CCB (pCCB). In the following, we vary
2.5. Numerical Results 31
35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
−30
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
Conversion Price for CCB
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in 
Fu
nc
tio
n 
Va
lue
 
 
Imposed Effective Loss (in %)
Value for Existing Shareholders (in $100 million)
Figure 2.7: Reasonable interval for the conversion price pCCB. We only consider the conver-
sion of CCB. The x-axis is the conversion price as a proportion to the stock price at the issuance
of CCB. The green solid line is estimated by function (2.42). The black dot line is estimated by
function (2.43). The red line gives the reasonable interval [45.83%, 53.32%] for the location
of fixed conversion price.
Table 2.4: Reasonable Intervals for Fixed Conversion Price
Conversion Trigger Reasonable Interval Interval Size
4.5% CET1 [41.96%, 49.66%] 7.70%
5.0% CET1 [45.83%, 53.32%] 7.49%
7.0% CET1 [61.43%, 67.64%] 6.21%
9.0% CET1 [77.26%, 81.43%] 4.17%
two parameters each time and investigate the existence and the change of the reasonable region
for conversion prices. For convenience, instead of using the conversion price for the senior
bond (pS ), we use the conversion price ratio (p¯) to control the variation of the conversion price
for the senior bond.
Firstly, we fix the conversion proportion of the senior bond ( fS ) and vary the conversion
price ratio (p¯) and the conversion price for CCB (pCCB). We start from the special case fS = 0.
The region given in the left upper panel of Figure 2.8 is a bar bounded by two lines vertically
located at 45.83% and 53.32% respectively, which are exactly the end points of the reasonable
interval in the case with only conversion of CCB. For non-zero conversion proportions, shown
in Figure 2.8, the regions satisfying the principle put forward by OSFI are bounded by three
lines and are located above the blue dashed-and-point line. The region shrinks as more propor-
tion of the senior bond participates in conversion. As a result, the issuing firm has to be careful
in choosing the combinations of the conversion price ratio and the conversion price of CCB if
they plan a relatively large fraction of contingent capital in the capital structure.
In Figure 2.9 we fix the conversion price ratio and vary the conversion price for the CCB
(pCCB) and the conversion fraction ( fS ). The reasonable regions are bounded by three lines and
are located below the blue dashed-and-point line. The scale of the region is positively related
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with the conversion price ratio. If we assign an extremely small conversion price ratio, such
as p¯ = 0.001 in the upper left panel, only a very small fraction (less than 1%) of the senior
tranche is allowed to be converted in a trigger event. Otherwise the senior bondholders would
be significantly benefited from conversion since the senior bond would be easily redeemed
above par.
Since there is a narrow reasonable interval for the conversion price of CCB (pCCB), we only
consider two fixed conversion prices (pCCB = 0.5 and 0.53) while vary the conversion fraction
( fS ) and the conversion price ratio (p¯). In Figure 2.10, the reasonable region is located to the
left of the red dashed line and black line and the right of the blue dashed-and-point line. Since
the black line just appears in the right upper corner, implying that almost all the combinations
on the whole panel satisfies the liability seniority between the senior bond and CCB. As the
conversion price pCCB increases, the change of the reasonable region is uncertain as is shown
in Figure 2.10.
To conclude, we find that the area of the reasonable region depends on the dilution to the
CCB investor21 caused by the conversion of the senior bond. Intuitively, there is a limited
region for the fixed conversion price which controls the dilution within a reasonable range.
The higher the dilution implied by the parameters, the smaller the range would appear. If
we vary the conversion proportion fS while fixing two other parameters, the dilution to the
CCB investor increases as a greater fraction of the senior bond participates in conversion.
As a result, we observe a shrinking region in Figure 2.8 as the conversion fraction increases.
Similarly, if we vary the conversion price ratio p¯ while fixing the the conversion proportion
and the conversion price to the CCB, the dilution to the CCB after conversion declines as the
conversion ratio climbs so the area of the reasonable region increases. However, if we change
the conversion price pCCB while fixing the conversion proportion and the conversion price ratio,
the change of the reasonable region is not clear. This is because to keep the conversion price
ratio unchanged, the conversion price for the senior bond increases with the growth of that for
the CCB making the dilution to the CCB investor ambiguous. As a result, the area change in
Figure 2.10 is unclear.
21The dilution here refers to the dilution effect to the CCB investor after conversion resulting from the con-
version of the senior bond. With the senior bond participating in the conversion, if the ownership stake ωCCB
decreases post conversion, we say there is a dilution effect to the CCB investor.
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Figure 2.8: Reasonable region for the combination of conversion price and conversion price
ratio. The black solid lines represent the function fˆ ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0 and the red dashed lines
represent the function gˆ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0 with given conversion fraction fS ’s. The blue dashed-
and-point lines represent the equivalence of the par yields for deposits and senior bonds. In the
left upper panel, the two blue dots located at 45.83% and 53.32% respectively.
2.5.3 Fixed Imposed Loss
In this section we fix the proportion of imposed loss (or write-down proportion) to the notional
value of the contingent capital at conversion, but let the conversion price be the contempo-
rary market stock price. Similar to the section of fixed conversion price, we investigate the
credit spread of contingent capital under different fixed losses, its sensitivity to the firm’s asset
volatility and present the reasonable interval for fixed imposed losses.
Imposed Losses
Only Conversion of CCB According to Table 2.5, the credit spread of the CCB is positively
related to the loss imposed at conversion. With a relatively high asset volatility, the credit
spread appears to be more susceptible to the change of imposed loss under a higher asset
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Figure 2.9: Reasonable interval for the combination of conversion price and conversion frac-
tion of the senior bond. The black solid lines represent the function fˆ ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0 and red
dashed lines represent the function gˆ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0 with given conversion price ratio p¯’s.
The blue dashed-and-point lines represent the equivalence of the par yields for deposits and
senior bonds. The two blue dots located at the x-axis have the x-value 45.83% and 53.32%.
volatility because conversion probably occurs earlier and the CCB investor would suffer a
write-down earlier than under a low asset volatility. The credit spread of the senior bond is not
sensitive to the change of the imposed loss since the conversion of the contingent capital only
influences its coupon leg without changing its recovery rate at liquidation.
Conversion of CCB and Partial Senior Bond Table 2.6 lists the credit spreads of the senior
bond and CCB under different imposed losses at conversion. The credit spread of the senior
bond becomes sensitive to the change of imposed loss and it increases with the the loss imposed
at conversion. Comparing Table 2.6 with Table 2.5, the credit spread of CCB does not change
significantly as part of the senior bond converts to common shares at the same time with the
CCB. This is because the conversion fraction of the senior bond might be significant enough to
delay the possible liquidation and prolong the dividend stream for CCB investors.
2.5. Numerical Results 35
Conversion Price pCCB = 0.5
Conversion Price Ratio (%)
Co
nv
er
sio
n 
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 S
en
io
r (
%)
 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
cS = cCCB
cD = cS
Etrad
τ
c
 = (1 − ωS − ωCCB)Eτ
c
Conversion Price pCCB = 0.53
Conversion Price Ratio (%)
Co
nv
er
sio
n 
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 S
en
io
r (
%)
 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
cS = cCCB
cD = cS
Etrad
τ
c
 = (1 − ωS − ωCCB)Eτ
c
Figure 2.10: Reasonable interval for the combination of conversion price ratio and conversion
fraction of the senior bond. The red dashed lines represent the function gˆ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0 with
given conversion price pCCB’s. The blue dashed-and-point line represent the equivalence of the
par yields for deposits and senior bonds. The black solid lines represent fˆ ( fS , p¯, pCCB) = 0.
Table 2.5: Credit Spreads Under Fixed Imposed Loss ( fS = 0.0%)
σ Bond Imposed Loss (βCCB)
0.0% 5.0% 10% 15% 20% 25%
5.0%
Senior 13 bp 13 bp 13 bp 13 bp 13 bp 13 bp
CCB 0 bp 106 bp 216 bp 333 bp 455 bp 584 bp
10.0%
Senior 24 bp 25 bp 25 bp 25 bp 25 bp 26 bp
CCB 0 bp 204 bp 417 bp 638 bp 868 bp 1109 bp
20.0%
Senior 63 bp 63 bp 64 bp 65 bp 65 bp 66 bp
CCB 0 bp 523 bp 1065 bp 1628 bp 2214 bp 2823 bp
Table 2.6: Credit Spreads Under Fixed Imposed Loss ( fS = 19.47%)
σ Tranche Imposed Loss (βCCB)
0.0% 5.0% 10% 15% 20% 25%
5.0%
Senior 4 bp 7 bp 10 bp 13 bp 16 bp 18 bp
CCB 0 bp 103 bp 214 bp 332 bp 459 bp 596 bp
10.0%
Senior 9 bp 14 bp 19 bp 25 bp 30 bp 36 bp
CCB 0 bp 201 bp 413 bp 637 bp 875 bp 1128 bp
20.0%
Senior 24 bp 37 bp 50 bp 63 bp 77 bp 90 bp
CCB 0 bp 515 bp 1056 bp 1626 bp 2229 bp 2868 bp
Conversion Fraction of Senior Bond
In Figure 2.11, we plot the credit spreads under different conversion proportions of the se-
nior bond. The credit spread of the senior bond and CCB change non-monotonically with the
increase of the conversion proportion. When the conversion proportion is relatively low, the
upside (delayed liquidation, prolonged streams of dividends and coupons) brought by the con-
version of the senior bond dominates, causing a decline in the credit spreads. However, as the
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conversion proportion grows, the downside (growing write-down to the notional value and di-
lution effects) brought by the conversion of the senior bond dominates, causing an increase in
the credit spreads. Due to the heavy weight of the senior bond, the weighted total cost moves
similarly with the credit spread of the senior bond. The non-monotonic shape makes it possible
for the firm to choose a conversion proportion of the senior bond so that the weighted total cost
of contingent capital is minimized. In our case, the weighted total cost is minimized when
about 30.0% of the senior bond converts to common shares in a trigger event.
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Figure 2.11: Credit spreads as a function of the conversion proportion of the senior bond.
The conversion fraction is denoted as the percentage of the senior bond notional value. The
weighted total credit spread is estimated with the corresponding notional value as the weight.
Reasonable Intervals for Fixed Imposed Losses
Similar to the analysis under fixed conversion price, now we present the reasonable interval
under fixed imposed loss.
Only Conversion of CCB Table 2.7 presents the reasonable intervals under different trigger
locations. As the conversion trigger moves up, the interval moves towards the origin. Under
a relatively highly-located conversion trigger, conversion might happen when the firm’s value
is adequate, which implies a low loss proportion imposed to the senior bond and the existing
common shares. As a result, two end points of the interval move towards the origin as the
trigger moves up. Moreover, the size of the interval declines as the trigger location moves
upwards. Therefore, the issuing firm must be careful if it uses a going-concern (highly-located)
conversion trigger since there would be a relatively small room from which the firm can choose
a fixed imposed loss so that the liability seniority is respected and the existing shareholders are
not rewarded upon conversion. Additionally, the higher the trigger, the more concentrated the
reasonable interval is around small imposed losses.
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Table 2.7: Reasonable Intervals for Fixed Imposed Losses
Conversion Trigger Reasonable Interval Interval Size
4.5% CET1 [0.6465%, 9.3898%] 8.7433%
5.0% CET1 [0.6020%, 8.7816%] 8.1796%
7.0% CET1 [0.4247%, 6.3037%] 5.8790%
9.0% CET1 [0.2481%, 3.7532%] 3.5051%
Conversion of CCB and Partial Senior Bond The reasonable region is determined by the
conversion proportion of the senior bond ( fS ), the loss imposed on CCB investors at conversion
(βCCB) and to the converted part of the senior bond (βCS ). Similar to our discussions under fixed
conversion price, we vary the imposed loss to the converted part of the senior bond through the
imposed loss ratio which is defined as βCS divided by βCCB.
In Figure 2.12, the reasonable region is bounded by the two lines since under our calibra-
tion any combination on the panel would guarantee the seniority between the senior bond and
deposits. In the special case of fS = 0.0%, the region is insensitive to the change of imposed
loss ratio and the two lines are horizontally located at 0.6020% and 8.7816% respectively, pro-
viding a cross check for the reasonable interval in Table 2.7. As the senior bond participates
in the conversion, the red dashed line shows some slope and the black line moves downwards
slightly. The black line in the graph is not strictly horizontal but changes slightly under dif-
ferent imposed loss ratios due to the fixed write-down for CCB. As a greater fraction of the
senior bond participates in the conversion, the senior bondholder bears more loss at conver-
sion. Under this circumstance, the reasonable combination would move towards the origin as
the conversion proportion of the senior bond increases, leading to the red line pressing towards
the origin and the black line merges to the zero x-axis.
Fixing the loss imposed on CCB investors, the reasonable region shown in Figure 2.13 is
completely determined by the red dashed line which represents the punishment to the existing
shareholders at conversion. As the loss imposed on the CCB increases, the reasonable combi-
nations begin to cluster towards the origin because given an imposed loss ratio, with the rise
of the loss imposed to CCB, the conversion proportion of the senior bond has to be reduced in
order to prevent existing shareholders expropriating wealth from contingent capital investors
through conversion.
Assuming the imposed loss ratio between the (converted part of) senior bond and CCB is
fixed, the reasonable region is bounded by two lines in Figure 2.14. As the imposed loss ratio
goes to one, the loss imposed to the converted part of the senior bond approaches to that of the
CCB and the area for the reasonable combinations reduces. Fixing a conversion proportion for
the senior bond, if the imposed loss ratio is large or close to one, we have to control the loss
imposed to CCB so that the total loss absorbed by contingent capital investors does not exceed
the loss sustained by the original shareholders upon conversion.
2.5.4 Conversion Trigger
The second essential design feature of contingent capital is the conversion trigger. In our paper,
we only focus on the capital ratio trigger as in Glasserman and Nouri [11]. In the case only
CCB converts, Table 2.8 demonstrates that the cost of contingent capital is less sensitive to
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Figure 2.12: Reasonable region for the combination of imposed loss on CCB and the imposed
loss ratio. The black solid lines represent the function fˆ ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 and the red dashed
lines represent the function gˆ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 with given conversion fraction fS ’s.
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Figure 2.13: Reasonable region for the combination of imposed loss ratio and conversion frac-
tion of the senior bond. The black solid lines represent the function fˆ ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 and the
red dashed lines represent the function gˆ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 with given βCCB’s.
the trigger location under fixed imposed loss than under fixed conversion price. This is due
to the reason that under a fixed conversion price, CCB investors receive a fixed fraction of the
firm’s residual value at conversion, and since this residual value increases with the location
of the conversion trigger, increasing the trigger level effectively lowers the loss imposed on
CCB investors at conversion. However, under fixed imposed loss, the effective redemption to
the CCB upon conversion is a constant equal to the difference between the notional value and
the fixed write-down. This phenomenon persists even when the senior bond participates in
the conversion. As seen in Table 2.9, the credit spread of the CCB is relatively stable under
fixed imposed loss but quite volatile under fixed conversion price, with respect to the change
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Figure 2.14: Reasonable region for the combination of imposed loss on CCB and the imposed
loss ratio. The black solid lines represent the function fˆ ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 and the red dashed
lines represent the function gˆ( fS , βCS , βCCB) = 0 with given imposed loss ratios.
of trigger location.
Therefore, the location of the capital-ratio trigger would impact the costs of issuing con-
tingent capital. If the issuing firm wants to incorporate uncertainty into the trigger design,
such as saying conversion would be triggered somewhere around 5.0% CET1 ratio rather than
explicitly right at 5.0% CET1 ratio, it appears as though a fixed imposed loss would be prefer-
able because the ambiguity of the trigger would not increase the costs of contingent capital
significantly.
Table 2.8: Sensitivity to Trigger Location ( fS = 0)
Trigger Location in CET 1 Ratio
Conversion Terms 4.25% 4.5% 5.0% 5.25% 5.5%
Senior - Fixed Price 13bp 13bp 13bp 13bp 12bp
CCB - Fixed Price 234bp 196bp 113bp 68bp 12bp
Senior - Fixed Loss 13bp 13bp 13bp 13bp 13bp
CCB - Fixed Loss 101bp 105bp 113bp 117bp 122bp
Table 2.9: Sensitivity to Trigger Location ( fS = 19.47%)
Trigger Location in CET 1 Ratio
Conversion Terms 4.25% 4.5% 5.0% 5.25% 5.5%
Senior - Fixed Price 13bp 11bp 7bp 5bp 3bp
CCB - Fixed Price 233bp 208bp 152bp 122bp 89bp
Senior - Fixed Loss 7bp 7bp 7bp 7bp 7bp
CCB - Fixed Loss 99bp 103bp 111bp 115bp 119bp
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2.5.5 Term Structure under Simulations
So far our work is based on the assumption that all bonds are perpetual. This assumption allows
us to derive analytical formulas to price contingent capital and other liabilities in the capital
structure. However, since there are few perpetual bonds in the real world, it is meaningful to
extend our pricing methodology under a finite time horizon and price contingent capital with
finite maturities. I used C++ to implement the simulation.
One possible way is using Monte Carlo simulation. The basic idea is along each path, we
discount back all the payments (coupon payments before conversion, dividends post conversion
and equity value received upon conversion if conversion happens, or the principal if conversion
does not happen). By averaging the discounted values of all simulated paths, we estimate
the expectation of the present value for each liability. Equating the expected present value
with the corresponding notional value, we may solve for the par yield of each liability in the
capital structure. In the procedure, we need to pay attention to the estimation of the equity
value received by contingent capital investors upon conversion. Under fixed imposed loss,
it is simply as the difference between the notional value and the fixed write-down value (i.e.
(1− βCCB)LJ). However, under a fixed conversion price, it depends on the firm’s residual value
at conversion which must be evaluated through sub-simulations. Figure 2.15 gives a brief
introduction of our simulation procedure. Taking one asset value path as an example, it follows
the dynamics (2.15) before conversion. When it hits the conversion level around t = 0.38 years,
we evaluate the residual value at this moment because contingent capital investors receive their
“principal payments” in terms of common shares at conversion. Let the conversion (hitting)
time be the starting point of our sub-simulation, beyond which we simulate five asset value sub-
paths after conversion following the dynamics (2.16). By discounting back the payments along
those sub-paths to the conversion time and taking the average, we get the estimated residual
value at conversion22. After that, we discount all the payments along the main path from the
conversion time back to the beginning to calculate the present value of each liability in the
capital structure. Repeating this process and equating the average present value of expected
payments (including coupon payments, dividends and final principal payments or the value of
common shares received from conversion) to the corresponding notional value of each liability
in the capital structure, we solve for the par yields. The stopping criteria used in searching for
the par yields is √
(LD − D0)2
L2D
+
(LS − S 0)2
L2S
+
(LJ −CCB0)2
L2J
< 0.1%, (2.44)
where D0, S 0 and CCB0 are discounted value of deposits, senior bond and CCB respectively
and they are approximated from the simulation. The condition (2.44) implies the solved par
yields only allow for a relevant difference between the discounted present values and notional
values smaller than 0.1%.
22We did not evaluate the residual value at conversion by directly subtracting the value of unconverted liabilities
from the total asset value because there are simulation errors which might destroy the strict equivalence of the
asset value to the sum of the equity value and the liability value. Therefore, direct subtraction might lead to
negative residual values at conversion and cause unnecessary noises in searching for the par yields. However,
the simulation errors will vanish when the number of simulation paths is very large, which would be very time-
consuming especially when a small time step is used.
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Figure 2.15: Simulation procedure under the fixed conversion price.The upper horizontal line
is the conversion level and the lower horizontal line is the liquidation level.
Considering only conversion of the CCB, we use the time step dt = 0.004 as an approxima-
tion to the asset value’s update each business day (252 business days in a year). Under a fixed
loss, sub-simulation is not required so we simulate one hundred thousand paths to estimate the
par yields. However, under a fixed price, since there are sub-simulations involved for each path
hitting the conversion level, in order to keep the computational time reasonable, we use ten
thousand paths in the main routine of simulation and one thousand paths in the sub-simulation
for each path hitting the conversion level.
The upper panel of Figure 2.16 plots the term structures of the senior bond and CCB under
fixed loss. If the firm has a relatively high asset volatility (σ = 5.0% or 3.0%), the term struc-
ture for the senior bond is humped-shaped while for the CCB it is monotonically decreasing.
For the senior bondholder, it is possible that the firm has difficulties paying back the principals
of liabilities within a short term. However, for long-term liabilities, since the repayments of
principals are not so imminent, and in the long run, it is possible for the firm to recover after re-
structuring or corrective actions and be able to repay its liabilities, the risk premium decreases
with increasing time to maturity. The humped-shaped term structure is not exclusive to the cap-
ital structure model. Analytical and empirical discussions can be found in Merton [20], Sarig
and Warga [26] and Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan [14], etc. and this humped-shaped term
structure appears in the 2008 financial crisis according to Berg [4]23 and in 2013 debt-ceiling
crisis according to Ozdagli and Peek [23]24. Recalling that the relatively high asset volatility
23The author studies the credit default swaps for several maturities to extract the risk premium term structure
from market prices and find that short-term risk premium have increased significantly during the financial crisis
while the long-term risk premium remained almost unchanged during the financial crisis.
24They investigate the effects of the 2013 debt-ceiling crisis on the Treasury bill market and find that the 2013
debt-ceiling crisis reduced the demand for Treasury bills that were scheduled to mature right after the debt-ceiling
deadline, but not for longer-term Treasury bills. Accordingly, they see a hump formed at the shorter end of the
term structure of Treasury bill yields around the debt-ceiling deadline, with the term structure returning to more
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(σ = 5.0%) is calibrated as the maximum value of the asset volatility of the Canadian represen-
tative bank during the 2008 financial crisis, it makes sense to perceive a humped-shaped term
structure for the senior bond. For the CCB, with a relatively high asset volatility, conversion
is likely to occur and the time of conversion is brought forward. In other words, the contin-
gent capital investor bears loss at conversion earlier than under a relatively low asset volatility.
Although the conversion could lower the liability commitments and inject capital to the firm
immediately, the short maturity might still put the firm into the trouble of paying back all the
liability principals due to reasons such as lack of liquidity. However, in the long run, with the
capital boost from the conversion of CCB and some operational improvements, it is likely that
the firm is able to fully repay its liability commitments. Along with a relatively long coupon
or dividend payment stream, we observe a decreasing credit spread for the CCB as the time
to maturity increases. Similar term structures are discussed in Merton [20]. If the firm has a
relatively low asset volatility (σ = 1.00%), the credit spread of the senior bond and CCB is
positively related to the time to maturity. This is a general shape of bond yield term structure,
mainly including the concern for the increasing uncertainty in the long run.
In the lower panel of Figure 2.16, we graph the difference between the credit spread of the
senior bond and CCB and of the corresponding liability in an otherwise identical traditional
capital structure. With the difference staying in the negative panel, replacing the traditional
junior bond with CCB would lessen the credit spread of the senior bond. However, the contin-
gent capital bond is more expensive than the otherwise identical traditional junior bond due to
the conversion feature and the positive write-down at conversion.
Similar observations can be found in Figure 2.17 under fixed conversion price. For ex-
ample, we observe a decreasing or humped-shaped term structure under relatively high asset
volatilities while an increasing term structure with relatively low asset volatility, which can be
explained by the similar analysis as we made under fixed imposed loss.
Last but not the least, it is perceived from Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 that it requires more
than twenty years25 to maturity before the perpetual case is realized. The review of issuances
of contingent capital in Appendix A show that in practice, the contingent capital are mainly
long-term debts – all of the issued contingent capital have maturities more than ten years and
some are perpetual debts. From this point of view, we can say that the main implications given
by our model under the infinite maturity might still hold in practice.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
Starting from the structural model developed by Metzler and Reesor [21] to price the zero-
coupon contingent capital, we extend the model to price contingent capital with fixed coupon
payments. In terms of the perpetual case, the closed-form pricing formula is derived and solved
numerically, giving fair prices for contingent capital under different conversion terms and trig-
ger locations. In the finite-maturity case, we implement our model with Monte Carlo simulation
and generate term structures having similar shapes with the classical Merton model [20]. We
implement the pricing model based on the capital structures calibrated from the balance sheet
normal levels immediately after resolution of the crisis.
25Our numerical results demonstrate that when the time to maturity is extended to thirty years, the perpetual
case is well replicated.
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Figure 2.16: Term structures for liabilities under fixed imposed loss. The upper panel plots the
credit spread of the senior bond and CCB. In the lower panel, it shows the difference between
the credit spread of the senior bond and CCB and that of corresponding liability in an otherwise
identical traditional capital structure.
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Figure 2.17: Term structures for liabilities under fixed conversion price. The upper panel
plots the credit spread for the senior bond and CCB. In the lower panel, it shows the difference
between the credit spread of the senior bond and CCB and of the corresponding liability in an
otherwise identical traditional capital structure.
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of a representative Canadian bank and discuss conversion terms and triggers under a regulatory
perspective.
We did not compare the value of a zero-coupon CCB and the value of a CCB with fixed
coupon payments on the quantitative level in this chapter but some insights can still be obtained
comparing the results in this chapter and the results in Metzler and Reesor [21]. Generally,
most of the results for the CCB with coupon payments discussed in this chapter are consistent
with the results for the zero-coupon CCB studied in Metzler and Reesor [21]. For example, the
remarkably narrow reasonable intervals for conversion terms, the sensitivity of the CCB price
to the location of the conversion trigger under different conversion terms and the influence of
firm-specific parameters on the value of CCBs.
As new shares are issued through the conversion of contingent capital, there exist dilution
and ownership re-distribution after conversion, which might give rise to manipulation incen-
tives to the contingent capital investors and the existing equity holders. For example, if the
conversion price depends on the market stock price, contingent capital investors might have
incentives to push down the stock price before conversion so that they could obtain a larger
ownership stake. If the conversion trigger is based on the market stock price, the existing
shareholders might want to trigger the conversion by pushing down the stock price and trans-
fer wealth from contingent capital investors. Hence, an important avenue for future work is
investigating the manipulation incentives when the conversion is imminent.
According to OSFI [19], the non-viability contingent capital bond (NVCC) would bring
larger net benefits in the Canadian context than a CCB with the trigger well above the point
of non-viability. NVCC is a contingent capital bond with conversion trigger at the point of
non-viability. It is a special contingent capital because authorities can participate in deciding if
the bank is close to or at the so-called point of non-viability and force the NVCC to convert. In
other words, instead of using an objective conversion trigger which might be a capital ratio or
an observable market variable, the trigger of NVCC depends on the knowledge and judgement
of authorities and therefore is subjective. Thus, another division of our future work would be
the evaluation of contingent capital with regulatory discretionary trigger.
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Chapter 3
Short-Selling Incentives Near Conversion
to Equity
In this chapter we address the issue of whether a long position in a CCB creates incentives to
short the issuing firm’s stock. We consider two types of incentives - “honest” and “dishonest”.
By an honest short we mean a short position that is taken in an effort to create a natural hedge
against a decline in the value of the CCB. By a dishonest short we mean one that is put in place
within an effort to push the market value of the stock below its fundamental value.
In order to quantify incentives to take honest short positions, we consider a firm having a
traditional capital structure, as in Section 2.2. We compute the fraction of the firm’s equity
that would need to be shorted in order to completely hedge a long position in the firm’s junior
debt. Next we replace the junior debt with contingent capital and compute the fraction of the
firm’s equity that would need to be shorted in order to completely hedge a long position in
the firm’s contingent capital. We find that for the representative Canadian institution, near the
point of conversion CCB investors would need to short nearly three times as much (4.0% versus
1.38%) of the firm’s equity as would investors in otherwise identical junior debt. Relatively
speaking, then, the introduction of contingent capital would create much stronger incentives to
take honest short positions; in absolute terms it is not clear that these incentives would be a
significant concern.
Quantifying incentives to take dishonest short positions is much more challenging. The
first step is to understand how such incentives might arise. To this end consider an investor that
owns a CCB for which the conversion price is the firm’s stock price at conversion. Suppose that
conversion appears imminent in the sense that the firm’s CET1 ratio is 5.2% and the conversion
trigger is a CET1 ratio of 5.0%. Further suppose that if the firm’s CET1 ratio were to drop
to 5.0% then the fair/fundamental value of the firm’s stock would be $5 per share. If, by
shorting the firm’s stock, the CCB investor is able to push the market price down to 80% of
its fundamental value, then the investor will end up paying $4 per share for something that
should cost $5 per share. Alternatively, the investor will end up owning 25% more of the firm’s
equity than they would have owned in the absence of manipulation. It is precisely this type of
incentive that is a major concern for regulators and potential issuers of contingent capital, and
this chapter appears to be the first academic work to rigorously develop a model that can be
used to investigate the issue.
48
3.1. Honest Incentives – Hedge 49
3.1 Honest Incentives – Hedge
We continue using the notation from Chapter 2. In the case that the firm’s asset value falls, the
value of the CCB and equity fall as well. Therefore, the profit from shorting equity in the case
that the firm’s asset value falls would cover the loss in the long positions of CCB. When the
firm’s financial situation is deteriorating and conversion is likely, the short-selling behaviour
would presumably intensify (Spiegeleer and Schoutens [26] [25]).
Based on (2.29) and by Itoˆ’s Lemma, given an asset value at time t, we can derive the
diffusion process for CCB (see Appendix C for details) and therefore the diffusion term
σCCB(Vt) = (ωCCBEτc −
cCCBLJ
r
)σVtU′(Vt), (3.1)
where U(Vt) = u(v¯t) = Et,v[e−r(τc−t)] with the asset-to-liability ratio v¯t = Vt/L and u(v¯t) is given
by (2.24). Similarly, we can obtain the diffusion terms for deposits (σD(Vt)) and senior bond
(σS (Vt)). To this end, the diffusion term for the equity is
σE(Vt) = σVt − σD(Vt) − σS (Vt) − σCCB(Vt), t ≤ τc, (3.2)
which decomposes the variation of the firm value as the sum of variations from each tranche in
the capital structure.
Define
∆t =
σCCB(Vt)
σE(Vt)
. (3.3)
Considering a portfolio consisting of (i) a long position in the CCB and (ii) a short position
in 100∆t% of the firm’s outstanding equity, is (locally) riskless. Let pit = CCBt − ∆tEt be the
time-t value of the portfolio. Using the fact that in the absence of arbitrage all assets have the
same Sharpe ratio1, we obtain dpit = (1 − ∆t)rdt. Therefore, by shorting 100∆t% of the firm’s
equity, CCB investors of the firm offset the gain or loss in their long positions of CCB given the
firm value at the moment. From this perspective, ∆t measures the short-selling pressure from
CCB investors given the firm value at time t.
Similarly, under a traditional capital structure, define,
∆tradt =
σtradJ (V
trad
t )
σtradE (V
trad
t )
, (3.4)
where σtradJ (V
trad
t ) and σ
trad
E (V
trad
t ) are the diffusion terms of the junior bond and equity in the
traditional capital structure at time t. Intuitively, ∆tradt can be thought as the sensitivity of
a change in the otherwise identical traditional junior bond value for a change in the issuing
firm’s equity value. Although there is no conversion risk for the otherwise identical traditional
junior bondholders, they can offset the possible loss in their long positions of the traditional
junior bonds by shorting the firm’s shares as well.
Figure 3.1 shows the short sale proportions of the issuing firm’s equity given different asset
values using the parameters and capital structure given in Table 2.2. At the conversion level
1That is, µCCB(Vt)−r
σCCB(Vt)
=
µE (Vt)−r
σE (Vt)
, where µCCB(Vt) and µE(Vt) are the growth rate of CCB and equity value at time t
respectively.
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(the starting point of the x-axis), CCB investors would need to short approximately 4.0% of the
firm’s outstanding equity in order to fully hedge their position; comparatively, the otherwise
identical traditional junior bondholders only need to short approximately 1.38% of the firm’s
equity to fully hedge their position. When the asset value keeps growing, two deltas approach
to zero because there is little conversion risk for the CCB and little default risk for the otherwise
identical traditional junior bond in which case both of them tend to be risk-free. The potential
for conversion is the main difference between the CCB and the otherwise identical traditional
junior bond. As long as the conversion level locates above the liquidation level, we always
have ∆t > ∆tradt because conversion always occurs prior to liquidation and it is the extra risk
except the default risk confronted by CCB investors.
Remark So far we compare the hedge ratio of CCB with that of the otherwise identical tra-
ditional junior bond and confirm the existence of the extra short-selling incentives from CCB
investors. In other words, if we replace the traditional junior bond in the capital structure with
CCB, the short-selling incentives of CCB investors will be significantly intensified as the firm
value approaches to the conversion level.
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Figure 3.1: Delta of CCB and the otherwise identical traditional junior bond.
3.2 Dishonest Incentives – Convert at A Favourable Price
In the vast majority of existing CCBs the conversion price is related to the firm’s stock price
at conversion. For example, Credit Suisse Group (2011 and 2012) uses a volume weighted
average stock price for a preceding time period with a predefined floor price as the conversion
price, and Bank of Cyprus (2011) bases the conversion price on the market price with both a
floor and a ceiling price, etc. The issuances made by Canadian banks, such as RBC, CIBC and
BMO also relate the conversion price to the market stock price. A review of the issuances and
developments of CCBs can refer to Avdjiev, Kartasheva and Bogdanova [2].
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If the conversion price is highly correlated with the firm’s stock price at or near conversion
then, all else being equal, a lower stock price translates into a larger ownership stake post-
conversion for CCB investors. With the prospect of conversion, CCB holders might short sell
the firm’s shares to press down the market stock price in advance. If the conversion occurs
eventually, they would receive more shares from the conversion than not doing so. Therefore,
CCB investors receive a greater fraction of the equity value than they deserve and the shares
they receive are probably under-valued upon conversion. The difference between the conver-
sion price and the rational conversion price based on the firm’s fundamentals is seized by CCB
investors. Such incentives are a serious concern for regulators. More qualitative discussions
about possible manipulation (short-selling) incentives can be found in Squam Lake Working
Group on Financial Regulation [27], Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [4][13], Ioan-
nides and Skinner [5], Order and Lai [23], D’Souza and Gravelle [9] and Duffie [10], etc.
Although the aforementioned studies have discussed the CCB investors’ possible manip-
ulation incentives qualitatively, the issue has never been rigorously analyzed. In this chapter,
we use the structural model developed in Chapter 2 to rigorously investigate incentives for in-
vestors that own CCBs to short the issuing firm’s stock. Canadian banking data are employed in
this chapter in order to provide a closer look of the potential manipulation risk in the real world
issuance of CCBs. In order to analyze potential incentives for dishonest short positions we al-
low temporary deviation between the market stock price and its fundamental value. The effect
is to mimic the potential effect of large-scale short selling on the market value of the stock.
Our model provides a practical way to analyze investors’ possible return from manipulations
under different market-based conversion prices, and therefore sheds light on the short-selling
incentives from CCB investors.
Three market-based conversion prices are discussed in this paper, the contemporary market
stock price, the trailing average stock price and the contemporary market stock price plus a
floor. We find that
• the direct use of contemporary market stock price could tempt the manipulation incen-
tives;
• as might be expected, a relatively high floor price can reduce incentives to take dishonest
short positions;
• the use of trailing average would cut down the possible return from manipulations to a
limited extent, depending on the number of historical data used in calculating the trailing
average.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we model the deviation between the market
stock price and its fundamental value. Then we discuss the assumption of the time to close
investors’ short positions. In Section 3.3.3 we define and investigate two returns from investors’
manipulations - the return from conversion and the return from short-selling. We present our
analytical and simulation results in Section 3.4 and conclude in Section 3.5.
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3.3 Model
Assuming a probability space (Ω,F ,P), where P is the physical pricing measure. Denote the
expectation E˜ with respect to the measure P. We continue using the notation from Chapter 2.
Under the physical measure, before conversion, the asset value dynamics is
dVt = ((µ − q)Vt − (cDLD + cS LS + cCCBLJ)) dt + σVtdWt, t < τc (3.5)
where the constant µ > 0 is the gross growth rate in the firm’s assets. We do not consider the
conversion of the senior bond in the capital structure in this chapter so post conversion, the firm
ceases to pay the CCB’s coupon and the asset value dynamics becomes
dVt =
[
(µ − q)Vt − (cDLD + cS LS )] dt + σVtdWt, t ≥ τc, (3.6)
where the conversion time τc is defined as the first passage time of the pre-determined asset-
liability ratio b∗,
τc = inf {t ≥ 0 : v¯t ≤ b∗} . (3.7)
To analyze the short-selling incentives from CCB investors, we are going to extend the
model proposed in Chapter 2, where the fundamental equity value depends on the asset value
and cannot be manipulated, by assuming the market equity value could be manipulated by
investors and there will be a deviation between the market and fundamental value under ma-
nipulations.
3.3.1 Impact of Short-Selling
Conventional wisdom tells that short selling generally drives down the market price of the stock
being shorted. Assuming that short-selling only drives down the market share price without in-
fluencing fundamentals, short-selling would induce a deviation between the market share price
and the fundamental value. One would assume that such a deviation would not persist. In
the long run, the market share price would revert back towards its fundamental value. There-
fore, in our model we allow the market stock price to first deviate from and then revert back
to the fundamental value. This assumption is inspired by the pervasive asset price movement
pattern in the market – short-term momentum and long-term reversal after unexpected infor-
mation and events2. Various empirical studies have suggested the existence of the pattern and
the interpretation of this pattern has been linked strongly to financial behavioural models3.
We assume that the investor opens the short position when the CET1 ratio strikes a lower
threshold. Define τs/o as the time when short-selling happens. Since there is a one-to-one
relation between the asset value and the CET1 ratio, the short position is opened upon first
passage of asset value to some lower threshold
τs/o = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vt = bs/oL}, (3.8)
2According to Vayanos and Woolley [29], momentum is a tendency of rising asset price to rise further, and
falling asset price to keep falling; reversal describes a long-term phenomenon – assets that perform well in the
long run tend to subsequently underperform, or vice versa.
3Empirical studies include Jegadeesh and Titman [15], De Bont and Thaler [6], Chan [7], Rouwenhorst [24]
and Fama and French [11], etc. For interpretation using financial behaviour models please see Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam [8], Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny [3] and Hong and Stein [14], etc.
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where bs/o is the asset-liability ratio corresponding to the critical CET1 trigger where short po-
sition is opened. Define the stock price based on the fundamental value as Pt. It is equal to the
fundamental equity value divided by the existing number of shares. Based on our assumption,
the market stock price P˜t and the fundamental value Pt are related by a continuous function
y(t),
P˜t+τs/o = y(t)Pt+τs/o , t ≥ 0. (3.9)
We expect the function y(t) to capture both the deviation and reversion process of the market
stock price. In mathematics, it has the property y(0) = 1 and limt→∞ y(t) = 1. The first property
tells that it always takes time to realize the deviation between the market and fundamental value
and the second one describes a long-term full reversion process.
In this chapter, we use one of the candidates
y(t) = 1 − Kαte1−αt, t ≥ 0, (3.10)
where the constant K measures the maximum price deviation between P˜t+τs/o and Pt+τs/o and
the constant α controls the speed of deviation and reversion. For simplification, we assume the
CCB investors only short once at τs/o and there are no transaction costs. Figure 3.2 presents
the percentage deviation of the market share price from the fundamental value. Moreover, a
piecewise version of the function y(t) in (3.10) would allow us to control the deviation and
reversion speed respectively 4.
3.3.2 Closing the Short Position
We assume the investors close their short positions when either (1) the mark-to-market value
of the short position falls below some pre-specified stop-loss level or (2) conversion occurs. As
we can see the latter is the hitting time of asset value to a fixed lower level corresponding to a
pre-determined asset-liability ratio b∗, while the former is the hitting time of asset value to a
moving upper barrier.
Let the parameter h ≥ 1.0 be some stop-loss level chosen by the investors. For example,
h = 1.15 means that the stop-loss level corresponds to the market stock price increasing by
15%. The stop-loss level is hit at the stopping time
τs/l = τs/o + Ts/l, (3.12)
where Ts/l measures the elapsed time between hitting times τs/o and τs/l,
Ts/l = inf{t ≥ 0 : P˜t+τs/o = hP˜τs/o}, h ≥ 1.0. (3.13)
In other words, once the short sellers’ losses exceed 100(h − 1)%, they will close their short
positions. Equation (3.12) and (3.13) indicate that τs/l is decided by the market equity value.
4For example, let
y(t) =
1 − Kαdte1−αd t, 0 < t ≤ 1/αd,1 − Kαrte1−αr t, 1/αd < t, (3.11)
where the parameter αd and αr control the deviation and reversion speed respectively. For example, if αd = 4 and
αr = 7.16, the deviation time and reversal time is approximately 0.25 years and 1.02 years after τs/o.
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Figure 3.2: The percentage deviation of the market share price from the fundamental value
(with α = 4,K = 0.2 in (3.10)). The red vertical line stands at the point (t = 0.25) when
the maximum (20%) difference is realized. The left side of the red line illustrates the devia-
tion process of the market share price from the fundamental value. The right side depicts the
reversion process of the market share price towards the fundamental value.
However, the conversion time τc is decided by the fundamental asset (equity) value5. Therefore,
the two hitting times correspond to two different but related processes. Using (3.10), we rewrite
Ts/l = inf{t ≥ 0 : P˜t+τs/o = hP˜τs/o},
= inf
{
t ≥ 0 : y(t)Pt+τs/o = hPτs/o
}
, (3.14)
= inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Pt+τs/o =
hPτs/o
y(t)
}
. (3.15)
With this transformation, the hitting time τs/l is determined by the trajectory of the fundamental
value as well. Since the fundamental equity value is implied by the fundamental asset value
under the structural model, assumption (3.15) can be restated in terms of the asset value,
Ts/l = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Et+τs/o(Vt+τs/o) =
hEτs/o(Vτs/o)
y(t)
}
, (3.16)
where Et(Vt) is the fundamental equity value in term of its corresponding asset value implied
by the structural model. Due to the correspondence between the fundamental equity value and
asset value, we can understand the assumption to close short positions in term of the asset value
instead of the equity value. Once the short sell starts, our framework includes two barriers in
term of the asset value – the lower barrier is the conversion level and the upper barrier is the
stop-loss requirement level. Hitting either barrier would make CCB investors close their short
positions. In the perpetual case, investors’ short positions are closed at
τs/c = min{τc, τs/l}. (3.17)
5Recall that under the structural model, the firm’s equity value depends on the firm’s asset value.
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If the asset value path hits the conversion level first, we have τs/c = τc and investors make a
positive profit on the short sale; however, if the asset value path hits the stop-loss requirement
level first, we have τs/c = τs/l then investors lose money on the short sale. It is noteworthy that
according to (3.16), our upper barrier is a moving barrier rather than a constant barrier as the
lower barrier (fixed conversion level) because it varies with the time elapse.
For simplification, we assume that CCB investors will not use shares they receive from
conversion to cover their short positions. This assumption might be relaxed if we introduce the
parameter named short interest, which is defined as the number of shorted shares. However,
it is hard to quantify the short interest corresponding to a delayed price fall after short sales
because the price drop might be influenced by subjective factors such as investors’ predictions
and behaviours in the market. Therefore, we always assume CCB investors would buy shares
from the market on the contemporary market stock price to cover their short positions at τs/c.
3.3.3 Return Analysis
We are going to analyze investors’ incentives to enter dishonest short positions by decomposing
the potential return into two parts. One is the return from conversion (Rc), which quantifies the
difference between the fundamental-based conversion price and the market-based conversion
price. It distinguishes CCB investors’ short-selling behaviours from the regular short-sellers’
because it is a specific return for CCB investors rather than a general return for all regular short
sellers. The other is the return from short-selling (Rs), which measures investors’ profits or
losses by holding their short positions. It is defined the same way as the return for all regular
short-sellers and includes short-selling behaviours from both CCB investors and regular short-
sellers. The total return from the dishonest incentives is defined as a weighted summation of
the two components
Rtotal := w(m)Rc + (1 − w(m))Rs, (3.18)
where m is the relative size of the short position to the notional value of the CCB and w(m) =
1/(1 + m). For example, if m = 2 then investors must short $2 worth of equity for every $1
notional of the CCB in order to have the desired effect on the firm’s stock price.
Analyzing CCB investors’ potential returns under manipulations would shed a light on in-
vestors’ manipulation incentives. By employing Monte Carlo simulation, we further our studies
under different conversion prices and discuss their effects of restraining potential manipulation
incentives.
Return from Conversion (Rc)
The return from conversion is defined as the difference between the conversion price (the price
CCB investors actually “pay” for the shares) and the rational conversion price in the absence of
manipulations (the fair price CCB investors should “pay”). The occurrence of conversion only
depends on the behaviour of the fundamental firm value. That is, if the fundamental firm value
hits the conversion level, conversion occurs and the conversion price is decided by the market
stock price at that moment. Although we define our conversion level using the accounting based
CET1 ratio, the conversion time decided by the fundamental value path potentially merges the
judgement of regulators about conversion because the fundamental value is not observable
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from the market. Figure 3.3 describes a situation when the fundamental firm value hits the
conversion level and the market stock price is below the fundamental value at conversion. The
difference between what the conversion should be (i.e. what the price would be in the absence
of manipulation) and what the conversion price actually is, represents a transfer of value from
equity investors to CCB investors.
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Figure 3.3: Short-selling causes the deviation between the market equity value and the funda-
mental value. Conversion happens because the fundamental equity value hits the conversion
level. Investors close their short positions at conversion.
We define the return from conversion
Rc =
Pconv
P˜conv
− 1, (3.19)
where Pconv is what the conversion price would have been in the absence of manipulation and
P˜conv is what the conversion price actually is. Since we assume that manipulations would
depress the market stock price below the fundamental value which implies Pconv ≥ P˜conv, the
return from conversion will stay non-negative. If conversion never occurs, the return from
conversion is defined as zero. The conversion price could be the contemporary market stock
price at conversion, the trailing average market stock price in a specified look-back period or a
market stock price plus a floor.
Contemporary Market Stock Price We start from considering the simplest case, where the
conversion price is the contemporary market stock price at conversion (P˜conv = P˜τc). Let
Tc = τc − τs/o measure the amount of time that elapses between the opening of the short
position and conversion and the expectation E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜[Rc|Vτs/o = v]. By assumption
(3.10), we have
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v
[
1
y(Tc)
− 1
]
. (3.20)
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It is clear that Rc = g1(Tc) and g1(t) = (1 − y(t))/y(t). Thus the return from conversion is
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] =
∫ ∞
0
g1(t) fτs/o,v(t)dt, (3.21)
where fτs/o,v(t) is the density function of Tc given the manipulation occurs at τs/o and the firm’s
asset value is v at that moment. Note that in general the function f can be defective in the sense
that it does not integrate to one, and this will occur whenever there is a positive probability
that conversion never occurs. Since Tc is the hitting time of an affine GBM beginning at
the asset-liability ratio bs/o to the level b∗, the Laplace transform of f is available in closed
form (Metzler [22]). In addition, as we only focus on the return from conversion here, the
density function is defined in a one-barrier (conversion level) framework. This is because even
if investors cover their short positions prior to conversion due to the stop-loss assumption,
conversion might happen afterwards when there is still difference between the fundamental
value and the market price, in which case CCB investors might still obtain benefits with the
conversion price below its fundamental value.
Let Fτs/o,v(t) =
∫ ∞
t
fτs/o,v(s)ds and Fˆτs/o,v(t) = Fτs/o,v(t)/Fτs/o,v(0). Then Fˆτs/o,v(t) is the sur-
vivor function of a proper density in the sense that Fˆτs/o,v(0) = 1, whereas Fτs/o,v(0) could be
less than one which will cause problems for the Abate and Whitt [1] we will use later. Using
the fact that Fτs/o,v(0) = L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(0), it is easy to derive
L
{
Fτs/o,v(t)
}
(β) =
1
β
L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(0) − 1
β
L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(β). (3.22)
As a result, we have
L
{
Fˆτs/o,v(t)
}
(β) =
1
β
− 1
β
L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(β)
L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(0)
, (3.23)
which is in closed form since L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(β) is available in closed form according to Met-
zler [22]. As the function Fˆ is the survivor function of a proper density, it follows that it can be
recovered numerically from its Laplace transform using the algorithm in Abate and Whitt [1].
Using the techniques of partial integration, we can rewrite (3.21) as
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] =
∫ ∞
0
Fτs/o,v(t)g
′
1(t)dt = L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(0)
∫ ∞
0
Fˆτs/o,v(t)g
′
1(t)dt (3.24)
We use numerical techniques to estimate the integral term in (3.24) and start by decomposing
it as ∫ ∞
0
Fˆτs/o,v(t)g
′
1(t)dt =
∫ T ∗
0
g′1(t)Fˆτs/o,v(t)dt +
∫ +∞
T ∗
g′1(t)Fˆτs/o,v(t)dt, (3.25)
where T ∗ is a quantity beyond which the integrand value is very small and negligible6. As a
result, we can approximate the expected return from conversion by
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] ≈ L
{
fτs/o,v(t)
}
(0)
∫ T ∗
0
g′1(t)Fˆτs/o,v(t)dt. (3.26)
6We can prove that g′1(t)→ 0 as t → +∞.
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So far our discussion illustrates that the error of this approximation includes the estimation
error of Fˆτs/o,v(t) from using the algorithm of Abate and Whitt [1] and the truncation error.
The survivor function Fˆτs/o,v(t) approaches to zero as t → ∞. Additionally, we can verify
that the derivative of the function g1(t) is well bounded. Therefore, one way of choosing T ∗ is
to make the value of the survivor function within the interval (T ∗,+∞) approximately zero. By
doing so, we can effectively control the truncation error since the integrand is approximately
zero in the interval (T ∗,+∞). Since the survivor function can be thought as the complementary
cumulative distribution function, we can prove that the condition Fˆτs/o,v(T
∗) ≈ 0 is equivalent
to Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗) ≈ Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞). It means that once the short position is opened, if
conversion does not happen within T ∗, the probability of conversion happening after T ∗ is
almost zero.
Trailing Average Market Stock Price Thus far we have discussed the return from conversion
when the conversion price is the contemporary market stock price upon conversion. In practice,
however, it is more common for the conversion price to be a n-day trailing average market stock
price prior to conversion, that is,
Pconv =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Pt¯i , (3.27)
where t¯i = τc − i∆t with ∆t = 1/250 is the i-th day in the look-back period starting from
the conversion time τc. Unfortunately, here, we cannot simplify the return from conversion to
a neat integral as we did when the conversion price is the contemporary market stock price.
According to the definition, we have
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v
 1n ∑n−1i=0 NPt¯i1
n
∑n−1
i=0 NP˜t¯i
− 1
 = E˜τs/o,v  1n ∑n−1i=0 Et¯i1
n
∑n−1
i=0 E˜t¯i
− 1
 , (3.28)
where as a reminder, N is the number of existing common shares before conversion. Equation
(3.28) shows that the return from conversion depends on the historical fundamental and market
equity value (Et¯i and E˜t¯i) before conversion.
Let ωtrail be the fraction of the firm’s equity that CCB investors would receive upon con-
version in the absence of manipulation and ω˜trail be the ownership investors will receive with
manipulations. Following the structural model proposed in Chapter 2, the conversion term
determines the ownership stake distributed to contingent capital investors at conversion and
therefore the costs (coupon rates) of liabilities in the capital structure, which in turn determines
the equity value. As a result,
Et(ωtrail) = Vt − Dt − S t −CCBt(ωtrail) − BCt, t < τc, (3.29)
where Dt, S t and CCBt are value of deposits, senior bond and CCB in the capital structure and
can be estimated by (2.27), (2.28) and (2.29) respectively, BCt is the discounted bankruptcy
cost at time t. Furthermore, by the fact that ωtrail = N∗J/(N
∗
J + N) and Pconv = LJ/N
∗
J , where N
∗
J
is the number of shares generated from conversion, we have
Pconv =
1
N
1 − ωtrail
ωtrail
LJ. (3.30)
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Multiplying N on both sides of (3.27) and (3.30) gives
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Et¯i(ωtrail) =
1 − ωtrail
ωtrail
LJ, (3.31)
from which we can solve the fair ownership stake ωtrail when the conversion price is the trail-
ing average stock price. To be more specific, for each path we simulate until the conversion
happens (τc) or T ∗. In the trailing average period we are interested in, we use the asset value
Vt¯i to compute the equity value Et¯i and therefore the left side of the equation (3.31). Then we
can solve for ωtrail from the equation (3.31).
By our assumption for the relationship between the market and fundamental stock price,
we can solve ω˜trail from
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
E˜t¯i(ω˜trail) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Et¯i(ωtrail)y(Tc − t¯i) =
1 − ω˜trail
ω˜trail
LJ. (3.32)
Consequently, we can rewrite the return from conversion as
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v
[
(1 − ωtrail)/ωtrail
(1 − ω˜trail)/ω˜trail − 1
]
. (3.33)
Thinking of the ratio (1 − ωtrail)/ωtrail as the residual value distributed to existing sharehold-
ers over the CCB investors, then (3.33) shows that the return from conversion is decided by
the ratio change under manipulations. By solving ωtrail and ω˜trail from (3.31) and (3.32), we
evaluate the return from conversion with the conversion price as the trailing average by (3.33).
Since there is no approach to solve for the ownership stakes analytically, to compute the return
from conversion, we use Monte Carlo simulation instead. For each path, we estimate the own-
ership stake ωtrail and ω˜trail by (3.31) and (3.32) and then the return from conversion. The final
expectation of the return from conversion is approximated by taking the average.
Contemporary Market Stock Price Plus a Floor To guarantee the minimum loss imposed
to CCB investors at conversion, regulators might use a floor to make sure that the conversion
price is no smaller than the floor price. That is,
Pconv = max
{
Pτc , P f loor
}
, (3.34)
where P f loor represents a constant floor price. With the definition, the expectation of the return
from conversion becomes
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v
 NPτcmax {NP˜τc ,NP f loor} − 1
 . (3.35)
Letω f loor (ω˜ f loor) be the fair ownership stake distributed to CCB investors at conversion without
(with) manipulations, then
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v
 (1 − ω f loor)Eτcmax {(1 − ω˜ f loor)Eτcy(Tc), p f loorE0} − 1
 , (3.36)
where p f loor = P f loor/P0 is the ratio of the floor price divided by the stock price at the date
CCB was issued (P0), and E0 is the equity value at the same date. Since there is no closed-
form expression, we apply Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the value.
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Return from Short-Selling (Rs)
Consider an investor with a long position in a CCB that opens his/her short position when the
firm’s CET1 ratio is 5.5%, believing that conversion is imminent. If the investor is wrong and
the firm is able to reverse its fortunes and start performing well, then it is likely that the upper
stop-loss limit is hit prior to conversion occurring. In this instance the investor would lose
money on the failed attempt to capitalize on more favourable terms of conversion. Because the
investor has the potential to lose money on the short position, there is a potential cost associated
with the short position that must be weighed against the benefit of more favourable terms of
conversion. We measure this cost using what we call the return from short selling, defined as
Rs = 1 −
P˜τs/c
P˜τs/o
, (3.37)
where τs/c is given by (3.17). If the expected value of Rs is negative then naked short selling is
not profitable. It is possible, however, that the expected value of Rc is so large that it outweighs
the costs of short selling, in which case owning a CCB can actually induce an investor to short
the stock in instances when naked shorting is not profitable.
The return from short-selling is a general concern, not only for CCB investors, but also for
all regular short-sellers. If the return from short-selling is significant, normal short-sellers and
speculators besides CCB investors might participate in the short-selling and amplify the price
drop. The return from short-selling is estimated either at the date conversion happens (Figure
3.3) or the date investors have to close their short positions because of the stop-loss requirement
(Figure 3.4). As a result, there are two barriers, the conversion barrier and the stop-loss barrier.
According to Karatzas and Shreve [16]7, if the firm value diffusion process starts between the
two regular barriers, it will end up with hitting either the lower barrier (the conversion barrier)
or the upper barrier (the stop-loss requirement level). Therefore, we always have τs/c < ∞.
Instead of discussing the return from short-selling under different conversion terms, we
generalize our discussion here. By the assumption (3.9),
E˜τs/o,v[Rs] = E˜τs/o,v
[
1 − h1{τc>τs/l} − y(τc − τs/o)
Pτc
Pτs/o
1{τs/l>τc}
]
, (3.38)
Therefore, to compute the return from short-selling, one must be able to compute (i) the prob-
ability that the stop-loss barrier is hit prior to the conversion barrier and (ii) the mean value of
y(τc − τs/o)Pτc given that the conversion barrier is hit prior to the stop-loss barrier (recall that
Pτs/o is a known constant). In general both of these quantities must be computed using Monte
Carlo. The difficulty with (i) is that the stop-loss barrier is moving (i.e. time-dependent) while
the conversion barrier is flat8. Upper and lower bounds on this probability can be determined
as follows. Let B− and B+ be the minimum and maximum values of the moving barrier, re-
spectively, and let τ−s/l and τ
+
s/l be the hitting times of these asset value to these levels. Then
7Theorem 5.29 on page 348.
8Although the double-barrier hitting time distribution is studied and applied in the pricing of barrier options,
most studies are under the framework of double constant barriers, such as in Lin [19], Lo, Chung and Hui [20],
Rogers and Zane [18], Tuckwell and Wan [28], Geman and Yor [12] and Lo, Lee and Hui [21], etc. It seems that
there is no similar study to the case of our problem, which includes one fixed barrier and one moving barrier and
the hitting time depends on an affine geometric Brownian motion.
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Figure 3.4: Short-selling causes the deviation between the market equity value and the fun-
damental value. Investors have to cover their short positions before conversion because the
stop-loss requirement level is breached by the market equity value.
the probability of interest will lie somewhere between Pτs/o,v(τ
+
s/l < τc) and Pτs/o,v(τ
−
s/l < τc).
And since B− and B+ are regular boundaries for asset value these bounding probabilities can
be computed using the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Karlin and Taylor [17, Page 192]) Let Xt be a diffusion on (a, b) where a <
b are two regular barriers. Given that X0 = x ∈ (a, b), we define R(x) = P(τb < τa). Then R(x)
is the solution of the differential equation
1
2
σ2(x)R′′(x) + µ(x)R′(x) = 0, (3.39)
with necessary boundary conditions R(a) = 0 and R(b) = 1.
As for the mean value of y(τc−τs/o)Pτc , since Pτc is a constant when the conversion price is
equal to the market price at conversion, computing the second expectation in (3.38) reduces to
computing the term E˜τs/o,v
[
α
(
τc − τs/o) e−α(τc−τs/o)|τc < τs/l]. This term can be computed using
the following theorem. The detailed discussion can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.3.2 Suppose a diffusion process dXt = µ(Xt)dt + σ(Xt)dWt, where Wt is the stan-
dard Brownian motion. Let X0 = x and x ∈ (a, b) where a < b are two regular barriers and
define τa and τb are the hitting times to the barrier a and b respectively. For a fixed parameter
α, let
v(x) = E[ατae−ατa |τa < τb], (3.40)
w(x) = E[e−ατa |τa < τb]. (3.41)
Then we have v(x) = lim→0 v(x) and w(x) = lim→0 w(x), where v(x) and w(x) are defined
on (a, b − ). Moreover, v(x) is the unique solution to the following ordinary differential
equation
σ∗2(x)
2
v′′ (x) + µ
∗(x)v′(x) − αv(x) + αw(x) = 0, a < x < b, (3.42)
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subject to the boundary conditions v(a) = 0 and v(b−) = 0. And w(x) is the unique solution
to the following ordinary differential equation
σ∗2(x)
2
w′′ (x) + µ
∗(x)w′(x) − αw(x) = 0, a < x < b, (3.43)
subject to the boundary conditions w(a) = 1 and w(b − ) = 1.
Additionally, or both (3.42) and (3.43),
σ∗(x) = σ(x), (3.44)
and
µ∗(x) = µ(x) − s(x)
S (x)
σ2(x), (3.45)
with s(η) = exp
{
− ∫ b
η
2µ(ξ)
σ2(ξ)dξ
}
as the scale density function of x and S (x) =
∫ b
x
s(η)dη.
It is worth noting that Theorem 3.3.2 provides an approach to calculate the expectation term
in the case of two fixed barriers. Similar to our discussion for term of probability, we would
calculate the expectation term replacing the moving upper barrier with the constant barrier B−
or B+. By doing so, we obtain a range within which the expectation term would be located.
3.4 Numerical Results
Except the parameters from the base case shown in Table 2.2 in Chpater 2, we assume the
growth rate of the representative financial institution as µ = 8.0%. Without specification, we
fix the parameter α = 4 implying that market price would start to revert back towards the
fundamental value after one quarter. This arrangement lies in the fact that there are quarterly
financial statement updates for financial institutions so we assume the market price would be
equal to the fundamental value after the quarterly financial announcements of the financial
institution. The maximum deviation K between the market and fundamental stock price is as-
sumed as 20% which is the historical maximum daily price drop of the representative Canadian
bank of last 15 years. The stop-loss parameter is h = 1.15 meaning that the short sellers are
going to close their short positions once their losses exceed 15% of their initial investment9.
3.4.1 The Return from Conversion (Rc)
In this section, first we show the return from conversion when the conversion price is the
contemporary market stock price. Applying Monte Carlo simulations, we extend our analysis
under different conversion prices, including the trailing average and the contemporary market
stock price plus a floor.
9The approximation is based on the margin requirement. Under Regulation T, the Federal Reserve Board
requires all short sale accounts to have 150% of the value of the short sale at the time the sale is initiated. Many
brokerages have maintenance requirements of 30%−40%. In our case, we assume the maintenance margin as 30%
so that the the first margin call occurs when the market stock price is 115% of the stock price at the occurrence of
short-selling.
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In Figure 3.5, both panels show an non-monotonic shape for the expectation of the return
from conversion given different values of α and K. This shape is consistent with our assumption
that the market stock price would deviate first and then revert back towards the fundamental
value under manipulations. In the left panel, we vary the value of parameter K and find a
positive relation between the return from conversion and maximum deviation value. The right
panel illustrates the change of the return from conversion given difference deviation speeds. For
example, α = 4 implies the maximum deviation realizes after one quarter since the occurrence
of short-selling, α = 12 implies one month and α = 52 implies one week. The location of
the point at which investors could maximize the expectation of return from conversion depends
on the speed of deviation. In other words, if the market could quickly reflect the short-selling
effects into the market stock price (a large α), the optimal short-selling point would be close to
the conversion level.
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Figure 3.5: Expectations of the return from conversion (Rc) at different short-selling occurrence
levels. The conversion price is the contemporary market stock price. The x-axis is the firm
value in CET1 ratio at which short-selling occurs. For example, 10% means short position is
opened when the firm’s CET1 ratio is at 10%.
In addition, we calculate the Sharpe ratio by estimating the standard deviation of the expec-
tation return numerically. The shape of the Sharpe ratio generally follows the non-monotonic
shape shown in Figure 3.5, confirming that a rapid and large deviation of the market stock price
would raise the return from conversion. We note that when the asset value is relatively large
and far away from the conversion level, we have significantly negative Sharpe ratios. There-
fore, although the expected return from conversion is nonnegative, it is highly risky to carry
out the manipulation when the firm value is high and conversion is unlikely.
Now we extend our discussion to more general conversion prices by applying Monte Carlo
simulation. In simulation, we use the parameter T ∗ as the “maturity”. It means that we simulate
paths all of which start from the assumed short-selling occurrence level and hit the conversion
barrier before T ∗. Based on those paths we can obtain a biased average return from conversion
because it is conditioning on Tc ≤ T ∗. To correct the bias, we need to multiply the average
return with Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗) (see Appendix C.4 for more details).
64 Chapter 3. Short-Selling Incentives Near Conversion to Equity
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1200
−1000
−800
−600
−400
−200
0
200
Asset Value in CET1 Ratio (%)
Sh
ar
pe
 R
at
io
 
 
α = 4, K = 0.2
α = 4, K = 0.1
α = 4, K = 0.05
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1200
−1000
−800
−600
−400
−200
0
200
Asset Value in CET1 Ratio (%)
Sh
ar
pe
 R
at
io
 
 
α = 4, K = 0.2
α = 12, K = 0.2
α = 52, K = 0.2
Figure 3.6: Sharpe ratios of the return from conversion (Rc) at different short-selling occurrence
levels. The conversion price is the contemporary market stock price at conversion. The x-axis
is the firm value in CET1 ratio at which short-selling occurs.
With Monte Carlo simulation, we consider three different conversion prices - the contempo-
rary market stock price, the trailing average market stock price and the contemporary market
stock price plus a floor which is 49% of the stock price on the date the bond was issued10.
Figure 3.7 displays the histograms of the return from conversion under the three different con-
version prices when short-selling occurs at different asset levels. When the conversion price is
the contemporary market stock price, the return from conversion never goes negative, implying
that the worst case for investors is the market stock price fully reverts back to the fundamental
value and conversion happens at the fundamental value. However, the manipulation becomes
less effective when we add the floor (49% of the stock price at the date CCB was issued) to
the conversion price since the return from conversion roughly stays at zero. This results from
the high location of the floor which could be easily approached by the fundamental and market
stock price. Once the floor is reached, the conversion price is fixed at the floor price and there
are no profits from pushing down the market stock price prior to conversion. The 7-business
day trailing average conversion price only has a limited effect on restraining the manipulation
incentives. When the conversion price is the 7 business day trailing average, although the re-
turn from conversion is smaller than when the conversion price is the contemporary market
stock price, it is still significantly positive.
Table 3.1 summaries the statistics of Figure 3.7 after the bias correction. The results demon-
strate that the contemporary market stock price plus a floor would restrain CCB investors’
short-selling incentives by totally wiping out their potential return from conversion under ma-
nipulations. If we use the 7-business day trailing average, the manipulation incentives are not
significantly held down compared to directly using the contemporary market stock price.
The number of days we use in calculating the trailing average would influence the return
10The location of the floor is within the “regulatory window” with conversion trigger as 5.0% CET1 ratio
discussed in Chapter 2. With the floor price locating within the window, the original shareholders are not rewarded
when conversion occurs.
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Figure 3.7: The return from conversion (Rc) under different conversion prices and short-selling
occurrence levels in CET1 ratios. We use one million paths with T ∗ = 8 years and dt = 0.001.
Trailing average is calculated based on 7 business days. The floor price is set as 49% of the
stock price at the date CCBs were issued.
Short-Selling
Market Price Trailing Avg Price Market Price with a Floor
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
5.5% 3.7358% 5.8663% 2.6245% 5.7322% 0.00% 0.00%
8.0% 7.0451% 8.5537% 6.2106% 8.3503% 0.00% 0.00%
10.5% 5.2285% 8.7065% 4.9783% 8.4725% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 3.1: Mean and standard deviation of the return from conversion (Rc) with different con-
version prices and different short-selling occurrence levels. We use 7-business-day trailing
average and the floor is 49% of the stock price at the date CCBs were issued.
from conversion. Generally, using more historical stock prices in the look back period would
increase the trailing average price and therefore decrease the return from conversion. Taking the
30 business day trailing average for instance, the average return from conversion is 1.6046%,
4.3184% and 4.0046% given the short-selling occurs at 5.5%, 8.0% and 10.5% CET1 ratio
respectively, and all those returns are smaller than the corresponding ones listed in Table 3.1.
As for the conversion price with a floor, the location of the floor is critical in determining
the return from conversion. A low floor would increase the probability of a positive return from
conversion by depressing the market stock price in advance. For example, when we use 45%
of the stock price at the date CCBs were issued instead, the average return from conversion
is 2.4799%, 3.6328% and 2.2697% given that short-selling occurs at 5.5%, 8.0% and 10.5%
CET1 ratio respectively, and all those returns are significantly larger than the corresponding
ones listed in Table 3.1.
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3.4.2 The Return from Short-Selling (Rs)
As the upper barrier is a moving barrier we cannot find a closed-form expression for expected
return from short-selling. However, by bounding the moving upper barrier between two flat
barriers (B− and B+) we can determine analytic bounds on the expected return from short-
selling.
We commence with estimating the probability of hitting the stop-loss (upper) barrier prior
to the conversion (lower) barrier (i.e. Pτs/o,v(τc > τs/l)). By Monte Carlo simulation, we
can approximate the probabilities under all three kinds of upper barriers – the flat barriers
B−, B+ and the moving barrier. According to Theorem 3.3.1, we can numerically solve the
probability from a second-order ordinary differential equation when the upper barrier is fixed.
Therefore, when the upper barrier is B− or B+ , the probabilities from solving the ordinary
differential equations provide cross checks for our simulation results. As long as the simulation
results and the results from solving differential equations are not significantly different, we can
assume the simulation approximation for the probability under the moving barrier is accurate.
We graph our results in Figure 3.8, including results from simulation and solving ordinary
differential equations. Under the two constant upper barriers B− and B+, the relative difference
of the probabilities given by the simulation and solving ODEs is bounded by 7%. As a result,
we could confirm the relative accuracy of the probability estimation under the moving upper
barrier.
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Figure 3.8: The probability of hitting the stop-loss level prior to the conversion level under three
kinds of upper barriers – the flat barriers B−, B+ and the moving barrier. The dots represent the
simulation results. The lines represent the results from solving ordinary differential equations.
Similarly, when the conversion price is the contemporary market stock price at conversion,
for the expectation term in (3.38), the estimations under the two constant barriers (B− and B+)
can provide a range for the value of the expectation term under the moving upper barrier. As an
approximation, we replace the moving upper barrier with a weighted average of the constant
barriers B− and B+ and the weight is decided by the distances between the probabilities of hit-
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ting the upper barrier first under the three kinds of upper barriers11. Based on this replacement,
we estimate the expectation term in (3.38) using Theorem 3.3.212.
Figure 3.9 shows the expectation of the return from short-selling when the conversion price
is the contemporary market stock price. The green dots represent the simulation results for
the return from short-selling under the actual moving upper barrier. All three dots are located
within the range bounded by the analytic results under the two alternative constant upper bar-
riers B− and B+. Roughly, the pattern of the expectation of the return from short-selling is
captured when we approximate the moving upper barrier with the weighted average barrier.
As a result, we can think of the estimations under the weighted upper barrier as reasonable
approximations to those under the moving upper barrier.
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Figure 3.9: The expectation of the return from short-selling (Rs) under different upper barri-
ers given different short-selling occurrence levels. The conversion price is the contemporary
market stock price. The green dots are the simulation results.
Using the weighted barrier to approximate the moving upper barrier, we show the change
of the expected return from short-selling under different deviation speeds (α) and the maximum
deviations (K) in Figure 3.10. We observe a positive relation between the return from short-
selling and the value of α and K. Thus, investors would prefer a quick and instantly effective
manipulation in order to maximize their return from short-selling.
Figure 3.11 lists the histograms of the return from short-selling. Generally, there are two
clusters, one corresponds to the case that the upper barrier is hit first and investors have to close
their short positions because of the stop-loss requirement, and the other corresponds to the case
that conversion occurs and investors cover their short positions at conversion by buying shares
at the contemporary market price. The statistics are listed in Table 3.2. The return from short-
selling is not obviously positive and could easily go negative. As a result, if one does not have a
11For example, if investors start short common shares at 8.0% CET 1 ratio, according to the simulation results
shown in Figure 3.8, the probabilities under B−, B+ and the moving barrier are approximately 59.59%, 76.54%
and 70.67% respectively. Therefore, the weight given to the maximum and minimum value of the moving upper
barrier is about 34.62% and 65.38% respectively.
12Please see Appendix C.2 for the rationality of choosing  = 10−6 when we use Theorem 3.3.2.
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Figure 3.10: Expectations of the return from short-selling (Rs) at different short-selling occur-
rence levels. The conversion price is the contemporary market stock price. The x-axis is the
firm value in CET1 ratio at which short-selling occurs.
long position in a CCB then there are limited incentives to short. However, for CCB investors,
although the return from short-selling is relatively small, the possible return from conversion
may still tempt them to press down the market stock price so that they could benefit from a
lower conversion price.
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Figure 3.11: The return from short-selling (Rs) under different conversion price designs and
short-selling occurrence levels in CET1 ratios. We use 7-business-day trailing average and the
floor is set as 49% of the stock price at the date CCBs are issued.
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Short-Selling
Market Price Trailing Avg Price Market Price with a Floor
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
5.5% −0.1054% 9.8823% −0.1368% 9.3438% −0.1018% 9.8627%
8.0% 0.8523% 21.5707% 1.1933% 20.8229% 0.8630% 21.5466%
10.5% −2.0107% 23.6657% −1.8304% 22.9899% −2.0046% 23.6450%
Table 3.2: Mean and standard deviation of the return from short-selling (Rs) under different
conversion prices and short-selling occurrence levels.
3.4.3 The Total Return
According to (3.18), the total return from the short position depends on the dollar value of
the shares investors need to short in order to realize the assumed maximum deviation between
the market stock price and the fundamental value. If the size of the short position relative
to the notional value of the CCB is relatively large then the return from short-selling would
take a relatively large weight in the calculation of the total return. However, the return from
conversion dominates if the opposite happens.
We plot the weighted total return in Figure 3.12 under the contemporary market stock price.
When cost (the size of the short position relative to the notional value of CCB) of realizing the
assumed deviation is relatively small, we observe positive total returns which would tempt
contingent capital investors to participate into the manipulation. However, the manipulation
incentive would diminish as the cost climbs and the total return falls. Corresponding to our
assumption of deviation and reversion process between the market stock price and the funda-
mental value, as the short-selling occurrence level moves away from the conversion level (5%
CET1 ratio), the total return increases first (from blue line to green line) and then decreases
(from green line to red line). It is not suggested to start short sale when the firm is adequate
in capital because investors can only realize positive returns when the size of short position is
relatively small. For example, if investors short shares when the firm’s CET1 ratio is 10.5%,
they can obtain positive returns only when the size of the short position relative to the notional
value of the CCB is smaller than about three.
Using the trailing average stock price as the conversion price, we find a general decline of
the total return in Figure 3.13 compared to the total return presented in Figure 3.12. This is
because the trailing average offsets the market price drop to some extent, making the conversion
price not as sensitive to the manipulation as the contemporary market stock price. If more
historical data are included in the trailing average, the total return falls further. This can be
verified by comparing the two panels in Figure 3.13.
Sometimes the issuing firm applies a floor price in order to curb the short-selling incentives
from directly using the contemporary market stock price. For example, several Canadian banks,
such as RBC, CIBC and BMO, use the floor price in their issuance of contingent capital bond.
In Figure 3.14 we show the total return under two different floor prices. With a relatively low
floor (45% price floor), there are some effects on pressing down the potential return from short-
selling. However, as the floor moves up to 49%, the return is close to zero if investors short at
5.5% CET1 ratio, in which case the manipulation incentives are effectively curbed. Hence, a
relatively high floor has a direct restriction on the incentives to short.
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Figure 3.12: Expectations of the total return under different short-selling occurrence levels.
The conversion price is the contemporary market stock price. The x-axis is the relative size of
short position to CCB notional value (i.e. the parameter m).
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Figure 3.13: Expectations of the total return under different short-selling occurrence levels.
The conversion prices are the 7-day and 30-day trailing average for the left and right panels,
respectively. The x-axis is the relative size of short position to CCB notional value (i.e. the
parameter m).
3.5 Conclusion
By modelling the deviation between the market stock price and the fundamental value, we
analyze the extent to which a long position in a CCB might tempt investors to short the issuing
institution’s stock. Under our calibration to the presented Canadian bank, it is likely to earn
profits by depressing the market stock price prior to conversion under a successful and effective
manipulation. We observe the return from conversion is the main recourse of the total profits,
so CCB investors might be the the ones having manipulation incentives when the conversion
is likely. In our calibration, we use parameters (the maximum deviation K = 20% and the
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Figure 3.14: Expectations of the total return under different short-selling occurrence levels. The
conversion price is the contemporary market stock price plus a floor. The floor is represented
as the percentage of the stock price at the issuance of CCB. The x-axis is the relative size of
short position to CCB notional value (i.e. the parameter m).
deviation and reversion speed α = 4) under some extreme case where the market price drop is
huge and the market correction is relatively inefficient so that it might be possible for contingent
investors to benefit from their short-selling. The results under this kind of calibration might not
be normal, but it indeed provides insights for regulators in the case that the manipulations
are successful and exert negative impacts on the market confidence to the financial institution
which is the regulators’ concern related to CCB and motivates this work.
We discuss three market-based conversion prices in this chapter. When the conversion price
is the contemporary market stock price, investors are likely to push down the market stock price
below the fundamental value prior to conversion since their return from conversion under ma-
nipulation stays non-negative. However, a relatively highly located floor price would restrain
this dangerous incentive since the floor guarantees the minimum loss burdened by CCB in-
vestors at conversion. The trailing average conversion price offsets the possible dramatic price
drop prior to conversion by taking average of the historical stock prices, but its effectiveness of
curbing manipulation incentives is medium compared to a relatively high floor price.
Additionally, we prove that the potential return is influenced by the effectiveness of ma-
nipulations. If the market price reflects to the manipulation rapidly, the short-selling pressure
would mainly appear around the conversion level. Besides, the realized deviation between the
market stock price and the fundamental value also plays an important role in calculating the
potential return from manipulations.
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Chapter 4
Contingent Capital Bond with Regulatory
Discretionary Trigger
4.1 Introductions
One of the most important features in the design of a CCB is the conversion trigger, which
is the event that causes the CCB convert to common shares. In practice the vast majority of
CCBs include regulatory discretion. This means that even if the CET1 ratio were to go below
the objective trigger of, say 5.0%, conversion would not be triggered unless approved by the
designated regulatory body (for example, OSFI in Canada). In other words, authorities retain
the right to force the conversion in view of the issuing firm’s solvency prospects and economic
stability and sustainability. A trigger activated based on supervisors’ judgement is called a
regulatory discretionary trigger (Avdjiev, Kartasheva and Bogdanova [1]). With the phase in
of Basel III, the share of CCBs with discretionary triggers has increased substantially over the
past couple of years. A short list includes Credit Suisse (2011 and 2012), UBS (2012), Royal
Bank of Canada (2014), Bank of Montreal (2014) and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
(2014), etc. More details can be found in Appendix A.
The use of a regulatory discretionary trigger helps ensure conversion occurs in an efficient
way. With a book-value based trigger, conversion might fail to be triggered when it is necessary
because a book-value based trigger might not reflect the firm’s financial situation promptly or
correctly1. However, in the case of a market-based trigger, it is possible that conversion is trig-
gered when it is unnecessary. For example, if the issuing firm uses the market stock price as the
trigger, the trigger might be breached due to normal market price fluctuations or market ma-
nipulations rather than the firm’s non-viability implied by the market price (Squam Lake [11]).
Therefore, the regulators’ participation in making conversion decisions can mitigate the lag of
a book-value based conversion trigger to the market and avoid unnecessary conversions under
a market-value based trigger. In addition, regulators might prefer a contingent capital claim
to forestall bankruptcy only in times of systemic crisis rather than reduce the probability of
bankruptcy unconditionally (McDonald [8]). In other words, regulators might permit a poorly-
1For example, Citibank, a systemically important financial institution that did receive a significant government
bailout during the 2008 financial crisis, had a Tier 1 capital ratio that never fell below 7.0% during the course of
the financial crisis (Duffie [3]).
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performing individual bank to fail in good times in the case that its failure won’t cause systemic
damages (as might be appropriate if post-bankruptcy restructuring would be be expected to sig-
nificantly help the bank). Under this circumstance, regulators’ judgement is involved in making
conversion decisions in order to realize an optimal resolution for the individual bank.
The role of the regulatory discretionary trigger is most pronounced in some jurisdictions
such as Canada. The Advisory from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institu-
tions (OSFI) [7] claims that the Superintendent would have the authority to trigger conversion
conditioning on the legislative provisions and in association with accompanying interventions
by other Financial Institution Supervisory Committee (FISC) agencies. Additionally, the Basel
Committee’s proposal on gone-concern contingent capital requires that the judgements of regu-
lators must be involved in the conversion decision. In view of a safety-net regulatory framework
operated by OSFI, D’Souza and Gravelle [2] argue that it is advisable to issue gone-concern
contingent instruments, which focus on resolution, in the Canadian context. Clearly, then,
regulatory discretion should be a key component in CCB modelling.
Unfortunately, regulatory discretion is very difficult to model mathematically. If the trigger
is solely based on objective capital requirements or observable market prices, investors know
exactly if conversion will happen or not given a firm value or market price. On the contrary,
under the discretionary trigger, investors only know that conversion might happen given a
firm value or market price without knowing exactly if conversion will happen. For example,
investors might believe that if conversion is to occur it is likely to be triggered when the firm’s
CET1 ratio is 5.0%, but they are not certain of this. It is not obvious how to incorporate
such perceptions in a mathematical model, and this is the challenge. Despite the fact that the
vast majority of actual CCBs incorporate some sort of regulatory discretion in their terms of
conversion, almost all the literatures in the field of pricing contingent capital focus on objective
or observable triggers such as a capital-ratio trigger (Glasserman and Nouri [4], Metzler and
Reesor [10], etc.) or a market trigger (Sundaresan and Wang [12], etc.). To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to incorporate a regulatory discretion into the pricing of contingent
capital.
Following the intensity approach (Lando [6]), the conversion time under a regulatory dis-
cretionary trigger is modelled as the first jump time of a Cox process. We assume that the
intensity of the Cox process is a function of the firm’s asset value and this function summarizes
investors’ beliefs on how regulators are likely to exercise their discretion. In this paper, we
consider two types of intensity functions – those corresponding to “too-big-to-fail (TBTF)”
institutions and those corresponding to “non-systemically important (NSI)” institutions. The
NSI intensity function mimics regulators’ possible behaviours in triggering conversion for non-
systemically important financial institutions. Regulators might not enforce conversion prior to
liquidation (in which case the bond is never converted to equity), i.e. they might simply allow
the institution to fail instead of trying to prevent failure via conversion. The TBTF intensity
function approximates regulators’ considerations for the too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
It has the property that conversion is certain to occur prior to liquidation and assumes the like-
lihood of regulators enforcing the conversion increases as the firm value approaches to the
liquidation level.
In this chapter, we focus on the conversion term of fixed imposed loss due to its computa-
tional efficiency and the conversion price is equal to the market stock price at conversion. We
use the regulatory discretionary trigger rather than the capital ratio trigger which distinguishes
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this work from our previous ones.
For the reader’s convenience, we list our main conclusions here
• The intensity approach is a practical way to incorporate regulatory discretion into the
trigger design. The level of conversion uncertainty can be effectively controlled by the
parameters in the intensity function.
• For a NSI financial institution, adding conversion ambiguity in a gone-concern context
would decrease the cost of CCB. However, adding conversion ambiguity in a going-
concern context would increase the cost of CCB. Therefore, the cost change of CCB
with discretionary trigger depends on the proposed way of incorporating conversion un-
certainty2.
• For a TBTF financial institution, CCB is more expensive than the one issued by a NSI
financial institution. This is because the CCBs issued by TBTF institutions are sure to be
converted to common shares as a bail-in financial resolution before other resolutions and
liquidation. Hence, there is a chance that conversion occurs “at the last second” in the
sense that the institution is on death’s door when conversion is finally triggered. In such
cases CCB investors are completely wiped out at conversion since the shares they receive
are nearly worthless. The presence of such risk increases the cost of CCB substantially.
• It is still possible to set reasonable terms of conversion, in the sense of our discussion in
Section 1.2. For a too-big-to-fail financial institution, the reasonable interval is relatively
stable which might allow a consistent conversion term even if the level of regulatory
discretion changes. However, for a NSI financial institution, the reasonable interval is
relatively unstable.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 4.2 we construct the conversion process
and introduce the pricing model under the regulatory discretionary trigger. Numerical results
are presented in Section 4.3. We conclude in Section 4.4.
4.2 Model
We assume a probability space (Ω,F ,Q) on which there is a standard Brownian motion W. The
σ-algebra Ft is generated by the Brownian motion up to time t andQ is a risk-neutral measure
which exists in an arbitrage-free economy. The firm’s asset value process Vt is defined on the
probability space. To be consistent, we continue to use the notation of Chapter 2 and generalize
firm’s asset value dynamics as
dVt = µ(Vt,Ci)dt + σ(Vt)dWt, i = 0, 1 (4.1)
where µ(Vt,Ci) = (r − q)Vt − Ci is the drift term before (i = 0) and after (i = 1) conversion,
σ(Vt) = σVt is the diffusion term and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. Before conversion
2For NSI financial institutions it is not clear exactly how to quantify “conversion uncertainty”. Here, if one
quantifies uncertainty via the standard deviation of the CET1 ratio at conversion, we say the conversion ambiguity
is added in a gone-concern context; if one quantifies uncertainty via the standard deviation of the intensity function
itself, we say the conversion ambiguity is added in a going-concern context. More details will be discussed later.
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the dollar value of coupon payments is C0 = cDLD +cS LS +cCCBLJ. After conversion the dollar
value of coupon payments is C1 = cDLD +cS LS . Since now conversion is decided by regulators
rather than the hitting time of the asset value diffusion process, we commence by modelling
the conversion time.
4.2.1 Construction of Conversion Process
In this section, we give both an intuitive and a formal description of how the conversion pro-
cess is modelled. The description here follows Lando [5]. We assume the intensity function
k(·) is a non-negative continuous function and depends on the current firm value. It will rep-
resent investors’ beliefs on how regulators will exercise their discretion given an asset value.
Conditional on Ft, N is a Poisson process on [0, t] with intensity λs = k(Vs),
Q(Nt − Ns = m|Ft) =
(∫ t
s
k(Vu)du
)m
m!
exp
(
−
∫ t
s
k(Vu)du
)
, m = 0, 1, ...... (4.2)
In particular, assuming N0 = 0, we have
Q(Nt = 0|Ft) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
k(Vu)du
)
. (4.3)
With a regulatory discretionary trigger, we define the conversion time as
ξˆ = in f {t ≥ 0 : Nt = 1} , (4.4)
Mathematically, the definition (4.4) represents the first jump time of the Cox process. Addi-
tionally, we define
ξ = in f
{
t :
∫ t
0
k(Vu)du ≥ e˜1
}
, (4.5)
where e˜1 is a unit exponential random variable independent of Ft. It can be shown that ξˆ and ξ
have the same probability distribution according to
Q(Nt > 0|Ft) = 1 − exp
(
−
∫ t
0
k(Vu)du
)
= Q
(∫ t
0
k(Vu)du ≥ e˜1|Ft
)
. (4.6)
Based on this fact, in our following discussion we will use the definition (4.5) of the conversion
time instead of (4.4) under the regulatory discretionary trigger because of the implementation
convenience in simulation.
After modelling the conversion time, we are going to give two mathematical results in the
following. The probability that conversion does not occur prior to t is
Q(ξ > t|Ft) = Q
(∫ t
0
k(Vs)ds ≥ e˜1
∣∣∣Ft) = exp (−∫ t
0
k(Vs)ds
)
. (4.7)
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Based on this fact, given a firm whose contingent capital bonds have not converted up to time
t, the probability of conversion within the next small time interval with length h is
Q(ξ ≤ t + h|ξ > t,Ft) = Q(t < ξ ≤ t + h|Ft)
Q(ξ > t|Ft)
=
Q(ξ > t|Ft) −Q(ξ > t + h|Ft)
Q(ξ > t|Ft)
= 1 −
exp
(
− ∫ t+h
0
k(Vs)ds
)
exp
(
− ∫ t
0
k(Vs)ds
)
= 1 − exp
(
−
∫ t+h
t
k(Vs)ds
)
= k(Vt)h + o(h), (4.8)
where (4.8) holds according to the Taylor expansion. As a result, we can think of k(Vt) as a
stochastic hazard rate depending on the firm’s financial situation at time t. The conditional
conversion probability within a small time interval given that conversion has not occurred yet
depends on the instantaneous firm’s health. This intuition allows us to connect the constructed
conversion process with authorities’ possible behaviours of triggering the conversion given the
current firm value.
4.2.2 Intensity Function
We know that the constructed conversion process depends on the intensity function which
approximates the regulators’ behaviours of enforcing the conversion. In the following, we
are going to make several assumptions for intensity functions in order to discuss regulators’
behaviours for different types of financial institutions.
One practical assumption is when the asset value is very large3, it is unlikely that regulators
are going to enforce conversion since the financial institution is very healthy. Mathematically,
it implies
v→ +∞, k(v)→ 0. (4.9)
However, when the asset value is relatively low and close to the point of non-viability, it is
possible that the firm becomes non-viable due to the failure of keeping its liability commitment,
at which point the value of the intensity function should be nonzero. The behaviour near
the point of non-viability is less obvious, and to this end we consider two different intensity
functions corresponding to two different types of financial institutions. In the following, we
discuss intuitions and reasonable assumptions of the intensity function in each category.
NSI Financial Institutions
Regulators are not responsible for saving all financial institutions from failure. For a NSI finan-
cial institution, if its financial situation is deteriorated to the point of non-viability, sometimes
3Assuming a fixed amount of issued liabilities, a large asset value will be due mostly to a large equity value.
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it is wise to let it go bankrupt rather than saving it since the restructured firm that emerges
after bankruptcy might bring more benefits than rescuing the financial institution directly. If
the institution is truly terrible then simply letting it fail is probably a good idea, since a health-
ier competitor can take its place. Therefore, regulators might never enforce conversion when
the failure of the financial institution will not cause disastrous consequences to financial sta-
bility. Under this circumstance, define DEF0 = d∗L as the liquidation level in the absence of
contingent capital (the same idea with (2.3)), and this is what the liquidation level will be if
regulators decide not to enforce conversion prior to liquidation. For NSI financial institutions,
it is reasonable to assume
v→ DEF0, k(v)→ 0. (4.10)
One candidate for the non-monotonic intensity function is the probability density function of
the lognormal distribution ln N(µk, σ2k) with a parallel shift of distance DEF0,
k(v) =
1√
2piσk(v − DEF0)
exp
(
− (ln(v − DEF0) − µk)
2
2σ2k
)
, v > DEF0, (4.11)
where µk and σk are positive constants. One advantage of using (4.11) is that the function
k(v) is non-negative for any asset value above the liquidation level. Additionally, by variating
µk and σk, we can control the location of the peak of the intensity function and the mean of
possible conversion locations4.
There are at least two ways to quantify the degree of regulatory uncertainty (i.e. the degree
of uncertainty surrounding regulators’ decision about whether or not to enforce conversion).
The first approach focus on the expected CET1 ratio at conversion. Since the CET1 ratio
is proportional to asset value, this approach is tantamount to fixing E[Vξ] and then quantifying
uncertainty via the standard deviation of Vξ. The left panel of Figure 4.1 shows two intensity
functions under this approach by fixing the expected CET1 ratio at conversion at 5.0%. Un-
fortunately there is no closed form expression relating the parameter (µk, σk) to the mean and
variance of Vξ and the relation between the two sets of parameters must be determined using
Monte Carlo simulation. As such this approach is computationally intensive.
The conversion uncertainty also can be incorporated via the spread of the intensity function
with the maximum value fixed at a suggested trigger location (such as a CET1 ratio). The fixed
suggested trigger can be thought of as a point at which conversion is most likely enforced.
As the firm value approaches the suggested objective trigger, it is likely that regulators will
enforce the conversion in order to boost the firm’s capital above the suggested level. However,
if conversion does not happen when the asset value falls below the suggested trigger, the like-
lihood of conversion decreases with the decline of the firm value and it is more likely regulator
is willing to let the firm fail. Given (4.11), the most likely point at which conversion occurs
is DEF0 + exp(µk − σ2k) (i.e. the location of the maximum value). The parameter σk controls
the scale of the function and therefore can be interpreted as reflecting uncertainty around the
4It is also possible to use other non-monotonic functions instead of the probability density function of the
lognormal distribution. For example, the probability density function of the log-logistic and the inverse Gaus-
sian distributions, etc. However, we take the probability density function of the lognormal distribution because
fixing the peak value location (mode) and the scale parameter σk, the other parameter µk can be estimated explic-
itly. However, the parameter of the log-logistic function and inverse Gaussian distribution can only be estimated
numerically rather than explicitly given the fixed mode and the scale parameter.
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suggested trigger. A large value of σk indicates that investors are not so confident in this belief
while a small σk indicates that investors are reasonably certain. Therefore, in this approach one
first specifies what investors believe is the most likely point at which conversion is enforced,
and then varies σk in order to quantify the impact of uncertainty on the cost of contingent debt.
This situation is demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Examples of intensity functions for NSI institutions. The intensity functions in the
left panel have the same mean of conversion location at 5.0% CET1 ratio while the ones in the
right panel have the same peak location at 5.0% CET1 ratio.
TBTF Financial Institution
For the systemically important financial institutions with potential too-big-to-fail problem, the
government would support them when they face potential failure in order to avoid severe ad-
verse consequences to the greater economic system. It is reasonable to assume the bail-out
financial resolution provided by the government comes after the the bail-in resolution from the
conversion of contingent capital. Therefore, conversion will always be enforced by regulator
prior to liquidation for the too-big-to-fail financial institutions.
Suppose as the asset value approaches to the level DEF0 which is the liquidation level for
the firm in the absence of contingent capital, it is more and more likely that the regulators are
going to trigger the conversion in order to rescue the firm and invoke an orderly resolution. A
condition describing this situation would be
v→ DEF0, k(v)→ +∞, (4.12)
which guarantees that conversion always occurs prior to liquidation5. To facilitate our com-
parison with the results under the NSI intensity function, we consider the following intensity
function,
k(v) =
 1√2piσk(v−DEF0)exp
(
− (ln(v−DEF0)−µk)22σ2k
)
, v > DEF0 + exp(µk − σ2k),
λ
(v−DEF0)2 , DEF0 < v ≤ DEF0 + exp(µk − σ2k),
(4.13)
5However, the condition (4.12) is necessary but not sufficient for conversion to precede liquidation with prob-
ability one.
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in which we keep the part of the NSI intensity function at the right side of the peak location
unchanged but replace the left part with a monotonic function which approaches to infinity as
the asset value moves towards the level DEF06. The parameter λ is chosen so that the function
is continuous at the peak. Two examples are plotted in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Examples of TBTF intensity function.
The two categories of intensity functions describe two possible behaviours of regulators
when they consider triggering conversion. The main difference between them is: for the NSI
intensity function, regulators might let the institution fail without enforcing the conversion of
contingent debt and CCB might end up as a liability; however, in the case of TBTF intensity
function, financial resolution always starts with the conversion of CCB.
4.2.3 Pricing of CCBs
Similar to the definition in Chapter 2, the liquidation time τd is the first-passage time to a
specified asset-liability ratio d∗,
τd = in f {t ≥ 0 : v¯t ≤ d∗}. (4.14)
In the case that regulators allow the firm to fail without enforcing conversion (τd < ξ), the
barrier is the level DEF0 = d∗L. This case is only possible for NSI financial institutions.
In the event that conversion is enforced prior to liquidation (τd > ξ), the barrier is the level
DEF1 = d∗(LD + LS ). This case is possible for both NSI and TBTF financial institutions
Being consistent with Chapter 2, we assume the financial institution keeps operating until
liquidation happens. LetEx[·] be the expectation with the asset value diffusion process starting
at V0 = x. Given the fixed imposed loss 100βCCB% to the notional value of CCB at conversion,
6We don’t have a formal mathematical proof that the intensity function in (4.13) is such that conversion to
precede liquidation with probability one, but the numerical evidence (in Table 4.10) indicates that this probability
is extremely close (if not exactly equal to) one.
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the fair coupon rates (par yields) are solved from the following equation system
LD =
cDLD
r
(
1 −Ex[e−rτd ]) + RDLDEx[e−rτd ], (4.15)
LS =
cS LS
r
(
1 −Ex[e−rτd ]) + RS LSEx[e−rτd ], (4.16)
LJ =
cCCBLJ
r
(
1 −Ex
[
e−rτd
])
+ (1 − βCCB)LJEx
[
e−rξ1{ξ≤τd}
]
+ RJLJEx
[
e−rτd1{τd<ξ}
]
, (4.17)
where τd = min{τd, ξ} and the recovery rates at liquidation for deposits, the senior bond and
CCB are RD, RS and RJ respectively. Only when τd < ξ (i.e. regulators never enforce con-
version) is there a recovery payment to the CCB investor. To respect seniority, we assume
RD > RS > RJ.
To estimate the credit spreads, we need to calculate the Laplace transform of the liquidation
time and conversion time in the equation systems. When the conversion trigger is objective then
the Laplace transform of the conversion time can be expressed in terms of Laplace transforms
of hitting times of affine geometric Brownian motion to fixed levels, which is available in closed
form (Metzler [9]) and happens to involve the confluent hypergeometric function. However, in
this chapter, the conversion time ξ is no longer the hitting time of asset value to a fixed level.
Thus, the analysis is more complicated and we require the transform of the “killing time” ξ as
well as two conditional transforms. Although we are not able to compute these transforms in
closed form, we are able to characterize them as solutions to second-order ordinary differential
equations. By numerically solving the ordinary differential equations, we obtain the value for
the transforms.
In the following, we state the theorems of relevant differential equations and the cor-
responding boundary conditions. Theoretical proofs are presented in Appendix D. For the
reader’s convenience, we summarize the results in Table 4.1 at the end of this section.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let U(x) = Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}]. Then U(x) is the solution of the following second-
order ordinary differential equation
GU(x) − (k(x) + α)U(x) + k(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (4.18)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx .
Different boundary conditions are applied for different categories of intensity functions.
Under the NSI intensity function, the boundary conditions are U(DEF0) = 0 and limx→+∞U(x) =
0. The first condition makes sense because as the asset value approaches to the level DEF0,
it is almost sure that the NSI institution will fail without the conversion of contingent capital
(i.e., ξ > τd). In other words, as x → DEF0, the value of the indicator 1{ξ≤τd} approaches to
zero. As the asset value approaches infinity, we have the boundary condition limx→+∞U(x) = 0
according to the assumption (4.9). Under the TBTF intensity function, regulators will always
enforce conversion prior to liquidation, leading to the boundary condition U(DEF0) = 1. This
is because as the asset value approaches to the level DEF0, contingent debt is more likely to be
converted to common shares. As a result, we have ξ → 0 as x→ DEF0. The second boundary
condition is limx→+∞U(x) = 0 based on the same reason under the NSI intensity function.
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Theorem 4.2.2 Let Z(x) = Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}]. Then Z(x) is the solution of the following second-
order ordinary differential equation
GZ(x) − k(x)Z(x) − αZ(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (4.19)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx .
Under the NSI intensity function, we have limx→∞ Z(x) = 0 because as the asset value
approaches to infinity, the hitting time τd → +∞. The other boundary condition is Z(DEF0) =
1 due to the reason that as x → DEF0, we have τd → 0 and the value of the indicator 1{τd<ξ}
approaches to one. Under the TBTF intensity function, the boundary conditions are Z(DEF0) =
0 and limx→∞ Z(x) = 0. As x → DEF0, it is more likely that regulator will enforce conversion
(ξ → 0) before the failure of the institution leading to the indicator 1{τd<ξ} approaches to zero.
Theorem 4.2.3 Let W(x) = Ex[e−ατd ]. Then W(x) solves the following second-order ordinary
differential equation
GW(x) − (k(x) + α)W(x) + k(x)W1(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (4.20)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx and W1(x) = Ex[e
−ατd ], which is calculated
based on the post-conversion diffusion process, i.e., the fixed coupon payment for the diffusion
process is C1.
Based on the assumption (4.12), limx→+∞W(x) = 0 holds for both TBTF and NSI intensity
functions. Under the NSI intensity function, the other boundary condition is W(DEF0) = 1.
This is because as x→ DEF0, we have τd → 0. In the TBTF case, as x→ DEF0, τd converges
to the hitting time of an affine geometric Brownian motion beginning at the level DEF0 to the
level DEF1. Therefore, W(DEF0) can be expressed in terms of the known Laplace transform
for such hitting times, i.e. W(DEF0) = EDEF0[e
−ατd ] (see Theorem B.1.6 in Appendix B).
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the relevant differential equations and the corresponding
boundary conditions.
Table 4.1: ODEs and Boundary Conditions
Transforms ODEs and Boundary Conditions
U(x) = Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}]
GU(x) − (k(x) + α)U(x) + k(x) = 0, x > DEF0
TBTF U(DEF0) = 1, limx→+∞U(x) = 0
NSI U(DEF0) = 0, limx→+∞U(x) = 0
Z(x) = Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}]
GZ(x) − k(x)Z(x) − αZ(x) = 0, x > DEF0
TBTF Z(DEF0) = 0, limx→+∞ Z(x) = 0
NSI Z(DEF0) = 1, limx→+∞ Z(x) = 0
W(x) = Ex[e−ατd ]
GW(x) − (k(x) + α)W(x) + k(x)W1(x) = 0, x > DEF0
TBTF W(DEF0) = EDEF0[e
−ατd ], limx→+∞W(x) = 0
NSI W(DEF0) = 1, limx→+∞W(x) = 0
So far we derived the ordinary differential equations and their boundary conditions cor-
responding to the transforms needed in the equation system. We do not need to derive the
84 Chapter 4. Contingent Capital Bond with Regulatory Discretionary Trigger
differential equation for the term Ex[e−rτd ] in (4.17) since it equals to the summation of U(x)
and Z(x). By solving the differential equations, we can estimate the par yields under the con-
version term of fixed imposed loss.
Similar to our discussions under the objective conversion trigger in Chapter 2, we also
investigate the interval for reasonable conversion terms when the conversion trigger depends
on regulatory discretion. Recall Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1, a reasonable conversion term must
guarantee the liability seniority in the capital structure and the existing shareholders are not
rewarded for the poor performance of the firm at the same time.
4.3 Numerical Experiments
To be consistent with our analysis under the objective conversion trigger, we continue to use
the parameters from the base case in Chapter 2 if there is no particular specification. Although
we only consider the discretionary trigger in this chapter, we use 5.0% CET1 ratio as the
conversion trigger suggested in the contract. We start from the NSI intensity function and then
move on to the TBTF intensity function, investigating the conversion features, credit spreads of
liabilities and the reasonable intervals for conversion terms. We present the numerical results
under the 5.33% fixed imposed loss given the efficiency of computation.
We use the finite difference methods to numerically solve (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20). Instead
of using a large asset value to approximate the infinite case of our boundary conditions in Ta-
ble 4.1, we make the substitution z = 1/x and project x ∈ [DEF0,+∞) to z ∈ (0, 1/DEF0] in
order to transform our boundary value problems to the ones with bounded intervals. When we
use the finite difference methods to solve the ordinary differential equations, we keep refining
the grids until the solved par yields do not change within the magnitude of 10−5 (or 0.1 basis
point). Additionally, simulation results have been used as cross checks to the numerical solu-
tions of the ordinary differential equations. When solving for the par yields, we continue using
the stopping criteria (2.44) in Chapter 2. That is, the summation of each liability’s relative
difference between the discounted value and the notional value cannot exceed 0.1%.
4.3.1 Results under NSI Intensity Functions
In the simulation, we take T = 100 years as an approximation to the infinite time horizon,
the time step dt = 0.0005 and use 100, 000 paths. The results are slightly biased since they
condition on ξ < T . However, this bias can be expected to be very negligible in the sense that
Q(ξ < ∞) −Q(ξ ≤ T ) is extremely small. In general we have Q(ξ < ∞) < 1 since there is a
positive probability conversion will never be enforced.
We start from the case that the regulatory uncertainty is quantifies via the standard deviation
of the conversion location Vξ. In Table 4.2, we fix the mean of conversion location (E[Vξ])
around 5.0% CET1 ratio. As the parameter σk increases, the standard deviation of conversion
location (S D(Vξ)) increases reflecting increased uncertainty about when conversion will occur.
In the case that regulatory uncertainty is quantified via the scale parameter (σk) of the intensity
function, Table 4.3 lists the mean and standard deviation of conversion locations under different
σk’s but with the peak fixed at the 5.0% CET1 ratio. By fixing the peak location of the intensity
function, we fix the CET1 ratio at which conversion is most likely to be enforced. As shown
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in the table, the parameter σk is positively related to the conversion uncertainty. However, the
mean of conversion location moves upwards with the increase of the parameter σk due to the
wide spread (fat right tail) of the intensity function.
Table 4.2: Gone-Concern NSI Intensity Functiona
σk Q(ξ ≤ T ) Conversion Location(CET1)Mean Std
0.05 82.17% 5.00% 0.05%
0.25 82.70% 5.00% 0.28%
0.5 80.98% 5.01% 0.56%
0.75 77.25% 5.01% 0.88%
1.0 72.18% 5.00% 1.36%
1.5 58.76% 4.96% 1.93%
2.0 40.35% 5.02% 2.61%
a Fix E[Vξ], vary S D(Vξ).
Table 4.3: Going-Concern NSI Intensity Functionsb
σk Q(ξ ≤ T ) Conversion Location(CET 1)Mean Std
0.05 82.38% 5.01% 0.051%
0.25 85.23% 5.25% 0.34%
0.5 91.58% 6.38% 1.21%
0.75 96.72% 9.37% 3.04%
1.0 98.16% 11.36% 3.94%
1.5 95.47% 11.78% 3.71%
2.0 84.48% 12.60% 4.87%
b Fix the peak location, vary σk.
As we will see soon, the first approach mainly adds the uncertainty on a gone-concern basis
while the second approach adds the uncertainty on a going-concern basis. Therefore, we will
refer the first intensity function as gone-concern NSI intensity function and the second one as
going-concern NSI intensity function from now on.
In order to have a closer look of the conversion uncertainty, we list the quantiles of conver-
sion location under two types of NSI intensity functions in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Under the
gone-concern NSI intensity function, we fix the mean of conversion location E[Vξ] and vary
the standard deviation S D(Vξ) through the change of σk. Table 4.4 shows that more than 85%
of conversion locations are located below the 6.0% CET1 ratio for different σk’s. Moreover,
the conversion location moves towards the liquidation level (4.0% CET1 ratio) as the param-
eter σk increases. Therefore, modelling regulatory uncertainty in this way corresponds to the
situation where regulators are more likely to enforce conversion on a gone-concern basis. In
other words, the conversion uncertainty is incorporated around the firm’s point of non-viability.
In the case of the going-concern NSI intensity function, we fix the peak location of the inten-
sity function and vary the scale parameter σk. It is perceived from Table 4.5 that about 85%
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of conversion locations are located above the 5.0% CET1 ratio and the conversion location
moves upwards as the parameter σk rises. Hence, the conversion is likely to happen when the
firm’s value is only mildly eroded or at a relatively adequate level. Therefore, in this situation
regulators are more likely to enforce conversion on a going-concern basis.
Table 4.4: Quantiles under Gone-Concern NSI Intensity Functions
σk 5% Quantile 15% Quantile Median 85% Quantile 95% Quantile
0.05 4.92% 4.95% 5.00% 5.06% 5.09%
0.25 4.63% 4.74% 4.97% 5.27% 5.48%
0.5 4.36% 4.51% 4.89% 5.51% 6.06%
0.75 4.19% 4.32% 4.76% 5.71% 6.66%
1.0 4.08% 4.17% 4.59% 5.82% 7.35%
1.5 4.01% 4.04% 4.27% 5.75% 8.34%
2.0 4.01% 4.02% 4.13% 5.72% 9.23%
Table 4.5: Quantiles under Going-Concern NSI Intensity Functions
σk 5% Quantile 15% Quantile Median 85% Quantile 95% Quantile
0.05 4.93% 4.96% 5.01% 5.06% 5.09%
0.25 4.78% 4.92% 5.21% 5.58% 5.83%
0.5 4.86% 5.23% 6.15% 7.54% 8.66%
0.75 5.45% 6.44% 8.94% 12.12% 14.71%
1.0 6.31% 7.88% 10.98% 14.27% 17.96%
1.5 6.53% 8.37% 11.48% 14.79% 18.25%
2.0 6.37% 8.28% 11.84% 16.66% 21.57%
Credit Spreads
We list the credit spreads of the senior bond and CCB under different parameter σk’s in Ta-
ble 4.6 and Table 4.7. Recall that our discussion is under the conversion terms of fixed im-
posed loss. That is, a fixed amount of loss is imposed to CCB at conversion regardless of the
firm’s health at conversion. With the gone-concern NSI intensity function, adding conversion
uncertainty would make conversion more likely to happen around the liquidation level. It ben-
efits CCB investors because a possibly lower conversion level implies a delayed conversion
and therefore a longer coupon stream. Thus, we observe an inverse relation between the pa-
rameter σk and the credit spread of CCB, as shown in Table 4.6. In addition, the credit spread
of the senior bond grows with the parameter σk. This is due to the reason that the delayed
conversion implied by a relatively large σk reduces the possibility of the firm’s viability after
the recapitalization from conversion. In other words, the senior bondholder is confronted with
relatively high liquidation risk under a relatively large σk, leading to a positive relation between
the spread and the parameter σk.
However, conversion uncertainty imposes an opposite impact to credit spreads under the
going-concern NSI intensity function as shown in Table 4.7. The going-concern uncertainty
makes conversion likely to occur at adequate capital levels, which is not favoured by CCB
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investors because an early conversion would make them suffer an early write-down, cutting
the coupon stream for them. Thus, we observe a positive relation between σk and the credit
spread of CCB. But for the senior bondholders, an early conversion reduces the liquidation risk
leading to a decreasing credit spread.
If we compare the credit spreads shown in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, we can find that gone-
concern CCB is far less sensitive to regulatory uncertainty than going-concern CCB. This can
be explained by the less sensitive of conversion location to the uncertainty in the case of adding
the uncertainty on a gone-concern basis than on a going-concern basis.
Table 4.6: Credit Spreads under Gone-Concern NSI Intensity Function
σk Senior (in bp) CCB (in bp)
0.05 14 95
0.25 14 97
0.5 14 95
0.75 14 90
0.90 15 86
1.0 15 83
1.5 17 69
2.0 18 55
Table 4.7: Credit Spreads under Going-Concern NSI Intensity Function
σk Senior (in bp) CCB (in bp)
0.05 14 95
0.25 14 103
0.5 14 130
0.75 13 301
0.90 13 841
1.0 13 1846
1.5 13 4431
2.0 13 2200
Intervals for Reasonable Conversion Terms
Under the fixed imposed loss, Table 4.9 lists the reasonable intervals under different σk’s with
the gone-concern NSI intensity function. The left end point of the interval above which the
liability seniority is guaranteed might go negative when this type of conversion uncertainty
increases (the increase of the parameter σk). In other words, the liability seniority might be
kept even when the CCB is redeemed above par in the case of conversion. This is because
under the NSI intensity function, conversion might not happen and the CCB eventually ends
up as a liability at liquidation. As a result, even if we assign a full redemption (zero write-down)
at conversion for contingent capital, the recovery rate (less than the recovery rate for the senior
bond) for CCB in the case of liquidation might push the credit spread of CCB above the credit
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spread of the senior bond. This results in the negative value at the left end point of the interval
when conversion is more likely to happen near the liquidation level and liquidation is likely
to happen without regulators enforcing the conversion of CCB at the same time. However,
the right end point climbs with the increase of the parameter σk because the likelihood of
conversion occurring below the suggested objective trigger increases according to the change
of median in Table 4.4. With the firm’s asset value close to the liquidation level, the existing
shareholders in the otherwise identical traditional capital structure7 take a relatively large loss
which allows a relatively high imposed loss at the right end point to ensure that the existing
shareholders are not rewarded for the firm’s poor performance.
As for the going-concern NSI intensity function, the left end point behaves similarly to
the ones under the gone-concern NSI intensity function but the right end point of the interval
moves oppositely with the increase of the parameter σk. Compared to the gone-concern NSI
intensity function, the going-concern NSI intensity function makes conversion more likely to
occur in a going-concern environment with about 85% probability that conversion happens
above the suggested objective trigger 5.0% CET1 ratio. Under this circumstance, the share-
holders in the otherwise identical traditional capital structure bear small losses on average so
the imposed loss cannot be very large to guarantee the existing shareholders are not rewarded
for the poor performance. This trend becomes more obvious and significant with the growth of
the parameter σk, leading to a decrease in the right end point in Table 4.9.
Table 4.8: Reasonable Intervals under Gone-Concern NSI Intensity Function
σk Reasonable Interval Size of Interval
0.05 [0.27%, 9.61%] 9.34%
0.25 [0.30%, 9.53%] 9.23%
0.50 [0.25%, 9.63%] 9.38%
0.75 [0.11%, 9.89%] 9.78%
1.00 [−0.14%, 10.30%] 10.44%
1.50 [−1.09%, 11.34%] 12.43%
2.00 [−3.39%, 12.50%] 15.89%
Table 4.9: Reasonable Intervals under Going-Concern NSI Intensity Function
σk Reasonable Interval Size of Interval
0.05 [0.25%, 9.61%] 9.36%
0.25 [0.38%, 9.09%] 8.71%
0.50 [0.38%, 7.48%] 7.10%
0.75 [0.17%, 3.49%] 3.32%
1.00 [0.00%, 0.71%] 0.71%
1.50 [−0.09%, 0.22%] 0.31%
2.00 [−0.35%, 0.22%] 0.57%
Due to the change of reasonable intervals under two NSI intensity functions, we find that
under the gone-concern NSI intensity function, there is a positive relation between conversion
7Please see Section 2.3.2 in Chapter 2 for details.
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uncertainty measured by the parameter σk and the size of the reasonable interval. However,
under the going-concern NSI intensity function, there is an inverse relation. Therefore, as more
and more regulatory discretion incorporated into the trigger in a gone-concern framework, the
size of the open window for reasonable conversion term grows. However, if the uncertainty
is added in a going-concern framework, the interval shrinks to allow for the incorporation of
regulatory discretion.
Another noteworthy conclusion is that under both NSI intensity functions, if a relatively
high regulatory discretion is incorporated into the trigger (for example, σk = 1.5 and 2.0), the
reasonable intervals demonstrate that even CCB investors are redeemed above par at conversion
(with negative write-downs), the liability seniority and the punishment to existing shareholders
might be guaranteed. It implies that the adverse impression brought by regulatory discretionary
trigger to CCB investors might be offset by the above par redemption.
4.3.2 Results under TBTF Intensity Function
In this section we only consider the TBTF intensity function (4.13) and focus on the compar-
ison between the results under the TBTF and the gone-concern NSI intensity function. By
doing so, we investigate the difference between the CCB issued by a NSI financial institution
and a TBTF financial institution.
Table 4.10 illustrates a positive relation between the standard deviation of conversion loca-
tions and the parameter σk, so σk still manages to measure the conversion uncertainty as it does
with the NSI intensity function. It is worth mentioning that the probability shown in the table
measures the likelihood that conversion happens within a given time horizon T . For too-big-to-
fail financial institutions, conversion is sure to occur prior to liquidation but it does not mean
conversion is certain to occur before the given time horizon T . Therefore, it is reasonable to
observe a probability less than one. When we extend the time horizon T , the probability of liq-
uidation increases so does the probability of conversion before T . Perceived from Table 4.11,
as σk increases, conversion is more likely to occur near (but never below) the liquidation level.
Credit Spreads
We present the credit spreads under the TBTF intensity function and the comparison with
the spreads under the gone-concern NSI intensity function in Figure 4.3. As the parameter
σk measures the conversion uncertainty, for too-big-to-fail financial institutions, the cost of
the senior bond is not sensitive to the conversion uncertainty because regulator will always
enforce conversion before liquidation. The capital infusion from conversion provides a safety
cushion for the senior bondholders reducing the liquidation risk and prolonging their coupon
stream. However, for NSI institutions, the conversion uncertainty raises the cost of the senior
bond because conversion might never happen resulting in a shorter coupon stream for senior
bondholders. The credit spreads shown in the left panel of Figure 4.3 verifies our analysis
in Chapter 2 indirectly. That is, the (sure-to-happen) conversion feature of the junior tranche
would reduce the cost the senior tranche.
The conversion uncertainty brought by the discretionary trigger reduces the cost of CCBs
as shown in the right panel of Figure 4.3. With the increase of the parameter σk, conversion is
more likely to be delayed to happen around the liquidation level. Hence, the life of CCB as a
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Table 4.10: TBTF Intensity Function
σk Qv0(ξ ≤ T )a Conversion Location(CET 1)Mean Std
0.05 98.35% 4.90% 0.14%
0.25 98.35% 4.84% 0.37%
0.50 98.34% 4.82% 0.65%
0.75 98.32% 4.78% 0.88%
1.00 98.32% 4.72% 1.18%
1.50 98.28% 4.60% 1.61%
2.00 98.24% 4.38% 1.66%
a The results shown in the table are under the ma-
turity T = 100. When we increase the maturity
to T = 200, the probabilities are 98.99%, 98.99%,
98.99%, 98.98%, 98.96%, 98.95% and 98.92% re-
spectively from the first row to the last row.
Table 4.11: Quantiles under TBTF Intensity Functions
σk 5% Quantile 15% Quantile Median 85% Quantile 95% Quantile
0.05 4.64% 4.75% 4.92% 5.03% 5.07%
0.25 4.25% 4.42% 4.86% 5.22% 5.44%
0.50 4.04% 4.17% 4.74% 5.42% 5.95%
0.75 4.00% 4.00% 4.54% 5.51% 6.46%
1.00 4.00% 4.00% 4.32% 5.46% 6.83%
1.50 4.00% 4.00% 4.03% 5.04% 7.16%
2.00 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.28% 6.14%
bond is prolonged and therefore the coupon stream received by investors. This effect reduces
the credit spread of CCB leading to generally decreasing lines in the right panel.
As for contingent capital bonds, the conversion uncertainty makes CCBs issued by too-big-
to-fail institutions more expensive than those issued by NSI institutions. This is because if con-
version happens near the point of non-viability then CCB investors effectively move down the
pecking order from bondholders (who has a relatively high recovery rate of their notional value
at liquidation) to shareholders (who might recover nothing at liquidation). Under the TBTF in-
tensity function, conversion is sure to occur prior to liquidation, excluding the situation that
CCB ends up as a liability with some recovery rate at liquidation. In other words, if liqui-
dation occurs, CCB investors will only hold shares which might be worthless at the moment.
Therefore, CCB investors of too-big-to-fail financial institutions would require high coupon
payments as compensation. This observation confirms our analysis in Chapter 2 indirectly.
That is, the (sure-to-happen) conversion feature makes the junior tranche more expensive.
According to Figure 4.3, the credit spreads under the gone-concern NSI intensity function
are more sensitive to the uncertainty than the TBTF intensity function. This is because con-
version might not occur under the NSI intensity function, then the recovery rate at liquidation
makes the redemption to CCB more volatile than the case that conversion is sure to be en-
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forced by regulators prior to liquidation and the redemption to CCB is fixed as one minus the
write-down proportion.
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Figure 4.3: Credit spreads as a function of the parameter σk.
Reasonable Intervals for Conversion Terms
The reasonable intervals are more stable under the TBTF intensity function (Table 4.12) than
that under the gone-concern NSI intensity function (Table 4.8). This observation can be in-
terpreted by the fact that credit spreads are less sensitive to the change of σk under the TBTF
intensity function than under the gone-concern NSI intensity function.
Table 4.12: Reasonable Intervals under TBTF Intensity Function
σk Reasonable Interval Size of Interval
0.05 [0.61%, 8.90%] 8.29%
0.25 [0.62%, 8.98%] 8.36%
0.50 [0.62%, 9.00%] 8.38%
0.75 [0.62%, 9.05%] 8.43%
0.90 [0.63%, 9.09%] 8.46%
1.00 [0.63%, 9.13%] 8.50%
1.50 [0.64%, 9.28%] 8.64%
2.00 [0.66%, 9.53%] 8.87%
4.4 Conclusion
We employ an intensity approach to incorporate the regulatory discretionary trigger into the
pricing of contingent capital bonds. Two categories of intensity functions are considered to
capture different patterns of regulatory discretion. The NSI intensity functions focus on the
NSI financial institutions with the possibility that regulators would not enforce the conversion
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and let the institution fail, while the TBTF intensity functions focus on the financial institu-
tions having potential too-big-to-fail problem and conversion is sure to happen as a source of
financial resolution before liquidation.
As for the NSI intensity function, we discuss two approaches of modelling regulatory dis-
cretion. Under the gone-concern NSI intensity function, conversion uncertainty is added on a
gone-concern basis and the implied delayed conversion reduces the cost for the contingent cap-
ital. However, under the going-concern NSI intensity function, conversion uncertainty is added
in a going-concern framework. Due to the implied early write-down, the cost of the CCB in-
creases. Because two types of NSI intensity functions imply opposite conversion uncertainty
patterns, the size of the reasonable interval changes oppositely.
Under the TBTF intensity function, the cost of CCB keeps declining as the regulatory
discretion increases. However, CCBs issued by too-big-to fail financial institutions would be
more expensive than those issued by NSI financial institutions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We extend the model put forward by Metzler and Reesor [2] to model contingent capital bonds
with fixed coupon payments. We consider three problems – the pricing of contingent capital
with a capital-ratio trigger, the potential manipulation incentives for investors when conversion
is likely and the pricing of contingent capital bonds with a regulatory discretionary trigger. Our
model adheres to the design advisory from OSFI [1] quantitatively and provides a reasonable
range for the choice of conversion terms so that both liability seniority and existing sharehold-
ers not being rewarded for the firm’s poor performance are guaranteed. We calibrate the model
to Canadian banking data to provide a preliminary picture for Canadian banks’ consideration
for issuing contingent capital bonds.
In general, our work provides an applicable but preliminary approach to model contingent
capital bonds. As for some potential extensions, there are several interesting divisions for our
future work. Although we incorporate fixed coupon payments into the asset value process,
we use constant model factors such as asset volatility (σ), risk-free interest rate (r) and the
dividend payout ratio (q) which are important for the behaviour of the firm value and which
might vary with the firm value. Therefore, it is worth trying to extend the model by treating
factors mentioned above as diffusion processes that change with the firm value. In addition, we
assume exogenous recovery rates in our model and calibrate the recovery rates from empirical
credit spreads of Canadian banks. However, it would be more realistic to make the recovery
rates depend on the firm value and evolve with time which might be another possible future
work division of this thesis.
For the investigation of short-selling incentives, the deviation between the market and fun-
damental stock price may be improved using a more realistic model. For example, we can
add random factors to the deviation and reversion process rather than merely making them
time-dependent.
In Chapter 4, we assume that regulators are fully in charge of determining conversion and
consider two typical intensity functions to mimic regulators’ possible behaviours in enforcing
conversion. However, some issuances use a combination of capital ratio and regulatory dis-
cretion as the trigger. Therefore, one might be interested in considering the combined trigger
and investigating the pricing of contingent capital under this type of trigger. In addition, with
the increasing complexity of the financial system, it would be hard to recognize if a financial
institution is too-big-to-fail. As a result, for each financial institution, we cannot directly use
a TBTF or NSI intensity function to approximate regulators’ behaviours. One possible way to
94
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solve this problem is to combine two categories of intensity functions and assign a weight to
each of them. The weight could be related to financial institution’s systemically importance or
other factors.
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Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Mathematical Proofs for Chapter 2
B.1.1 Hitting Time Properties
In this section, we lay out relevant properties of solutions of the diffusion process
dXt = µ˜(Xt)dt + σ˜(Xt)dWt, (B.1)
where
µ˜(x) = µx −C
and
σ˜(x) = σx
with constant µ, C, σ > 0 and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. We are particularly interested
in the hitting time
τy = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ y}, (B.2)
where y ≥ 0 is a constant barrier and located below the initial location of the diffusion process
X0 = x.
Here and below, denote the expectation E with respect to the probability measure P and
we use Px and Ex to represent the probability and expectation conditioning on X0 = x. The
Laplace transform of the first-passage time
u(x, y, µ,C, σ, α) = Ex[e−ατy]. (B.3)
Rather than working exclusively with processes taking values on the entire real line , we only
focus on the interval
I = (l, r). (B.4)
Similar to Karlin and Taylor [2], denote a and b are arbitrary fixed points inside (l, r), and
the particular choice of a and b is of no relevance. The scale function is defined as
S (x) =
∫ x
a
s(η)dη =
∫ x
a
exp
{
−
∫ η
b
2µ˜(ξ)
σ˜2(ξ)
dξ
}
dη, (B.5)
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and the speed density,
m(x) =
1
σ˜2(x)s(x)
. (B.6)
According to Karlin and Taylor [2], with the scale function (B.5), the probability of hitting
the upper barrier b prior to the lower barrier a is evaluated as (S (x) − S (a))/(S (b) − S (a)) for
x ∈ [a, b]. From this perspective, the scale function plays a role in measuring the probability
with the difference between the value of scale function at x and the lower barrier a.
Karlin and Taylor [2, Definition 6.2] The boundary l is said to be attainable if
Σ(l) =
∫ x
l
{∫ ξ
l
s(η)dη
}
m(ξ)dξ < ∞.
Proposition B.1.1 (Karlin and Taylor [2, Lemma 6.2]) If l is attainable, then l is attracting.
Lemma B.1.2 (Karlin and Taylor [2, Lemma 6.2]) Let l be an attracting boundary and sup-
pose l < x < r. Then the following are equivalent
1. Px(τl < ∞) > 0;
2. Σ(l) < ∞.
Proposition B.1.3 (Karatzas and Shreve [1, Proposition 5.22, case (b)]) Assume that for any
x ∈ I, we have σ˜2(x) > 0 and there exists a  > 0 such that ∫ x+
x−
1+|µ˜(y)|
σ˜2(y) dy < ∞. If S (l+) > −∞
and S (r−) = +∞, then Px(limt→τ∗ Xt = l) = 1, where τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt < (l, r)}.
This proposition indicates that if the scale function is bounded from below at the lower bound-
ary l while explosive at the upper boundary r, then the probability of hitting the lower boundary
l is one.
Theorem B.1.4 Given the diffusion process (B.1), the origin is attainable in finite time from
any initial point x > 0. That is
Px(τ0 < ∞) > 0 (B.7)
for all x > 0. If µ < σ2/2, this can be strengthened to Px(τ0 < ∞) = 1.
Proof Based on Lemma B.1.2, we only need to prove Σ(l) < ∞ for l = 0. We start from the
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scale function (B.5),
S (ξ) =
∫ ξ
l
s(η)dη
=
∫ ξ
l
exp
{
−
∫ η
b
2(µz −C)
σ2z2
dz
}
dη
=
∫ ξ
l
exp
{
−2µ
σ2
∫ η
b
1
z
dz +
2C
σ2
∫ η
b
1
z2
dz
}
dη
=
∫ ξ
l
exp
{
−2µ
σ2
ln
∣∣∣η
b
∣∣∣ + 2C
σ2
(
−1
η
+
1
b
)}
dη
=
∫ ξ
l
(
η
b
)− 2µ
σ2
exp
{
2C
σ2
(
−1
η
+
1
b
)}
dη
= b
2µ
σ2 exp
{
2C
σ2
1
b
}∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
= B
∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη, (B.8)
where we denote the constant B = b
2µ
σ2 exp
{
2C
σ2
1
b
}
. Furthermore,
Σ(l) =
∫ x
l
(∫ ξ
l
s(η)dη
)
m(ξ)dξ
= B
∫ x
l
(∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
)
1
σ2ξ2
exp
{∫ ξ
b
2(µz −C)
σ2z2
dz
}
dξ
=
B
σ2
∫ x
l
(∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
)
b−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
b
}
ξ
2µ
σ2
−2exp
{
2C
σ2
1
ξ
}
dξ
=
B
σ2
b−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
b
}∫ x
l
(∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
)
ξ
2µ
σ2
−2exp
{
2C
σ2
1
ξ
}
dξ
=
1
σ2
∫ x
l
(∫ ξ
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
)
ξ
2µ
σ2
−2exp
{
2C
σ2
1
ξ
}
dξ, (B.9)
where the last step holds because Bb−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
b
}
= 1. After exchanging the order of inte-
gration, we rewrite the integral (B.9) as
Σ(l) =
1
σ2
∫ x
l
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
} (∫ x
η
ξ
2µ
σ2
−2exp
{
2C
σ2
1
ξ
}
dξ
)
dη. (B.10)
Let f (z) =
∫ x
z
ξ
2µ
σ2
−2exp
{
2C
σ2
1
ξ
}
dξ and g(z) = z
2µ
σ2 exp
{
2C
σ2
1
z
}
, then we have f ′(z) = −g(z)/z2 and
Σ(l) =
1
σ2
∫ x
l
f (η)
g(η)
dη. (B.11)
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Taking l = 0, the integral (B.11) is improper and it is convergent if the integrand f (η)/g(η) is
bounded as η→ 0+. By the L’Hopital rule,
lim
η→0+
f (η)
g(η)
∞
∞
= lim
η→0+
f ′(η)
g′(η)
= lim
η→0+
−g(η)/η2
g′(η)
= lim
η→0+
− 1
η2
η
2µ
σ2 exp
{
2C
σ2
1
η
}
2µ
σ2
η
2µ
σ2
−1exp
{
2C
σ2
1
η
}
− 2C
σ2
1
η2
η
2µ
σ2 exp
{
2C
σ2
1
η
}
= lim
η→0+
− 1
η2
1
2µ
σ2
η−1 − 2C
σ2
η−2
= lim
η→0+
− 12µ
σ2
η − 2C
σ2
=
σ2
2C
< ∞. (B.12)
So far we proved that Σ(l) < ∞ for l = 0. Therefore, the origin is attainable. By Proposi-
tion B.1.1 and Lemma B.1.2, we have Px(τ0 < ∞) > 0.
Now we turn to prove Px(τ0 < ∞) = 1 when µ < σ2/2. According to Proposition B.1.3,
we only need to prove limx→0+ S (x) > −∞ and limx→∞ S (x) = ∞ when µ < σ2/2.
lim
x→0+
S (x) = lim
x→0+
∫ x
b
s(η)dη
= lim
x→0+
B
∫ x
b
η−
2µ
σ2 exp
{
−2C
σ2
1
η
}
dη
≥ lim
x→0+
Bexp
{
−2C
σ2
1
b
}∫ x
b
η−
2µ
σ2 dη
= lim
x→0+
b
2µ
σ2
∫ x
b
η−
2µ
σ2 dη
= lim
x→0+
b
2µ
σ2
− 2µ
σ2
+ 1
η−
2µ
σ2
+1
∣∣∣x
b
. (B.13)
It is easy to see that only when µ < σ2/2, the limit is convergent to a negative constant.
Similarly, we can prove that only when µ < σ2/2 the scale function explodes as x → ∞.
Therefore, we have limx→0+ S (x) > −∞ and limx→∞ S (x) = ∞ when µ < σ2/2.
Based on Theorem B.1.4, for any fixed barrier above the origin, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem B.1.5 Given the diffusion process (B.1), a fixed barrier y ∈ [0, x] is attainable in
finite time from the initial point x > 0. That is,
Px(τy < ∞) > 0. (B.14)
If µ < σ2/2, this can be strengthened to Px(τy < ∞) = 1.
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Theorem B.1.6 For α ∈ R+, and y ∈ [0, x], the function u(x, y, µ,C, σ, α) defined in (B.3) is
equal to
u =

(y
x
)γ M (γ, 2(γ + 1) − 2µ
σ2
,− 2C
σ2 x
)
M
(
γ, 2(γ + 1) − 2µ
σ2
,− 2C
σ2y
) , y > 0, (B.15)
(
2C
σ2x
)γ Γ (γ + 2 − 2µ
σ2
)
Γ
(
2(γ + 1) − 2µ
σ2
)M (γ, 2(γ + 1) − 2µ
σ2
,− 2C
σ2x
)
, y = 0, (B.16)
where Γ is the gamma function, M is the confluent hypergeometric function and γ is the unique
positive root of
ξ2 + (1 − 2µ
σ2
)ξ − 2α
σ2
= 0. (B.17)
Proof Fix all the parameters rather than the initial value X0 = x. According to Metzler [3] and
Theorem B.1.5, it is known that given the diffusion process (B.1), u(x) solves the following
second-order ordinary differential equation
σ2x2
2
u′′(x) + (µx −C)u′(x) − αu(x) = 0, x ∈ [y,+∞], (B.18)
subject to the boundary condition u(y) = 1 and limx→+∞ u(x) = 0. Metzler [3] shows that the
general solution to (B.18) is
u(x) = A
(
− 2C
σ2x
)γ
M(γ, 2(γ + 1) − 2µ
σ2
,− 2C
σ2x
), (B.19)
where A is an arbitrary constant. For y > 0, we must have A =
(
−2C/σ2y
)−γ
/M(γ, 2(γ + 1) −
2µ/σ2,−2C/σ2x) in order to enforce the boundary condition u(y) = 1, which leads to (B.15).
Using asymptotic relations for the confluent hypergeometric function M, Metzler [3] shows
that we must have A = (−1)γΓ
(
γ + 2 − 2µ/σ2
)
/Γ
(
2(γ + 1) − 2µ/σ2
)
in order to enforce the
condition u(0) = 1, leading to (B.16).
Lemma B.1.7 (Karlin and Taylor [2, Lemma 7.1]) Consider two fixed barriers h1, h2 ∈ (l, r)
and h1 < h2 < x. Then Ex[e−τh1 ] = Ex[e−τh2 ]Eh2[e
−(τh1−τh2 )].
B.1.2 Equity Value in the Capital Structure
In the following we are going to prove the relation
Vt = Lt + Et + BCt, (B.20)
where Lt is the total value of liabilities in the capital structure, Et is the equity value and BCt is
the total bankruptcy cost at time t before conversion (or liquidation under a traditional capital
structure). We continue using the diffusion process (B.1) but replacing Xt with Vt and the
parameter µ with r − q where r is the risk-free interest rate and q is the dividend payout ratio
with respect to the firm value. The parameter C can be though of as the fixed coupon payments
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to all the liabilities in the capital structure. The following discussion in this subsection is under
the risk-neutral measure. By Itoˆ’s formula,
de−rtVt = −e−rt(qVt + C)dt + e−rtσVtdWt. (B.21)
Write the stochastic differential equation (B.21) in integral form,
e−rtVt = V0 −
∫ t
0
e−ruqVudu +
C
r
(e−rt − 1) +
∫ t
0
e−ruσVudWu. (B.22)
After some transformation, we have
V0 +
∫ t
0
e−ruσVudWu =e−rtVt +
∫ t
0
e−ruqVudu − Cr (e
−rt − 1),
=e−rt(Vt − L)+ +
∫ t
0
e−ruqVudu
+ e−rt(Vt − (Vt − L)+) + Cr (1 − e
−rt).
Taking expectation on both sides, we have
V0 +E[
∫ t
0
e−ruσVudWu] =E[e−rt(Vt − L)+ +
∫ t
0
e−ruqVudu] +E[
C
r
(1 − e−rt)]
+E[e−rt(Vt − (Vt − L)+)1{τd>T }]
+E[e−rt(Vt − (Vt − L)+)1{τd≤T } − e−rtBCt] +E[e−rtBCt], (B.23)
where BCt = Et,v[BCτd e
−r(τd−t)1{τd≤T }]. The first expected value term on the right of (B.23) is the
present value of equity and the second term is the present value of the coupon leg. The second
line shows the expectation of the principal repayment under the circumstance that liquidation
does not happen before maturity while the first term on the third line represents the expectation
of principal repayment under the circumstance that liquidation happens before maturity. The
last term is the expectation of bankruptcy cost at liquidation. Since the expectation of Itoˆ
integral is zero, we have V0 = L0 + E0 + BC0. Therefore, we prove Vt = Lt + Et + BCt by no
arbitrage theory.
B.1.3 Proposition in Reasonable Conversion Terms
In the following we are going to prove the proposition in Section 2.3.2. For convenience we
restate the proposition here first and then prove it.
Proposition B.1.8 The condition βS < βCCB is satisfied if and only if cS < cCCB, where cS and
cCCB are the par yields of the senior bond and CCB respectively.
Proof The definitions of βCS , βS and βCCB are given by (2.31), (2.36) and (2.30), respectively.
Let βBS be the loss imposed to the unconverted part of the senior bond at conversion,
βBS = 1 −
S Bτc
(1 − fS )LS , (B.24)
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where S Bτc is the value of the unconverted part of the senior bond at conversion and is evaluated
by
S Bτc =
cS (1 − fS )LS
r
(
1 −Eτc,b∗L[e−r(τd−τc)]
)
+ RS (1 − fS )LSEτc,b∗L[e−r(τd−τc)]. (B.25)
Moreover, we have
βS = 1 − (1 − fS )(1 − βBS ) − fS (1 − βCS ). (B.26)
Denote u1 = E0,v[e−rτc] and u2 = Eτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)], then the par yields can be solved from the
following equation system (which omits the deposits)
LS =
cS (1 − fS )LS
r
(1 − u1u2) + RS (1 − fS )LS u1u2 + cS fS LSr (1 − u1) + ωS Eτcu1, (B.27)
LJ =
cCCBLJ
r
(1 − u1) + ωCCBEτcu1. (B.28)
We take out the ownership stakes (ωS and ωCCB) out of the expectation because they are deter-
mined by the conversion terms. Additionally, under a capital-ratio trigger, the residual value
right after conversion (Eτc) is determined and we can take it out of the expectation as well.
After some transformations to (B.25), we have
1 − βBτc −
cS
r
= −u2 cSr + RS u2. (B.29)
We normalize (B.27) and (B.28) by dividing them with the corresponding notional value and
substitute (B.26) and (B.29),
1 =
cS
r
(1 − u1) + (1 − βS )u1, (B.30)
1 =
cCCB
r
(1 − u1) + (1 − βCCB)u1. (B.31)
Subtracting (B.31) from (B.30) gives
(cS − cCCB)1 − u1r = (βS − βCCB)u1, (B.32)
which implies that βS < βCCB is satisfied if and only if cS < cCCB.
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B.2 Calibrations for Chapter 2
B.2.1 Capital Structure
Table B.1: Capital Structure of Big - 6 Canadian Banks (in millions)
Bank RBC CIBC BMO BNS TD NBC
Deposit 495, 875 244, 207 316, 067 460, 907 470, 002 93, 894
Senior (exclude Senior Unsecured) 204, 320 99, 293 153, 343 122, 450 224, 479 66, 825
Senior Unsecured1 49, 413 22, 417 22, 426 34, 487 21, 211 5, 095
Senior Tranche2(Approx BIDs) 253, 733 121, 710 175, 769 155, 220 245, 690 71, 920
Preferred Shares 4, 813 2, 006 2, 465 4, 384 3, 395 762
Subordinated Debt 7, 553 5, 112 5, 276 6, 896 11, 575 2, 461
Non-controlling Interests 1, 773 163 1, 441 1, 717 1, 485 1, 019
Junior Tranche (Approx CCBs) 14, 139 7, 281 9, 182 12, 997 16, 455 4, 242
Common Equity Tier 13(CET 1) 36, 624 14, 260 24, 485 30, 566 41, 039 6, 410
Total Assets 800, 371 387, 458 525, 503 659, 690 773, 186 176, 466
1 Since our capital structure is based on the balance sheet of the second quarter, the value of senior
unsecured debts is approximated by the bank’s senior unsecured debts which are still outstanding
after April 30, 2012. For those issued in foreign currencies, we translate the value back into Canadian
dollars using the exchange rate on the day of issuance.
2 We assume that the senior tranche is constituted of two parts, senior unsecured debt and the remaining
part prior to senior unsecured debt.
3 Since the preferred shares and non-controlling interests are categorized into the junior tranche, equity
here does not contain these two parts.
Table B.2: Capital Structure of Big-6 Canadian Banks by Proportion
Bank RBC CIBC BMO BNS TD NBC
Deposit/Total Assets 61.69% 63.03% 60.15% 69.87% 60.79% 53.21%
Total Senior Debt/Total Assets 31.70% 31.41% 33.45% 23.53% 31.78% 40.76%
Total Junior Debt/Total Assets 1.77% 1.88% 1.75% 1.97% 2.13% 2.40%
Equity/Total Assets 4.58% 3.68% 4.66% 4.63% 5.31% 3.63%
Table B.3: Suggested Conversion Proportion of Senior Bond
Bank RBC CIBC BMO BNS TD NBC
Senior Unsecured 49, 413 22, 417 22, 426 34, 487 21, 211 5, 095
Total Senior Debt 279, 764 121, 710 175, 769 156, 937 245, 690 71, 920
Conversion% of Senior 19.47% 18.42% 12.76% 22.22% 8.63% 7.08%
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Table B.4: Loss Absorbency Increase from Issuing Contingent Capital
Bank RBC CIBC BMO BNS TD NBC
Total Junior/CET1 38.61% 51.06% 37.50% 42.52% 40.10% 66.18%
Senior Unsecured/CET1 134.92% 157.20% 91.59% 112.83% 51.69% 79.49%
1 The mean and median for the loss absorbency increase (the first row) from the conversion
of CCB is 45.99% and 41.31%, respectively.
2 The mean and median for the loss absorbency increase (the second row) from the conver-
sion of unsecured senior bond is 104.62% and 102.21%, respectively.
B.2.2 Dividend Payout Ratio
Table B.5: Dividends Payout Ratio
Bank RBC CIBC BMO BNS TD NBC
Average 0.3718% 0.3196% 0.3387% 0.3823% 0.3262% 0.2876%
Median 0.3902% 0.3161% 0.3574% 0.3969% 0.3473% 0.2863%
Std 0.0433% 0.0635% 0.0491% 0.0456% 0.0471% 0.0167%
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Diffusion Terms for Liabilities in the Capital Structure
Considering the asset value process (3.5) before conversion, in the perpetual case, the evalu-
ation for each liability in the capital structure is stated by (2.27), (2.28) and (2.29) with the
expectations of the discount factor Et,v[e−r(τc−t)] given by (2.24). Ignoring all the constant pa-
rameters, let U(v) = u(v¯) = Et,v[e−r(τc−t)] for simplification1. According to Metzler [2], it is the
solution of
σ2v2
2
U′(v) + ((r − q)v − (cDLD + cS LS + cCCBLJ))U′(v) − rU(v) = 0, v ∈ [b∗L,+∞], (C.1)
subject to the boundary condition U(b∗L) = 1 and limv→+∞U(v) = 0. The CCB value at time t
is
CCBt =
cCCBLJ
r
+ (ωCCBEτc −
cCCBLJ
r
)U(v), t < τc. (C.2)
By Itoˆ’s Lemma, we have
dCCBt = (ωCCBEτc−
cCCBLJ
r
)(((r−q)VtU′−(cDLD+cS LS +cCCBLJ)U′+12σ
2V2t U
′′)dt+σVtU′dWt).
(C.3)
By (C.1), we rewrite (C.3) as
dCCBt = (ωCCBEτc −
cCCBLJ
r
)(rUdt + σVtU′dWt). (C.4)
As a result, the diffusion term for the CCB is
σCCB(Vt) = (ωCCBEτc −
cCCBLJ
r
)σVtU′(Vt). (C.5)
Similarly, we can derive the diffusion term for deposits (σD(Vt)) and senior bond (σS (Vt)) in
the capital structure are
σD(Vt) =
(
max{0,min{D,RDLD}} − cDLDr
)
σVtEτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)]U′(Vt), t < τc (C.6)
1As a remainder, v¯ is the asset-liability ratio while v is the asset value at time t.
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and
σS (Vt) =
(
max{0,min{D − RDLD,RS LS }} − cS LSr
)
σVtEτc,b∗L[e
−r(τd−τc)]U′(Vt), t < τc
(C.7)
respectively.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2
We continue using the notations from Section B.1.1 in Appendix B. Instead of considering only
one barrier, here we extend our discussion to a framework with two constant barriers 0 < a < b
where both a and b are entrance boundaries for Xt in the sense of Karlin and Taylor [1]. We
assume the starting point of the diffusion process X0 = x ∈ (a, b). The hitting times are defined
as
τa = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ a}, (C.8)
τb = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b}. (C.9)
Now we consider a process {X∗t , t ≥ 0} which is prescribed to be a process confined to the
sample paths which hit the lower barrier a prior to the upper barrier b. Accordingly, X∗t exhibits
only a part of the original sample path space since it is conditioned on the restriction of hitting
the lower barrier prior to the upper barrier. We shall refer X∗t as the associated conditioned
diffusion process to Xt. Moreover, X∗t is a Markov process since Xt is, and past history beyond
the current state cannot affect where absorption occurs.
According to Karlin and Taylor [1], we can still use the infinitesimal displacement proper-
ties and derive relevant differential equations to solve for certain functions. However, due to
the conditioning, there are two changes. The first one is in the infinitesimal displacement prop-
erties. Here we directly present the infinitesimal displacement properties for the conditional
diffusion process and more details can be found in Karlin and Taylor [1]. Conditioning on the
diffusion process hitting the lower barrier first,
µ∗(x) = µ(x) − s(x)
S (x)
σ2(x), (C.10)
with s(η) = exp
{
− ∫ b
η
2µ(ξ)
σ2(ξ)dξ
}
and S (x) =
∫ b
x
s(η)dη. Intuitively, since the process X∗t hits the
lower barrier a first, as x → b, the denominator in the fraction of (C.10) approaches to zero
and the drift µ∗(x) moves towards negative infinity. As a result, the process X∗t moves down
towards the lower barrier a very rapidly to avoid hitting the upper barrier b which is a conflict
to the condition τa < τb. As for the diffusion term, we have
σ∗(x) = σ(x). (C.11)
Since the derivation of the differential equation depends on a Taylor expansion and the in-
finitesimal displacement properties, in the following, we present the differential equations for
the general diffusion process Xt based on which we can then move on to the differential equa-
tions for the conditioned diffusion process X∗t by replacing µ(x) with µ
∗(x) and σ(x) with σ∗(x)
in the differential equations associated with Xt.
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Lemma C.2.1 (Karlin and Taylor [1, Page 204]) Let
P(x) = E0,x
[
exp
{
−
∫ τa∧τb
0
g(Xt)dt
}]
, (C.12)
and
Q(x) = E0,x
[
exp
{
−
∫ τa∧τb
0
g(Xt)dt
}∫ τa∧τb
0
f (Xt)dt
]
, (C.13)
then Q(x) is the solution of the following differential equation
1
2
σ2(x)Q′′(x) + µ(x)Q′(x) − g(x)Q(x) + f (x)P(x) = 0, a ≤ x ≤ b. (C.14)
Replacing µ(x) with µ∗(x), σ(x) with σ∗(x) and let g(x) = α and f (x) = α in Lemma C.1.1,
we get the differential equations in Theorem 3.3.2 for x ∈ (a, b). For the process X∗t , we define
the hitting times to a and b as τ∗a and τ
∗
b respectively.
The other change lies in the boundary condition (i.e. x → a and x → b). Obviously for
v(x) = E0,x[ατ∗ae
−ατ∗a |τ∗a < τ∗b] and w(x) = E0,x[e−ατ
∗
a |τ∗a < τ∗b], we have the boundary condition
v(a) = 0 and w(a) = 1. However, the boundary condition at the upper barrier b does not exist
because the upper barrier is unattainable due to the conditioning. One possible resolution to
approximate v(x) and w(x) with x ∈ (a, b) is to solve the differential equations on the interval
(a, b(1 − )) where  > 0 is arbitrarily small instead. Since the barrier b(1 − ) is attainable for
the conditioned diffusion process, we have v(b(1− )) = 0 and w(b(1− )) = 1. The rationality
is that according to (C.10), when the diffusion process is very close to the upper barrier b such
as at b(1 − ), the drift term µ∗(x) becomes very negative forcing the diffusion process to move
downwards to the lower barrier a very rapidly. Under this circumstance, the time of hitting
the lower barrier is so small that we have v(b(1 − )) = 0 and w(b(1 − )) = 1. Let v(x) and
w(x) be the solutions of the differential equations on the interval (a, b(1 − )). As  decreases
(i.e. the interval (a, b(1 − )) approaches to (a, b)), the solutions v(x) and w(x) converge to
v(x) and w(x) respectively except at the points close to the upper barrier b. Therefore, for the
solutions at a particular point, saying x˜, as we decrease the value of , if the solution v(x˜)
and w(x˜) do not change significantly, we can use them to approximate the solution v(x˜) and
w(x˜) respectively. The following two figures show the solutions v(x) and w(x) under different
upper barriers (i.e. different ’s) which are close to b.
According to the numerical results, we can see  = 10−6 would provide good approxima-
tions to the solutions of the differential equations at the points we are interested in, such as at
x = 5.5%, 8.0% and 10.5% CET1 ratio.
C.3 Discussion Related to the Parameter T ∗
In this section firstly we present our numerical experiments of choosing T ∗ to estimate the
numerical integral (3.26). Then we present the way to correct the bias in estimating the return
from conversion using Monte Carlo simulation.
Recall that we aim to find a T ∗ such that the value of the survivor function Fˆτs/o,v(t) at T
∗
approximately zero. Define the function
H(T ∗) =
Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗)
Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞)
= 1 − Fτs/o,v(T
∗)
Fτs/o,v(0)
= 1 − Fˆτs/o,v(T ∗). (C.15)
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Figure C.1: Solutions v(x) and w(x) on the interval (a, b(1 − )) with different ’s. The
parameters of the differential equations are from Table 2.2 except the asset value growth rate
µ = 8.0%. The lower barrier a corresponds to the conversion barrier and the upper barrier b
corresponds to the minimum value of the upper moving barrier.
Therefore, the condition Fˆτs/o,v(T
∗) ≈ 0 is equivalent to the condition Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗) ≈
Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞) or H(T ∗) ≈ 1. Figure C.2 illustrate the residual value 1 − H(T ∗) versus
different maturity T ∗’s. According to our analysis, the closer the residual value 1 − H(T ∗) is
to zero, the better our choice of T ∗ would be. At T ∗ = 8, the residual value is 6.23 × 10−8,
5.72× 10−7 and 1.43× 10−6 if short-selling starts at 5.5%, 8.0% and 10.5% CET1 ratio respec-
tively. Even if the short-selling starts at 30.0% CET 1 ratio, and the corresponding residual
value is approximately 4.13 × 10−5. Therefore, we consider T ∗ = 8 as a reasonable choice for
the maturity in our simulation.
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Figure C.2: The choice of the maturity T ∗ in simulation. The x-axis is the maturity T ∗. The
y-axis is the value for 1 − H(T ∗).
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C.4 Bias Correction for Simulation
Now we move on to the bias correction to our simulation results. If conversion never happens
(Tc = +∞) then Rc is zero. Therefore, we only need to consider two cases in estimating the
expectation of the return from conversion: one is Tc ≤ T ∗ and the other is T ∗ < Tc < +∞. By
the law of total expectation,
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] = E˜τs/o,v[Rc|Tc ≤ T ∗]Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗) + E˜τs/o,v[Rc|Tc > T ∗]Pτs/o,v(T ∗ < Tc < +∞).
(C.16)
According to our previous discussion, we choose a T ∗ such that Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗) ≈ Pτs/o,v(Tc <
+∞). Therefore, the second term in (C.16) is very close to zero since the condition Tc > T ∗ is
approximately equivalent to Tc = +∞. Thus,
E˜τs/o,v[Rc] ≈ E˜τs/o,v[Rc|Tc ≤ T ∗]Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗). (C.17)
The expectation term in (C.17) is estimated from simulation based on paths all of which hit the
conversion level before or at T ∗. Therefore, to obtain an unbiased estimation for the expected
return from conversion, we have to multiply the expectation term in (C.17) with the probability
Pτs/o,v(Tc ≤ T ∗). Based on our criteria of choosing T ∗, the probability can be replaced with
Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞) which can be solved analytically. Let z(β) = E˜τs/o,v[e−βTc] and by the law of
total expectation,
z(β) = E˜τs/o,v[e
−βTc |Tc < +∞]Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞) + E˜τs/o,v[e−βTc |Tc = +∞]Pτs/o,v(Tc = +∞),
(C.18)
= E˜τs/o,v[e
−βTc |Tc < +∞]Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞), (C.19)
where (C.19) holds because the second term in (C.18) approaches to zero in the infinite case
(Tc → +∞). Taking β = 0 at both sides of (C.19) gives
z(0) = Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞). (C.20)
Given a fixed parameter β, z(β) can be solved analytically according to Metzler [2]. Hence, we
can solve for z(0) = Pτs/o,v(Tc < +∞) analytically as well.
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Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 4
In this appendix, we consider the asset value diffusion process (4.1). The liquidation time τd is
defined as the first-passage time to the liquidation level by (4.14) and the conversion time ξ is
defined by (4.5). The expectation term Ex[·] represents the expectation under the risk-neutral
measure with the diffusion process currently located at x. For each theorem, we restate the
theorem first and then provide the proof for the reader’s convenience.
According to the definition of the liquidation time τd, for an arbitrarily small time elapse
h > 0, we haveQx(τd < h) = o(h).
D.1 Theorems and Proofs
Lemma D.1.1 For a small time elapse h > 0,
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤h}] = k(x)h + o(h). (D.1)
Proof By (4.7), the density function of the conversion time ξ conditioning on the asset value
trajectory up to time t is
fx(t) = k(Vt)exp
{
−
∫ t
o
k(Vs)ds
}
. (D.2)
For a sufficiently small h, use the rectangle method to approximate the integral,
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤h}] =
∫ +∞
0
e−αs1{s≤h} fx(s)ds,
=
∫ h
0
e−αsk(Vs)exp
{
−
∫ s
o
k(Vu)du
}
ds,
≈ k(x)h + o(h).
According to Karlin and Taylor [1], under the asset value process (4.1), where all the pa-
rameters such as the interest rate, dividend payout ratio and the coupon payments in the drift
term are constant, the infinitesimal displacement ∆hVt from time t to t + h conditioning on
Vt = x have the following properties:
lim
h→0
Ex[∆hVt|Ft]
h
= µ(x,Ci), i = 0, 1, (D.3)
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and
lim
h→0
Ex[(∆hVt)2 |Ft]
h
= σ2(x). (D.4)
Theorem D.1.2 Let U(x) = Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}]. Then U(x) is the solution of the following second-
order ordinary differential equation
GU(x) − (k(x) + α)U(x) + k(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (D.5)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx .
Proof Firstly, choosing an arbitrarily small time elapse h > 0, we rewrite U(x) into two parts
U(x) = Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ≤h}] +Ex[e
−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ>h}]. (D.6)
For the first term in (D.6),
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ≤h}] = Ex[e
−αξ1{ξ≤h}|τd ≥ h]Qx(τd ≥ h) +Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}|τd < h]Qx(τd < h)
= Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤h}|τd ≥ h]Qx(τd ≥ h) + o(h)
= Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤h}] + o(h). (D.7)
The last equation holds because the time elapse h > 0 is chosen to be arbitrarily small. As long
as the starting point x of the diffusion process is above the liquidation barrier, the condition
τd ≥ h is satisfied automatically. By Lemma D.1.1 and (D.7), we have
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ≤h}] = k(x)h + o(h). (D.8)
For the second term in (D.6), define the infinitesimal displacement Vh = x + ∆hV and the
σ-algebra generated by the σ-algebra Fh and the indicator 1{ξ>h} as σ(Fh,1{ξ>h}). By iterated
conditioning and (4.7) and using Taylor expansion, we have
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ>h}] = Ex
[
Ex[e−αξ1{ξ≤τd}1{ξ>h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ>h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}Ex[e−α(ξ−h)1{ξ≤τd}|σ(Fh,1{ξ>h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}EVh[e
−α(ξ−h)1{ξ−h≤τd−h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ−h>0})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}U(Vh)
]
= e−αhEx
[
Ex[1{ξ>h}U(Vh)|Fh]
]
= e−αhEx
[
U(Vh)Ex[1{ξ>h}|Fh]
]
= e−αhEx
[
U(Vh)exp
{
−
∫ h
0
k(Vs)ds
}]
= e−αhEx [U(Vh)(1 − k(x)h + o(h))]
= e−αh(1 − k(x)h + o(h))Ex [U(Vh)]
= e−αh(1 − k(x)h + o(h))Ex[U(x) + U′(x)∆hV + 12U
′′(x)(∆hV)2 + o(∆hV)]
= e−αh(1 − k(x)h + o(h))
(
U(x) + U′(x)Ex[∆hV] +
1
2
U′′(x)Ex[(∆hV)2]
)
= (1 − αh + o(h))(1 − k(x)h + o(h))(U(x) + hGU(x) + o(h))
= U(x) + h (GU(x) − αU(x) − k(x)U(x)) + o(h). (D.9)
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We obtain the third line according to the strong Markov property by thinking of the diffusion
process starting from the place at time h and the part before the time h becomes irrelevant. Let
ξ1 = ξ − h measure the time elapse between the conversion time and time h and τd1 = τd − h
measure the time elapse between the liquidation time τd and time h, then
EVh[e
−α(ξ−h)1{ξ−h≤τd−h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ−h>0})] = EVh[e−αξ11{ξ1≤τd1}|Vh,1{ξ1>0}] = EVh[e−αξ11{ξ1≤τd1}] = U(Vh)
giving us the equation on the forth line. In the second-last line of (D.9), we use the results of
the infinitesimal displacements (D.3) and (D.4). Combining (D.8) and (D.9), we have
U(x) = k(x)h + o(h) + U(x) + h (GU(x) − αU(x) − k(x)U(x)) , (D.10)
which verifies that U(x) is the solution of (4.18).
Theorem D.1.3 Let Z(x) = Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}]. Then Z(x) is the solution of the following second-
order ordinary differential equation
GZ(x) − k(x)Z(x) − αZ(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (D.11)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx .
Proof Taking a small time elapse h > 0, we decompose Z(x) into two parts,
Z(x) = Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}1{ξ≤h}] +Ex[e
−ατd1{τd<ξ}1{ξ>h}]. (D.12)
By the fact thatQx(τd < h) = o(h) and the law of total expectation,
Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}1{ξ≤h}] = Ex[e
−ατd |τd < ξ ≤ h]Qx(τd < ξ ≤ h) = o(h). (D.13)
For the second term in (D.12), define Vh = x + ∆hV and the σ-algebra generated by the σ-
algebra Fh and the indicator 1{ξ>h} as σ(Fh,1{ξ>h}). Using iterated conditioning, take out what
is known, by (4.7) and a Taylor expansion,
Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}1{ξ>h}] = Ex
[
Ex[e−ατd1{τd<ξ}1{ξ>h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ>h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}EVh[e
−α(τd−h)1{τd−h<ξ−h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ−h>0})]
]
= e−αhEx
[
1{ξ>h}Z(Vh)
]
= e−αhEx
[
Ex[1{ξ>h}Z(Vh)|Fh]
]
= e−αhEx
[
Z(Vh)Ex[1{ξ>h}|Fh]
]
= e−αhEx
[
Z(Vh)Qx(ξ > h|Fh)]
= e−αhEx
[
Z(Vh)exp
{
−
∫ h
0
k(Vs)ds
}]
= e−αhEx [Z(Vh) (1 − k(x)h + o(h))]
= e−αh (1 − k(x)h + o(h))Ex [Z(Vh)]
= e−αh (1 − k(x)h + o(h))Ex[Z(x) + Z′(x)∆hV + 12Z
′′(x)(∆hV)2 + o(∆hV)]
= (1 − αh + o(h))(1 − k(x)h + o(h))(Z(x) + hGZ(x) + o(h))
= Z(x) + h (GZ(x) − (α + k(x)Z(x))) + o(h), (D.14)
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where the second line holds by the strong Markov property and thinking of a diffusion process
starting at the place at time h. Let ξ1 = ξ − h measure the time elapse between the conversion
time and the time h and τd1 = τd − h measure the time elapse between the liquidation time τd
and the time h, then
EVh[e
−α(τd−h)1{τd−h<ξ−h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ−h>0})] = EVh[e−ατd11{τd1<ξ1}|Vh,1{ξ1>0}] = EVh[e−ατd11{τd1<ξ1}] = Z(Vh)
giving us the equation on the third line. The last but second line holds according to the results
of the infinitesimal displacements (D.3) and (D.4). Combing (D.13) and (D.14),
Z(x) = o(h) + Z(x) + h (GZ(x) − (α + k(x)Z(x))) , (D.15)
which proves that Z(x) is the solution of (D.11).
Theorem D.1.4 Let W(x) = Ex[e−ατd ]. Then W(x) solves the following second-order ordinary
differential equation
GW(x) − (k(x) + α)W(x) + k(x)W1(x) = 0, x > DEF0, (D.16)
where the operator G = 12σ2(x) d
2
dx2 + µ(x,C0)
d
dx and W1(x) = Ex[e
−ατd ], which is calculated
based on the post-conversion diffusion process, i.e., the fixed coupon payment for the diffusion
process is C1.
Proof Taking a small time elapse h > 0, we start from separating W(x) into two parts,
W(x) = Ex[e−ατd1{ξ≤h}] +Ex[e−ατd1{ξ>h}]. (D.17)
For the first term in (D.17), define Vh = x + ∆hV and the σ-algebra generated by the σ-
algebra Fh and the indicator 1{ξ≤h} as σ(Fh,1{ξ≤h}). Let W1(x) be the Laplace transform of the
post-conversion liquidation time τd with the current firm value located at x. Using iterated
conditioning, take out what is known, by (4.7) and a Taylor expansion,
Ex[e−ατd1{ξ≤h}] = Ex
[
Ex[e−ατd1{ξ≤h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ≤h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ≤h}EVh[e
−α(τd−h)|σ(Fh,1{ξ≤h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ≤h}W1(Vh)
]
= Ex
[
Ex[e−αh1{ξ≤h}W1(Vh)|Fh]
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW1(Vh)Ex[1{ξ≤h}|Fh]
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW1(Vh)Qx(ξ ≤ h|Fh)
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW1(Vh)(1 − exp
{
−
∫ h
o
k(Vs)ds
}
)
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW1(Vh)(k(x)h + o(h))
]
= (1 − αh + o(h))(k(x)h + o(h))Ex [W1(Vh)]
= (k(x)h + o(h))Ex[W1(x) + W ′1(x)∆hV +
1
2
W ′′1 (x)(∆hV)
2 + o(∆hV)]
= (k(x)h + o(h)) (W1(x) + hGW1(x) + o(h))
= k(x)W1(x)h + o(h). (D.18)
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In the second line of (D.18), the conditional expectation implies conversion happens before
time h, leading to the third line with the function W1(Vh) representing the Laplace transform
of the time elapse τd − h. By the strong Markov property, the expectation only depends on
the asset value at the time h so the function W1 only depends on the asset value Vh. The last
but second line in (D.18) holds due to the infinitesimal displacement results (D.3) and (D.4).
Applying similar techniques to the second term in (D.17)
Ex[e−ατd1{ξ>h}] = Ex
[
Ex[e−α(τd−h)e−αh1{ξ>h}|σ(Fh,1{ξ>h})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}EVh[e
−α(τd−h)|σ(Fh,1{ξ−h>0})]
]
= Ex
[
e−αh1{ξ>h}W(Vh)
]
= Ex
[
Ex[e−αh1{ξ>h}W(Vh)|Fh]
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW(Vh)Ex[1{ξ>h}|Fh]
]
= Ex
[
e−αhW(Vh)Qx(ξ > h|Fh)
]
= e−αhEx [W(Vh)(1 − k(x)h + o(h))]
= e−αh (1 − k(x)h + o(h))Ex
[
W(x) + W ′(x)∆hV + W ′′(x)(∆hV)2
]
= e−αh(1 − k(x)h + o(h))(W(x) +Ex[∆hV]W ′(x) +Ex[(∆hV)2]W ′′(x)). (D.19)
We need to deal with the term Ex[∆hV] in the last line of (D.19) carefully because it depends
on the coupon payment pattern1. Rewrite
Ex[∆hV] = Ex[∆hV1{ξ≤h}] +Ex[∆hV1{ξ>h}]. (D.20)
For the first term in (D.20), by the law of total expectation and (4.8)
Ex[∆hV1{ξ≤h}] = Ex[∆hV1{ξ≤h}|ξ ≤ h]Qx(ξ ≤ h) +Ex[∆hV1{ξ≤h}|ξ > h]Qx(ξ > h)
= Ex[∆hV1{ξ≤h}|ξ ≤ h]Qx(ξ ≤ h)
= Ex[∆hV |ξ ≤ h](k(x)h + o(h))
= hµ(x,C1)(k(x)h + o(h)),
= o(h). (D.21)
The second-last line in (D.21) holds because we assume that h is sufficiently small so if con-
version happens before h, it is equivalent to happening at the very beginning, then the coupon
payment pattern is C1. Similarly, for the second term
Ex[∆hV1{ξ>h}] = Ex[∆hV1{ξ>h}|ξ ≤ h]Qx(ξ ≤ h) +Ex[∆hV1{ξ>h}|ξ > h]Qx(ξ > h)
= Ex[∆hV1{ξ>h}|ξ > h]Qx(ξ > h)
= Ex[∆hV |ξ > h]Qx(ξ > h)
= hµ(x,C0)(1 − k(x)h + o(h)),
= hµ(x,C0) + o(h). (D.22)
1In Theorem D.1.2 and Theorem D.1.3, we only consider the diffusion process prior to conversion, so we take
the coupon payment pattern C0 by default. Here, if conversion happens before liquidation is unknown, so we need
to discuss two possibilities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 119
We use the coupon payment pattern C0 in (D.22) since the expectation conditions on ξ > h
implying that conversion happens after h. By (D.22) and (D.21),
Ex[∆hV] = µ(x,C0)h + o(h). (D.23)
Now we go back to continue with (D.19),
Ex[e−αTde f1{ξ>h}] = (1 − (α + k(x))h + o(h))
(
W(x) +Ex[∆hV]W ′(x) +Ex[(∆hV)2]W ′′(x)
)
,
= (1 − (α + k(x))h + o(h)) (W(x) + hGW(x) + o(h)),
= W(x) + h(GW(x) − (α + k(x))W(x)) + o(h). (D.24)
Finally, combining (D.24) and (D.18), we prove that W(x) is the solution of the ordinary dif-
ferential equation (D.16).
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Appendix E
Glossary
Bail-In A bail-in forces the financial institution’s creditors to bear some of the bur-
den by having part of the debt they are owed written off1.
Bail-Out A bail-out is when outside investors (such as taxpayers) rescue a financial
institution by injecting money to help service a debt.
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy is a legal status of a person or other entity that cannot repay the
debts it owes to creditors.
Basel III Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, to strengthen the regulation, supervi-
sion and risk management of the banking sector2.
Bond A bond is a debt investment in which an investor loans money to an entity
(typically corporate or governmental) which borrows the funds for a defined
period of time at a variable or fixed interest rate.
Capital Financial assets or the financial value of assets, such as cash.
Capital Structure In finance, capital structure is the way a corporation finances its assets
through some combination of equity, debt, or hybrid securities.
Contingent Capital Bond A contingent capital bond (CCB) is a subordinated security, such
as preferred share or subordinated debenture, that converts to common eq-
uity in financial distress.
Convertible Bond A convertible bond can be converted into a certain amount of the com-
pany’s equity at certain times during its life, at the discretion of the bond-
holder.
Coupon A coupon payment on a bond is a periodic interest payment that the bond-
holder receives during the time between when the bond is issued and when
it matures.
1http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-2
2http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
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Default Risk The event in which companies or individuals will be unable to make the
required payments on their debt obligations.
Dividend A dividend is a distribution of a portion of a company’s earnings, decided
by the board of directors, to a class of its shareholders. Dividends can be
issued as cash payments, as shares of stock, or other property.
Equity Equity is the value of an asset less the value of all liabilities on that asset.
Market Discipline Market discipline is a market-based promotion of the transparency and dis-
closure if the risks associated with a business or entity. It works in concert
with regulatory systems to increase the safety and soundness of the market.
Moral Hazard It is a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing
that it is protected against the risk. For example, a manager of a big finan-
cial institution might take excessive risk knowing that the government will
support the financial institution if it is in trouble.
Notional Value The notional value on a financial instrument is the nominal or face amount
that is used to calculate payments made on that instrument.
Par Yield Par yield is the coupon rate for which the price of a bond is equal to its
notional value (or par value).
Risk-Free Rate The rate of interest that can be earned without assuming any risk.
Risk Neutral Valuation The valuation of a derivative assuming the world is risk neutral. Risk
neutral valuation gives the correct price for a derivative in all worlds, not
just in a risk-neutral world.
Risk-Weighted Asset Risk-weighted asset (RWA) is a financial institution’s assets weighted
according to risk. Each asset is assigned a risk weight reflecting its credit
risk.
Short-Selling Short-selling is the sale of a security that is not owned by the seller, or
that seller has borrowed. This behaviour is motivated by the belief that a
security’s price will decline in the future, enabling it to be bought back at a
lower price to make a profit.
Too-Big-To-Fail It refers to the situation that certain financial institutions are so large and so
comprehensive that their failure would be disastrous to the greater economies
system, and that they therefore must be supported by government when they
face potential failure.
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